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ABSTRACT 
 
 In recent years, the beef industry has been forced to examine improving 
supply chain coordination in order to respond to the declining consumer demand for 
beef.  Exploring the different supply chain structures being used by beef industry 
participants to improve coordination and provide consumers with differentiated beef 
products is important.  The problem is that it is not clear how the different attributes 
often included in branded beef programs affect transaction costs and result in the 
formation of particular supply chain structures.     
 This thesis examines what makes a successful supply chain alliance in the 
beef industry.  Essentially, this study examines the sustainability and effectiveness 
of different alliance types and their ability to coordinate various branded beef 
programs and the product attributes included under these programs. A predictive 
transaction cost model is developed, which examines how different product 
attributes result in the emergence of particular transaction characteristics.  The 
model shows how the structure of the supply chain adapts in order to minimize the 
associated transaction costs.     
In order to better understand the relative importance of different transaction 
characteristics to supply chain participants, a two-part empirical study was 
conducted.  In the first portion of the study the relative importance of key transaction 
characteristics to cow-calf operators was examined through the use of conjoint 
analysis.  The results from the conjoint analysis indicate that certain transaction 
characteristics, namely asset specific investments, limit the willingness of cow-calf 
operators to participate in alliances due to the associated transaction costs.  Cow-calf 
operators placed an emphasis on premiums, which shows that while they are willing 
to make trade-offs and accept increased costs, associated with asset specific 
investments and price uncertainty, they are only willing to do this when benefits are 
greater than costs.         
To further understand the importance of different transaction characteristics 
to supply chain participants, key managers and directors of different beef alliances 
throughout Canada and the United States were interviewed.  Based on the interviews 
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it appears that alliances have typically limited the level of asset specific investments 
required.  Consequently, the degree of coordination is not affected to, any great 
extent, by the level of investments required.  Instead, the degree of coordination 
appears to more a result of how an alliance is aligned with a particular brand name 
label.  It appears that greater coordination occurs when an alliance owns a brand 
name label or is an exclusive supplier to a brand name label, as there is a higher risk 
of opportunistic behaviour and, as a result, higher transaction costs.   The use of 
grid-based pricing systems and the number of buyers/sellers in the market did not 
appear to have a significant affect on the method of coordination chosen.   
 Based on the results obtained from both the cow-calf operator conjoint-based 
analysis and interviews with alliance members this thesis identifies several critical 
success factors and challenges to improving coordination in the beef industry.  Most 
significantly, when developing alliances it is necessary to understand the importance 
of different transaction characteristics to supply chain participants.  This research 
demonstrates that supply chain participants in the beef industry are willing to make 
trade-offs between the benefits received from improved coordination and the 
transaction costs that arise, as long as the benefits exceeds the increase in costs.   
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1 INTRODUCTION 
1.1 Background 
Over the past decade substantial changes have taken place in the beef industry 
as increased consolidation and coordination among supply chain participants has 
occurred.  These changes are a result, in part, of twenty years of declining demand 
that plagued the beef industry during the 1980s and 1990s.  During this period 
consumers’ attitudes regarding the foods they consumed started to change.  
Consumers are caught up in fast paced busy lifestyles and, as a result, demand more 
convenient high-quality food products to better suit their needs.  They have begun to 
pay more attention to cholesterol levels, fat content, production practices, and health 
concerns.  At the same time as consumers’ attitudes have changed, the beef products 
being offered have not evolved to meet consumers’ demands.   
The divergence between what consumers want in beef products and what 
they are being provided with at the retail level has continued to grow over the last 
two decades.  This has forced the beef industry into making changes to recapture the 
market share that it has lost to pork and poultry.  Most recently, industry members 
have begun to focus on the production of differentiated beef products and ‘branded 
beef’ in an effort to better meet consumer demands for products with particular 
attributes and increase the consumption of beef.  Many industry members feel that 
the transformation occurring within the beef industry is a move in the right direction, 
as brands are signals to consumers of the consistency and quality of a product.         
 Even though the industry has recognized that branded, differentiated beef 
products are a method to stabilize and possibly increase beef demand, the North 
American beef industry has been slow to move in this direction due, in part, to the 
substantial reorganization of the supply chain that would be required.  Currently, the 
supply chain in the beef industry is set up to handle commodity production.  This is 
an efficient way of organizing production and distribution, as it allows for the 
inexpensive production and bulk transfer of very large quantities of meat.  This 
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system is not suitable for the production of differentiated products, as the 
commingling that occurs with bulk handling means that demand signals for specific 
attributes cannot easily be sent from consumers to producers.   
Slowly, commodity production systems and spot market transactions are 
disappearing and being replaced with increased degrees of supply coordination.  
Improved supply coordination through the use of contracts, informal alliances, 
formal alliances, or vertical integration reduces vertical segmentation in the 
production and marketing channel for beef by linking industry stages more closely 
together aligning incentives.  Increased information sharing allows alliance 
participants to respond more quickly and correctly to consumer demands.  Improved 
supply coordination can also minimize the added costs that arise from the production 
and segregation of differentiated products.  At the same time, there are also costs 
associated with increasing supply coordination.  As the industry moves away from 
operating in competitive spot markets towards more oligopsonistic/monopsonistic 
relationships with increased market power, search costs and negotiation costs are 
expected to increase due to a small numbers bargaining problem.  Consequently, 
industry participants are faced with the challenge of restructuring the beef supply 
chain so that the benefits resulting from increased coordination are greater than the 
costs. 
 
1.2 Problem Statement 
Current programs to supply differentiated beef products have been initiated 
and are managed by several different supply chain participants.  The methods used 
to coordinate the different segments in the beef industry vary widely and include the 
use of marketing and production contracts, brand licensing organizations, marketing 
alliances, and new generation producer cooperatives.  The objective of all of these 
arrangements is similar in that they are used by different supply chain participants in 
an attempt to operate in niche markets where premium prices exist.  Premium prices 
may result from consumer willingness to pay for differentiated products tailored to 
meet consumer preferences.  The different methods of vertical coordination vary in 
the premiums they create, the associated costs of coordination, and the allocation of 
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net returns between different supply chain participants.  The problem is that it is not 
clear how the different attributes that are included in branded beef programs affect 
transaction costs and result in the formation of particular supply chain structures. 
 
1.3 Objectives 
 The primary objective of this study is to identify what makes a successful 
supply chain alliance.  Essentially, this study will examine the sustainability and 
effectiveness of different alliance types and their ability to coordinate various 
branded beef programs and the attributes included under these programs.  Several 
more specific research objectives are identified that will assist in accomplishing the 
primary objective.   
 The specific research objectives of the study are to:   
I. Identify the critical number and types of coordinated links in the beef 
supply chain that are required to brand different beef products, 
focusing specifically on the attributes being guaranteed by various 
programs.  Identifying how these links impact transaction costs and 
subsequently the structure of the supply chain is also of interest. 
II. Select and apply an appropriate technique for evaluating the types of 
transactions costs arising along the supply chain.  Investigate how 
key transaction costs influence the decision of a supply chain member 
participation in different types of supply chains.     
III. Based on lessons from existing supply chain alliances, provide 
recommendations on how to overcome any challenges in improving 
coordination both at an individual supply chain and industry-wide 
level.  In addition, the opportunities for the development of different 
alliance structures in the future are evaluated. 
 
1.4 Hypothesis 
In order to improve consumer demand, the production of consumer responsive 
differentiated beef products is necessary.  In turn, improved coordination is a 
prerequisite for the production of differentiated beef products, as it facilitates the 
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increased transfer of information along the supply chain regarding what is demanded 
and what is being produced.  Improving coordination involves providing different 
beef industry participants with an incentive to become involved in alternative supply 
chain structures.       
It is proposed that participants in the beef industry will be willing to 
participate in a particular supply chain structure only if the value received from 
participating more than offsets the increase in operation and transaction costs.  The 
transaction costs incurred by participants in the supply chain will be dependent on 
both the types of attributes being provided to consumers and the level of consistency 
that is to be guaranteed.  As such, the hypothesis of this thesis is that different 
attributes and levels of consistency will result in the emergence of different 
transaction characteristics that will in turn affect transaction costs.  Studying the 
relative importance of these different transaction characteristics will make it possible 
to identify the relationship between the types of beef products produced and the 
optimal supply chain structure that coordinates their production, while minimizing 
the associated transaction costs. 
 
1.5 Thesis Organization 
 Following the introduction, the thesis is divided into seven chapters.  The 
second chapter provides an overview of the North American beef industry and the 
demand for beef.  In addition, the relationship between consumers and branded beef 
programs is discussed and branded beef case studies are provided to describe in 
more detail the types of branded beef programs that currently exist.  The third 
chapter discusses transaction costs and the main assumptions underlying transaction 
cost theory, as Transaction Cost Economics forms the theoretical basis for the thesis.  
Chapter three then provides a brief overview of supply chain coordination in the 
beef industry and how supply chain coordination issues can be examined from a 
transaction cost perspective.  Chapter Four outlines (1) the predictive transaction 
cost model developed and (2) the relationship between the transaction costs 
associated with different branded beef attributes and the coordination of supply 
chains.  Chapter Five describes the methodology behind the testing of the null 
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hypothesis derived from the predictive transaction cost model.  It also describes the 
design of the survey questions used to collect the data needed to test the propositions 
put forth and presents the results and analysis of a survey of cow-calf operators.  
Chapter Six deepens the analysis by examining the key points drawn from 
interviews with different alliance programs in both Canada and the United States.  
Chapter Seven discusses the conclusions and implications of this study. 
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2 INDUSTRY BACKGROUND 
2.1 Introduction 
The purpose of this chapter is to provide a brief background to the North 
American beef industry and the current demand for beef.  This chapter also 
examines the reasons behind the current transformation within the beef industry and 
its move away from the production of commodity-oriented products, focusing 
specifically on the reasons behind the emergence of branded beef programs.  
Branded beef programs and improved coordination in the industry are discussed 
both generally and through the use of case studies of different programs. 
 
2.2 North American Beef Industry 
 In 2002 there was approximately 198 million metric tons of meat produced 
worldwide.  Of the total meat produced, 42 percent was pork, 25 percent was beef, 
25 percent was chicken, 5 percent was sheep and goat meat, and 3 percent was 
turkey meat (International Beef Industry Congress, 2003, 6).   Currently, the largest 
beef producer in the world is the United States, which produces 24 percent of the 
world’s total production (Agri-Food Trade Service Fact Sheets, 2003).  Canada is 
the tenth largest world producer and produces approximately 1.2 million tons of beef 
or 2.5 percent of the world’s total production (Agri-Food Trade Service Fact Sheets, 
2003).  
Prior to the emergence of Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy (BSE) in 
Canada and the U.S. in 2003, Australia and the United States were the dominant 
participants in world beef export markets, having a 23 percent and 16 percent share 
of total world beef export volumes respectively.  Canada followed closely with a 15 
percent share of total world beef export volumes in 2001 (International Beef 
Industry Congress, 2003, 16).  Canada exported the majority of its beef into the 
United States and Mexico.  In 2003, 78 percent of Canada’s exports moved into the 
U.S. and 10 percent was exported into Mexico (Agri-Food Trade Service Fact 
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Sheets, 2003).  Other major export markets for Canadian beef included Japan and 
South Korea.  Cattle and beef exports are important to Canada, as they are its largest 
agri-food export.  By 2002 these exports were valued at four billion dollars (Canfax 
Research Services, 2002).          
In both Canada and the U.S. the beef industry is also the single largest 
component of domestic agricultural markets (Agri-Food Trade Service Fact Sheets, 
2003). Based on figures from 2001 it is estimated that 0.7 percent of Canada’s gross 
domestic product and slightly less than 1 percent of the U.S. gross domestic product 
is derived from sales of beef (Agri-Food Trade Service Fact Sheets, 2003).  From a 
different perspective, Canadian farm cash receipts from the sale of cattle and calves 
totaled $7.8 billion in 2001, 22% of total farm receipts (Canfax Research Services, 
2001). 
With a current cattle inventory of around 13.8 million animals, Canada’s 
cattle herd is about one-fifteenth the size of the U.S. herd (Agri-Food Trade Service 
Fact Sheets, 2003).  Canada’s beef feeding industry is regionally concentrated, with 
approximately 71 percent of all fed cattle production occurring in Alberta. Ontario is 
the second largest beef producing province and produces 18 percent of all fed cattle 
(Canfax Research Services, 2002).  The underlying reason that Alberta has become 
an epicenter for beef production and processing in Canada is the significant 
production cost advantages which exist.  Economics of scale in both production and 
processing have also emerged as a result of the industry’s regional concentration.  In 
North America, Alberta consistently ranks among the six largest breeding herds and 
feeding areas along with Texas, Kansas, Nebraska, Colorado, and Iowa. 
(Unterschultz, 2000, 29) 
The North American beef industry can be broken down into four main 
sectors.  The first stage can be divided into two further segments that include 
seedstock producers and commercial cow/calf operations.  Seedstock producers 
focus on the production of high quality purebred cattle that are sold to commercial 
operations to assist them to establish a certain genetic production base.  Commercial 
cow-calf producers raise calves from birth to 400-600 pounds when they are then 
weaned.  In the second stage, cattle feeders background or feed these weaned calves 
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out to heavier weights so that they can be finished on high-energy diets in feedlots.  
Feedlots represent the final stage in the feeding process.  Calves are typically fed to 
1,000 to 1,300 pounds at which time they are ready for slaughter.  The entire feeding 
cycle from the birth of calves on commercial operations to slaughter can range 
anywhere from twelve to eighteen months (Unterschultz, 2000, 23).  After cattle 
reach slaughter weight they are sent to the packer to be killed and processed.  The 
degree of processing can vary significantly with some beef being processed into 
ready-to-eat products; some being packaged and priced for immediate placement in 
retail meat counters, and the majority being boxed and sent to retailers where it is 
further processed to produce smaller packages.   
Each of the sectors varies considerably in their market structure and degree 
of concentration.  Seedstock producers and commercial cow-calf producers vary 
widely in size, ranging from many small “lifestyle” farms to large commercial 
operations.  The average herd size in Canada in 2001 was 53 head (Statistics Canada 
Website, 2003).    These sectors have remained relatively unchanged throughout the 
1980s and 1990s and have been characterized as being perfectly competitive with 
many individual sellers that have small herds of breeding stock (Alberta Agriculture 
Food and Rural Development, 2001, 27).  It has been argued that the cow/calf sector 
has always been less concentrated than other sectors of the beef industry because 
calf production requires more land, labour, and management per unit of output.  This 
has resulted in it being less conducive to the economies of size that have increased 
the concentration in other sectors of the beef industry (Barkema and Drabenstott, 
1990, 49).  Typically, average production costs stay relatively constant as the 
number of calves produced on an operation increases and consequently very little 
consolidation has occurred in the cow-calf sector (Barkema et al., 2001, 43).  At the 
same time, costs associated with monitoring production on a large cow-calf 
operation may be extremely high, due to the necessary dispersion of animals over a 
large geographic area.      
While relatively constant average production costs and high monitoring costs 
have not encouraged widespread consolidation in the cow-calf sector, some 
consolidation has become evident in recent years, as fewer farms became larger in 
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size across North America.  This consolidation has been in response to reduced 
access to markets and price differentials, which have arisen because large feedlots 
and processors prefer to deal with fewer and larger suppliers.  In Canada, 40 percent 
of the herd is located on farms with over 123 head of cattle.  In the U.S., the largest 
3.5 percent of cow-calf operators are producing about a third of the calves and the 
largest 9 percent of cow-calf operators account for approximately half of the cattle in 
the U.S. (International Beef Industry Congress, 2003, 1).  Meanwhile, the remainder 
of the U.S. cow-calf sector is in herds of less than a hundred head.  Thus, while 
some consolidation is apparent, the majority of commercial cow-calf animals 
continue to be located in smaller herds (International Beef Industry Congress, 2002, 
12).  On the whole, a high level of concentration is not expected due to the capital 
and management constraints faced by cow-calf operations.    
In the feedlot sector, concentration and consolidation is much more evident.  
Over the past twenty years the average size of individual feedlots has increased, 
while the number of feedlots has fallen.  This trend has occurred because feedlots 
have found economies of size in cattle feeding.  Savings were gained by spreading 
the costs of fixed investments across a large number of animals (Barkema et al., 
2001, 43).  Feedlots have also been able to exploit economies of scale generated by a 
constant flow of emerging technologies that reduce their variable costs (Brester, 
2002, 254).  This includes improved feed programs that increase feed efficiency, 
new health management protocols and medical treatments, and continually evolving 
identification systems, which in some cases use electronic scanners and databases, to 
improve current tracking and record keeping systems.     
The number of large-scale feedlots (+10,000 head) in Alberta increased from 
12 to 33 between 1991 and 2002 and the percentage of total beef production derived 
from these operations has increased from 31 percent to 58 percent in the same time 
period (Canfax Research Services, 2002).  A similar trend exists in the U.S., with the 
largest 2 percent of feedlots now producing about 85 percent of all finished cattle 
and the top three feedlot companies producing about 10 percent of all finished cattle 
(International Livestock Congress, 2002, 4).   
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Concentration and consolidation becomes even more evident when 
examining the packing and processing sector.  Since the early 1980s, the number of 
beef packing plants in the U.S. has declined from more than 600 to 170 (Barkema et 
al., 2001, 35).  Beef processing in the U.S. has moved into the control of fewer and 
larger companies.  The market share of the largest four firms increased from thirty-
three percent in the early 1980s to more than 80 percent by 1998 (Pearcy, 2000, 49).  
The four largest packers are comprised of two publicly traded companies, Tyson 
Foods/IBP and ConAgra, one private company, Excel/Cargill Foods, and one 
farmer-owned cooperative, Farmland National Beef.  In Canada, the concentration 
ratio is also increasing, with over 70 percent of all beef currently being processed by 
four major packers, as compared to the situation in 1991 when only 43 percent of 
beef was processed by these same packers (International Beef Industry Congress, 
2003, 1).  The major packers operating in the Canadian beef processing industry are 
Excel/Cargill, Tyson Foods/IBP, Better Beef Ltd., and XL Foods Ltd.   
The concentration in the packing and processing sector in both the United 
States and Canada has been a result of shifts in consumer demand and subsequent 
efforts to trim costs.  Economies of size played a key role in generating cost savings.  
In the last decade new technological developments have increased the 
mechanization of plants, improved processing capabilities, increased product 
innovation, and improved the overall efficiency of plants.  The implementation of 
this technology requires high levels of capital investment.  This has limited the 
ability of smaller high-cost plants to compete with larger plants that can distribute 
the sunk costs over a larger production base and consequently have a lower per-unit 
cost.  Smaller high-cost plants have exited from the industry.  The amount of new 
entry into the industry is limited due to the significant capital investments that would 
be required to enter.       
In addition to the four main sectors in the beef industry the other crucial link 
in the beef supply chain is with retailers and food service, which sell the final 
product to consumers.  In terms of the retail sector, supermarkets across North 
America have consolidated to reduce costs, capture market share, and to benefit 
from more effective and efficient coordination in all operating areas.  For many food 
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retailers, especially in the U.S., much of the consolidation is being driven by the 
competitive threat of Wal-Mart and other large discount retailers that have latterly 
added retail food sales to their stores (Allan, 2002).  Traditional grocery stores have 
high gross margins and low profits, while discounters like Wal-Mart often have half 
the gross margin and double the profit margin due to their high volumes, lower labor 
costs, and high turnover (Meeting the Market: Growth through Strategic Alliances, 
2002, 3).   
The top ten supermarket chains in the U.S. control 62 percent of food 
grocery sales.  The largest of those is Wal-Mart, second largest is Kroger, and the 
third largest is Albertsons (International Beef Industry Congress, 2003, 1).  In 
Canada, there is even more concentration in the food retailing sector with the top six 
supermarket companies representing 86 percent of all food grocery sales.  The top 
six supermarket companies in the U.S. only represent 37 percent of all food grocery 
sales although they tend to be regionally concentrated (Kubas and Simmons, 2000).  
The largest four firms in Canada are Loblaws, Sobeys, Canada Safeway, and Metro.        
 
2.3 Beef Consumption 
Until recently, the beef industry had experienced twenty years of declining 
consumption.  The market share for beef remained relatively stable from the mid-
1950s to the early 1970s and peaked in 1976 at 52.4 percent (Purcell, 2002, 5).  
Since then, the market share for beef has declined, while pork and chicken have 
grown in popularity among consumers.  In the paper Measures of Changes in 
Demand for Beef, Pork, and Chicken, 1975-2000, Purcell (2000) estimates that beef 
consumption in the U.S. has declined by 42 percent during the last two decades.   
Declining consumption for beef is also apparent in Canada.  From a peak 
annual consumption of around fifty kilograms per person in 1975, Canadian 
consumers now purchase only slightly more than twenty kilograms per capita.  Even 
more significant is the widening gap between Canadian and U.S. beef consumption 
patterns, with Canadian consumers being reported to now consume 15 percent less 
beef than their American counterparts (Unterschultz, 2000, 31).   
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While the market share and consumption of beef has declined, inflation 
adjusted retail prices for beef have also fallen. Figure 2.1 plots yearly beef 
consumption from 1980 to 2002 using a deflated beef price index.  From the scatter 
plot it is easy to see that along with consumption, inflation adjusted beef prices 
dropped significantly in the previous two decades, with each point depicting a 
particular year.  Hence, despite a decrease in real prices a decline in the demand for 
beef has occurred.  An important trend to note is that while the demand for beef has 
declined, poultry demand has increased. Per capita consumption of poultry has risen 
from 18 kg in the early 1970s to just over 35 kg in 1999 and poultry consumption is 
projected to continue to increase in the future (Purcell, 2000, 1). 
Figure 2.1 - Beef Consumption in Canada between 1980 and 2002 
(Deflated price index 1992=100) Source: AAFC Red Meat Information  
Website: http://www.agri.gc.ca/redmeat 
 
In examining declining beef consumption and poultry consumption, the 
question arises as to what has caused these changes in consumption.  Changes in the 
relative prices of beef and chicken can explain a portion of the change.  Beef prices 
have typically always been higher than chicken prices, but the ratio of these prices 
has increased during the last two decades, from 2.5 in 1976 to 2.9 in 1989, making 
beef more expensive relative to chicken (Brester et al., 1995, 3; Barkema and 
Drabenstott., 1990, 52).  Investment in poultry research and product innovation 
increased substantially during this same period.  This assisted in reducing production 
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and processing costs, which subsequently lowered retail chicken prices.  Lower 
relative poultry prices have led consumers to substitute away from more expensive 
beef and to purchase more chicken (Brester et al., 1995, 3).              
 Changes in the relative prices of beef and chicken can only explain a portion 
of the total change in consumption, with the substitution away from beef towards 
poultry being largely attributed to the increased production of consumer oriented 
products by the poultry industry.   Besides lowering production costs, substantial 
investments in the poultry industry have led to the production of consumer oriented 
products.  By offering a wide array of convenient, high quality, nutritious, and 
value-added products, the poultry industry has recognized and benefited from a 
changing consumer (Marsh et al., 2000, 3).   
Consumers are caught up in an on-the-go lifestyle and demand consistent, 
high-quality, convenient food products.  This is in large part due to the increasing 
participation of women in the work force.  In the U.S., the percentage of females in 
the labour force rose from 43% in 1970 to 60% in 1998 and for women ages 35 to 
44, the participation rate is as high as 77% (Kinsey and Senauer, 1996, 1).  As a 
greater proportion of females enter the labour force, less time is available for meal 
preparation.  The poultry industry was better able to recognize this trend due to its 
inherent ability to take a more consumer oriented approach as a result of the 
vertically coordinated nature of industry, which will be discussed in the next 
chapter.  Poultry is also more amenable to product differentiation, as it has a neutral 
taste that makes it more versatile and amenable to flavoring, coating, and spicing.    
 Other demographic factors have also negatively impacted the demand for 
beef including slower population growth, greater ethnic diversity, smaller 
households, an aging more health conscious population, and rising disposable 
incomes (Kinsey and Senauer, 1996, 1).  Slower growth in the Canadian population 
implies that total food sales are not likely to grow very much, if at all.  Greater 
ethnic diversity means that consumers are demanding a wider variety of products 
than are currently being provided by the beef industry.    
 Disposable incomes have been rising in North America because of an 
increased number of dual income households, smaller family sizes, and a general 
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rise in the income levels of the North American middle and upper classes.  As a 
result of this increase in income, there has been a growth in the demand for an even 
wider range of convenience oriented, value-added, nutritious products.  Consumers 
have become increasingly discriminating and less price conscious with food 
becoming more than just fuel; instead it is becoming a pleasure and wellbeing 
indicator (Meeting the Market: Growth through Strategic Alliances, 2002, 19).  This 
implies that other attributes besides price have become important, with the five 
major ones being nutrition and health, food safety, food quality, environmental and 
animal welfare, and convenience (International Livestock Congress, 2000, 1) 
Even though consumers are spending less time preparing meals they are 
paying more attention to cholesterol levels, fat, food safety, and other health 
concerns that are perceived to be related to the use of genetically-modified feeds, 
hormones, antibiotics, and non-organic inputs in meat production.  The beef 
industry, as it is currently structured, has been poorly placed to meet consumer 
demands for these attributes. One example of this is the continued production of 
marbled beef that was popular with consumers in the 1970s.  While consumers are 
increasingly concerned about purchasing low-fat and low-cholesterol meat products, 
the beef industry, unlike the poultry industry, failed to adjust their product offerings 
to meet consumers’ demands for differentiated products that provide the above 
mentioned attributes (Purcell, 1993, 32).     
Consumers have also become more demanding when it comes to the quality, 
consistency, and palatability of the foods that they consume.  In the 1990 U.S. 
National Beef Quality Audit, meat tenderness was ranked the second most important 
quality characteristic for beef consumers, while overall uniformity and consistency 
was the most important (Hudson and Purcell, 2003, 44). Several studies show that 
the beef industry has failed to provide consistently tender products to consumers.  In 
an Alberta survey, over 30 percent of steaks and 35 percent of roasts purchased in a 
six month period in six supermarket chains were ranked as unacceptable for 
tenderness by a trained lab panel (Brewin and Ulrich, 1999, 1).  In a survey done in 
Canada, forty-four percent of the consumers surveyed felt that buying beef was a 
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game of chance, with respect to whether the quality they received met their 
expectations (International Livestock Congress, 2002, 25).             
 Although the beef consumption has declined it continues to be a significant 
source of protein in the average diet, accounting for 6.7 percent of total retail 
counter sales and 35.1 percent of every retail meat dollar in Canada (Unterschultz, 
2000, 29).  In order to regain and maintain market share from other proteins, the 
beef industry needs to develop products that meet the changing demands of 
consumers.   Successfully increasing demand means that the five principal demand 
drivers, as identified by consumers, must be focused on: (1) consistency, quality, 
and palatability, (2) health and nutrition, (3) food safety, (4) environmental and 
animal welfare, and (5) convenience products (International Livestock Congress, 
2000, 2).  At the 2003 International Livestock Congress Randy Blach, an analyst 
with the U.S. based Cattlefax, summarized this idea by explaining that, “the 
consumer is the boss and as a result to expand demand, increase market-share, and 
improve profitability the beef industry must deliver a more consistent, convenient, 
consumer-oriented product” (International Beef Industry Congress, 2003, 2).       
 
2.4 Consumers and Branded Beef Programs 
Beef has traditionally been marketed as a generic product, with consumers 
purchasing beef products with broad quality characteristics and then transforming 
them into meals in their kitchens (Barkema, 1994, 542).  Consumers have typically 
not chosen beef based on differentiated quality characteristics, but this is slowly 
changing as the industry begins to focus on increased product differentiation and 
“branded beef” in an effort to better satisfy consumer demand.  Branded beef is seen 
as a move in the right direction as a brand provides a promise to consumers that the 
product will deliver consistently the qualities consumers demand (Smith, 2000, 8).     
Ideally, existing grading systems should enable consumers to identify and 
choose products that will satisfy their demands for different attributes.  The problem 
with existing grading systems is that the number of attributes being demanded has 
increased.  Also, the attributes demanded vary significantly from consumer to 
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consumer, overwhelming the ability of the traditional marketing system to classify 
and identify all of the important attributes (Barkema, 1994, 544).   
Both Canada and the U.S. have existing government grading systems that are 
designed to grade beef based on different characteristics. Canada’s top grades are 
Canada Prime, Canada AAA, Canada AA and Canada A, which differ mainly by the 
amount of marbling in the meat.  Other characteristics that are taken into account 
during the grading process are colour, age, and the yield of the carcass.  The U.S. 
system for grading beef is very similar to the Canadian system, with USDA Prime, 
USDA Choice, USDA Select and USDA Standard being close to equivalent to 
Canada Prime, Canada AAA, Canada AA, and Canada A respectively (Beef Trade 
Website).    
Even within the existing Canadian and U.S. grading systems there is a failure 
to identify adequate proxy variables for different measurements of quality such as 
tenderness.  Current standards grade on marbling, which does not provide an 
accurate or consistent measurement of tenderness.  This means that even within the 
same quality grade, tenderness can vary considerably and may result in a negative 
eating experience that could reduce consumer confidence and consequently the 
demand for beef (Lusk et al., 1999, 2).        
Branded differentiated products are an alternative, creating a system whereby 
consumers recognize the meat and its associated characteristics through a particular 
brand (Lusk, 2001, 1).  Brands also provide consumers with a guarantee that they 
will receive the same quality every time they consume a product.   In this sense 
brand “quality” is defined as consistency, tenderness, flavour, source verification, 
process verification, food safety, or any other specific characteristic that is 
demanded by consumers and provided under a particular brand (International 
Livestock Congress, 2002, 17).  
With the creation of branded beef products the potential for niche markets to 
emerge is increasing.  Product differentiation can be used to appeal to smaller 
groups of consumers that are willing to pay a premium for beef that includes the 
characteristics that they demand (Peterson and Phillips, 2001, 1).  Consumers may 
be willing to pay a premium if branded products lower their transaction costs.  With 
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branded products, consumers face less uncertainty with regards to the quality of the 
product.  Lower information costs are incurred, as less time is spent searching 
among products and monitoring products to determine which one will provide a 
given level of quality.  This results from the guarantees of consistency and 
uniformity provided under a brand name.  Given the costs savings derived from 
consuming branded products, consumers are often willing to pay more for them.   
The willingness of consumers to pay a premium for branded beef is critical 
to the ability of branded beef products to improve profitability in the beef industry.  
While branding a retail product can be advantageous there are added costs to 
consider (Lusk, 2001, 3).  These costs are typically associated with the additional 
production and segregation costs incurred to meet the identity preservation 
requirements of branded beef programs, as well as costs of safeguarding any asset 
specific investments that have been made.                   
If a firm differentiates its product on the basis of a specific quality or 
attribute, then an animal produced with that particular attribute must be separated 
from other animals throughout the supply chain (Lusk, 2001, 3).  Segregation and 
identity preservation costs will vary significantly and depend on the type of attribute 
being guaranteed and how easy, or difficult, it is to produce and detect this attribute 
along the supply chain.  The production of a particular attribute may also require 
specific physical or human capital investments that will result in additional costs, 
which will be discussed in the next chapter.  Total costs will also depend on how 
many members along the supply chain are involved in the production of a particular 
attribute.  The costs associated with monitoring and preserving a particular 
characteristic will increase as the number of supply chain participants required to 
produce the attribute increases.      
Very little research is available that focuses on consumers’ willingness to 
pay for branded beef programs that guarantee specific attributes.  Instead, most of 
the literature focuses more generally on the increased demand for different 
attributes.  A small number of studies have focused on consumers’ willingness to 
pay for tender, more consistent beef products including a study by Lusk et al., in 
1999 and another study by Fuez and Umberger in 2001.  This research is important 
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given that lack of tenderness and low overall uniformity and consistency have been 
identified as the most important quality concerns for beef consumers.   
Lusk et al. (1999) found that consumers demonstrated a preference for tender 
steak.  Blind taste tests revealed that 72 percent of consumers preferred tender steak 
relative to tough steaks and 36 percent of consumers were willing to pay an average 
premium of U.S. $1.23/lb for a steak that was guaranteed to be tender (Lusk et al., 
1999, 2).  In the same study, when information was revealed to consumers regarding 
the tenderness of the steak together with a taste test, 90 percent preferred tender 
steak and 51 percent were willing to pay an average premium of U.S. $1.84/lb for a 
guaranteed tender steak (Lusk et al., 1999, 2).  The significance of both of these tests 
is that consumers are able to distinguish between varying levels of tenderness and 
are willing to pay a premium for a guaranteed level of tenderness.    
A large proportion of the participants in this study failed to recognize 
government grades as an indicator for quality even though these grades are intended 
to inform consumers of beef quality (Lusk et al., 1999, 7).  Current Canadian and 
U.S. grading systems do not sufficiently segregate carcasses for tenderness.  
Consequently, there is a potential for industry participants to develop different 
branded beef programs that promote increased coordination along the supply chain 
to provide a guarantee of quality to consumers.  In return, they should obtain a 
premium price for their product and have fewer unsatisfied consumers. 
 
2.5 Branded Beef Programs 
In the past few years beef demand in the U.S. has begun to recover.  Since 
1998, after nearly 20 years of continuous decline, demand in the U.S. has increased 
each year (Purcell, 2002, 5).  These increases in demand have been attributed in part 
to the increased efforts of the beef industry to produce differentiated value-added 
branded products that better meet consumer demands (Kovanda and Schroeder, 
2003, 4).  In 1998, producer and processor brands accounted for between 10 and 12 
percent of the total market share of U.S. beef (Allan, 2002).  Gordon, a senior meat 
consultant with Informa Economics (formerly Sparks Companies), projects that by 
the year 2005, over 50 percent of U.S. beef will be branded (Lamp, 1998).  Similar 
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statistics are not available for Canada, but the percentage of the total market share of 
beef marketed through branded beef programs in Canada is probably lower than in 
the U.S. given that the emergence of these programs has been slower in Canada.  
The slower emergence of these programs may help to explain part of the 15% 
difference between Canadian and U.S. demand, as consumers in Canada have less 
access to branded beef and consequently continue to consume other proteins.          
A number of marketing arrangements are being used in the effort to provide 
branded products, and they vary based on their program specifications, management 
structures, and coordination mechanisms.  Beef is differentiated in a variety of ways, 
with the likelihood of success of a particular brand depending on the costs versus 
consumers’ willingness to pay (Lusk, 2001, 3).  Tenderness is one of the most 
frequently branded attributes.  Other programs are differentiated in terms of natural 
products that are hormone and/or antibiotic free and in some cases even free of any 
genetically-modified feeds.  A further extension of this market is the production of 
organic beef products and “safe” beef products, which are promoted as being free of 
E-coli and other bacteria.1  Markets have also arisen for leaner beef with a low level 
of marbling, targeting consumers who are concerned with lowering their cholesterol 
and fat intake.  Other branding initiatives include beef that has been produced in a 
particular region, is grass-fed, is environmentally friendly, animal-welfare friendly, 
of a particular breed, or is presented in a convenient value-added product format.  
Attributes that are often included in branded beef programs, in combination with 
those mentioned above include source-verification, process-verification, product 
freshness, appearance, and a particular USDA or Canadian grade.        
In terms of the mechanisms used to improve vertical coordination, there is no 
single format for developing a particular branded beef program.  Vertical 
coordination varies significantly and often depends on which supply chain member 
initiates the program and what attributes are being guaranteed, as this will determine 
the involvement of different supply chain members in a particular program.  
Currently, four dominant supply chain structures can be identified and include brand 
                                                 
1 This is typically done by implementing a HACCP based program throughout the production and 
processing stages that identifies risk areas and implements protocols to reduce these risks. 
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licensing programs, marketing alliances, new-generation cooperatives, and 
externally coordinated programs.          
Brand licensing programs have most commonly emerged under the auspices 
of existing breed organizations.  These programs typically require that cattle meet a 
certain genetic template, specific to a particular breed.  They create value by 
centering the program on a branded product that uses breed as a proxy to convey a 
certain standard of quality to the consumer (Anton, 2002, 2).  Licensing programs 
tend to be very loosely coordinated with the only requirements being that 
participants are certified to sell beef under the program name and that the breed of 
cattle entering the program are verified through visual inspection and/or genetic 
records (Anton, 2002, 2).   The largest existing licensing program is the Certified 
Angus Beef (CAB) program run by the American Angus Association.  Similar 
programs to the CAB program are emerging, including the Certified Hereford Beef 
program run by the American Hereford Association.     
Branded programs have also been initiated by packers, processors, and 
retailers under a marketing alliance.  These programs differ from brand licensing 
programs in that they are owned by operations that purchase finished cattle from 
cow-calf operators and/or feedlots via a marketing alliance that uses a grid pricing 
system with more detailed program specifications2.  Marketing alliances, and their 
associated grid pricing systems, typically have particular quality, yield, and process 
requirements, creating incentives for cow-calf operators and feedlots to produce 
animals that yield the desired quality traits (Anton, 2002, 1).  The production of high 
quality animals that meet all program requirements is rewarded with premium prices 
above a set base price.  The production of low quality animals results in discounts 
and even direct exclusion from the program.     
Prior to the emergence of grid-based pricing systems, cattle have 
traditionally been sold on a live animal basis, with pricing based on the average 
traits of an entire pen of cattle.  This type of pricing has occurred despite well-
                                                 
2 Grid pricing systems price cattle based on carcass quality, which is determined by the measurement 
of several different elements that often include carcass grade, carcass weight, yield grade, and rib-eye 
size.  This differs from a live-weight pricing system where cattle are priced based on a visual 
inspection of the live animal and animal weight.       
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documented sizeable differences in value among animals.  Basing price on average 
quality results in the market failing to send the appropriate price signals to producers 
regarding the quality attributes demanded by buyers (Kovanda and Schroeder, 2003, 
4).  Marketing alliances that use grid-based pricing systems have been suggested as 
one method of improving information flow and reducing quality variation, as cattle 
are priced on carcass quality and producers are provided with incentives to produce 
cattle with specific quality traits and improve the overall quality of cattle 
(Unterschultz, 2000, 88).  Cattle are typically graded on two dimensions in a grid-
based system.  Firstly, a quality grade is used to measure the taste and palatability of 
the meat.  The maturity of an animal is also taken into account, as older animals are 
generally thought to be tougher and have a less desirable taste.  Secondly, the 
amount of edible meat or yield of the carcass is considered (Beshear and Lamb, 
1998, 61).   
New generation cooperatives are also emerging as a means of producing 
branded beef products.  Cooperatives are typically producer-owned entities that take 
a systems approach to branded beef production.  The primary goal of cooperatives is 
to enhance the flow of information to members, reduce production costs, and 
increase profitability (Beshear and Lamb, 1998, 61).  Their focus is to create new 
efficiencies by implementing uniform practices within each segment of the supply 
chain and by coordinating production, processing, and marketing through alliances 
with other sectors of the industry (Kovanda and Schroeder, 2003, 9).  This type of 
system may facilitate the creation of stronger incentives for cow-calf operators to 
focus on improving quality.   
The management structure of new generation cooperatives is much more 
formal than the arrangements discussed above.  To ensure the stability and longevity 
of the program, membership of new generation cooperatives is often fixed and 
members are usually required to invest equity into the venture through the purchase 
of shares that come with certain rights and obligations (Anton, 2002, 1).  Shares 
establish a two-way contract between members and the cooperative, which requires 
members to sell a certain number of cattle through the cooperative and requires that 
the cooperative take delivery of these cattle (Boland and Katz, 2000, 8).  Investment 
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in a cooperative also establishes that the beef will be produced, marketed, and 
processed in a specific manner.  Often a grid-pricing system is used, which provides 
incentives for members to comply with the program requirements.  Further, in 
addition to the premiums and discounts provided on the grid, closed cooperatives 
may pay dividends or bonuses to members that market cattle through their program 
(Anton, 2002, 1)                
New generation cooperative is a term that has been applied to fifty or so beef 
industry cooperatives in the U.S. thus far (Boland and Katz, 2000, 108).  Ranchers 
Renaissance, U.S. Premium Beef, and Rancher’s Choice are all good examples of 
cooperatives that are driven by cow-calf operators and aligned with other supply 
chain members such as feedlots, packers, and retailers to produce branded beef 
products.       
Externally coordinated branded beef programs are less common than any of 
the other formats discussed.  The underlying approach of these operations is to 
create a fully vertically coordinated supply chain with the initiative being driven by 
a newly formed corporation instead of an existing supply chain participant.  The 
majority of these operations have only existed conceptually, with limited success 
when programs are actually put into operation.  This type of program has not been 
neglected completely though, as the underlying structure of these programs is seen 
to be a possible method of producing beef for large-scale branded beef programs in 
the future.   Future Beef Operations was the first such initiative in the U.S. that 
attempted to coordinate cow-calf producers, feedlots, packing/processing, and 
retailers through the formation of a new entity (Roybal, 2001).  Although this 
initiative failed, it provides some insights into how future branded beef programs 
may be coordinated.               
The types of supply chain coordination outlined above constitute a broad 
framework.  Within this framework, significant variations can occur in terms of 
organizational and management structure.  Many different value chain alliance 
structures have emerged within the industry and each is unique in certain aspects.  
However, identifying common features in a broad framework is useful in an analysis 
of the reasons behind different methods of vertical coordination.     
 23
Regardless of the type of coordination mechanism chosen, the success of a 
branded beef program depends on identifying a niche market and building brand 
loyalty (Hayes et al., 2003, 4).  Operations must be able to achieve a scale of 
production large enough to justify the costs of creating and maintaining the 
differentiated brand among consumers (Hayes et al., 2003, 3).  They must also be 
able to ensure a consistent and year-round supply of product to retailers and other 
end-users.  Lastly, management must be able to assert control over supply.  Without 
supply control entry will occur and production will expand to capture premiums 
until no premiums exist in the market.  In order to do this, brands must be based on 
some fixed attribute or membership must be limited through the use of membership 
fees, property rights, licensing requirements, or strict production standards that limit 
eligibility (Hayes et al., 2003, 4).      
Existing programs have been examined with respect to their objectives and 
program requirements.  Although program structures can vary significantly, several 
commonalities exist.  Ward (2001, WF-563), surveyed different alliances in the U.S. 
beef industry and found that the stated objectives in over half of the alliances 
mentioned a customer focus, beef industry improvements, improved communication 
between stages, and product enhancement.  Over three-quarters of the alliances 
spanned more than three stages of the production and marketing process in an effort 
to improve information flow through the supply chain (Ward, 2001, WF-563, 2).  
About one-third of the alliances had various forms of licensing agreements, non-
participation penalties, certification requirements, and/or required investment/fees to 
provide a level of commitment (Ward, 2001, WF-563, 2).  Over half of the alliances 
required the use of a specific breed and had some requirements for source 
verification (Ward, 2001, WF-563, 3). 
 
2.6 Branded Beef Case Studies 
 Case studies of existing branded beef programs are provided in this section 
to illustrate how branded beef programs have developed with the goal of improving 
consumer demand and producer returns.  Several programs are examined in order to 
provide examples of the different management structures outlined in the previous 
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section.  Case studies of Certified Angus Beef, Decatur Beef Alliance, Ranchers 
Renaissance, and Future Beef Operations are discussed.  These programs were 
selected as they all had a similar objective of providing an overall high quality, 
consistent, tender beef product.  It is important to note that while these case studies 
provide an insight into the different methods of supply chain coordination that are 
emerging in the beef industry, many programs exist that vary from the case studies 
outlined below.  The purpose of these case studies is to provide a snapshot 
illustration of what is occurring in the industry, while recognizing that these four 
structures are not the only ones that have emerged. 
 
2.6.1 Certified Angus Beef 
 The Certified Angus Beef (CAB) brand was started in 1978 and is the 
industry’s oldest, largest, and most successful brand.  CAB operates as a non-profit 
division of the American Angus Association, which is comprised of more than 
28,000 Angus breeders.  The goal of the program is to produce high quality, tender, 
flavourful beef.  The CAB functions independently with the guidance of a nine-
member board of directors with a mission to increase demand for Angus cattle 
through its branded beef program (Certified Angus Beef Website, 2003).  Currently, 
over 480 million pounds of beef are marketed through the CAB program annually 
(Kovanda and Schroeder, 2003, 13).  The program has grown by about 30 percent 
each year and sells products in the U.S. and fifty other countries in more than 8,000 
restaurants and retail locations.  Nonetheless, the CAB program has less than a 1 
percent share in the U.S. market (Brester, 2002, 259).   
The focus behind the Certified Angus Beef program is to produce consistent 
quality products with an emphasis on brand integrity.  The grading of CAB is done 
by the United States Department of Agriculture and the Canadian Food Inspection 
Agency rather than using in-house grades by processors.  No herds are “certified” 
and no living Angus cattle are actually “Certified Angus Beef”.  Rather, after 
meeting the live specification of being at least 51 percent black-hided, the program 
has eight further carcass specifications.  On average, only 17.3 percent of evaluated 
Angus cattle qualify to be sold under the Certified Angus Beef brand (Certified 
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Angus Beef Website, 2003).  The focus of the program is to provide price incentives 
to improve cattle quality and increase the percentage of cattle accepted in the 
program.  Since inception, some cow-calf operators that specialize in producing 
Angus cattle have focused on producing animals that are suitable for the CAB 
program have achieved an acceptance rate of more than 50 percent (Certified Angus 
Beef Website, 2003).   
 The Certified Angus Beef program differs from other programs in that it 
does not own cattle or beef products during any part of production or processing.  
Instead, the CAB program licenses packers, processors, distributors, retailers, and 
restaurants to harvest, fabricate, and merchandise Certified Angus Beef product.  
Financial rewards are derived along the supply chain through the preserved integrity 
of the brand by tracking product from the cow-calf operation to the processor level 
with a tagging system that is exclusive to the program.  To be eligible for the tagging 
program, the Angus Association must certify cow-calf operators as producing 
animals that are Angus or Angus-cross.  Although the existing tagging system is not 
a complete farm to plate traceability system, it allows for supply chain participants 
to achieve premiums through the identification of acceptable animals and a value 
based marketing system (Certified Angus Beef Website, 2003).   
An experimental auction combined with a consumer survey in 2002, which 
valued steaks with different attributes, suggested that consumers were willing to pay 
an average premium of U.S. $2.33/lb for CAB products, compared to generic 
products (Kovanda and Schroeder, 2003, 13).  The higher consumer demand and 
willingness to pay for CAB products has translated into fed cattle premiums of U.S. 
$2-$5 per-hundred weight.  A portion of this premium is typically passed back to the 
Angus cow-calf operators when calves are purchased by feedlots (Certified Angus 
Beef Website, 2003).  Given the program’s focus on breed, relatively little supply 
chain coordination is required to preserve product identity and pay participants for 
the desired attribute.  This is because the characteristic is visible during the entire 
production process and also in the initial stages of processing.     
 While packers, retailers, and other merchandisers to market Certified Angus 
Beef must purchase licenses, there are no long-term commitments required by cow-
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calf operators and feedlots (Certified Angus Beef Website, 2003).  Typically, formal 
agreements between packers, feedlots, and cow-calf operators are not necessary to 
ensure a constant supply of beef cattle into the CAB program.  This is because the 
program requirements are broad enough that a large supply of cattle is available to 
fill them through more informal arrangements.  Indirectly, a certain degree of 
commitment does arise, as in deciding to target the Certified Angus Beef market, 
cow-calf operators make a voluntary decision to align production with CAB breed 
and quality requirements and thus have an incentive to achieve premiums associated 
with the program.  Quality requirements in this case are fairly minimal; once beef 
has been identified as being from an Angus animal it must grade as either USDA 
Prime or Canada Prime to fulfill the program’s requirements (Certified Angus Beef 
Website, 2003).         
 The Certified Angus Beef brand is an interesting system in that it uses fairly 
narrow grading requirements to fulfill its guarantee of tenderness.  Aside from cattle 
having to be Angus, they have to grade as either the top 35% of USDA Choice or 
USDA/Canada Prime.   A review of the literature could not identify any evidence 
that there is a direct correlation between the Angus breed and production of higher 
quality, more tender and flavourful beef.  Hammack (1998) suggests that the Angus 
breed has a higher level of marbling than other breeds.  Marbling is related to 
tenderness and flavour, but no direct correlation between the Angus breed and 
tenderness and flavour was found in the literature review.      
 
2.6.2 Decatur Beef Alliance 
Decatur Beef Alliance is a marketing alliance that began in 1994 and is 
managed by Decatur County Feedyard in Kansas.  Decatur County Feedyard is a 
privately owned feedlot that has been in operation since 1977 and has a one-time 
capacity to feed 35,000 head of cattle.  Approximately 90% of the cattle fed in the 
lot each year are run through the alliance.  More than 130 cow-calf operators 
throughout the United States currently participate in the program and approximately 
50,000 head are being processed each year through the alliance (Weibert, 2004).  
The mission of the alliance is to produce consistent, quality beef at the lowest 
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possible cost and provide the highest quality service to both feeders and packers 
through the use of all available technology and proven techniques.  The goal of the 
program is to avoid “average management”, as there is tremendous range in growth 
patterns and carcass value.  Ignoring these differences, by penning cattle together 
from start to finish in the typical feedlot, creates carcass discounts and inefficiencies 
in the cost of production.  It results in a final product with too much inconsistency in 
quality.  Instead of managing pens of cattle “on average”, the Decatur Beef Alliance 
manages each individual animal to its optimum genetic endpoint, using a method 
which will be described further on in this section (Weibert, 2004).       
 The alliance is partnered with Excel’s processing plant in Dodge City, 
Kansas.  A quality-based grid pricing system is used, where cow-calf operators are 
paid for high quality, high yielding cattle.  The grid has high premiums and large 
discounts in order to provide incentives to focus on the production of top quality 
cattle.   The alliance does not own a particular brand, but instead directs its 
production towards existing brand programs run by Excel, which include Certified 
Angus Beef, Sterling Silver, and Ranchers Registry.  All of these brands focus on 
providing customers with consistent, tender, and flavourful beef.     
The alliance chose not to develop and own its own brand for several reasons.  
The owner of Decatur County Feedyard, Warren Weibert stated, “Developing a 
brand through an alliance is tremendous in terms of the large volumes typically 
required and the amount of organization required to ensure ongoing supplies are 
available.  Large amounts of capital must also be available to develop, market, and 
sell a brand.” (Weibert, 2004)  Aligning with Excel also has an advantage in that 
Excel has a large processing capacity and the production can be easily absorbed into 
the plant’s processing activities.  Consequently, the alliance is not limited in what it 
supplies to Excel on an ongoing basis and future growth is also not limited at this 
point.  This reduces the degree of coordination required to ensure adequate supplies, 
which is often significant for alliances that are the sole supplier to one particular 
brand, as they have to ensure an ongoing and constant supply of product.  At the 
same time, Excel also benefits from the partnership with Decatur, as the alliance 
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creates a constant, predictable, flow of cattle into the plant and into its high end 
programs, reducing the time spent searching for and procuring cattle.      
Program requirements for cow-calf operators entering into the program are 
minimal.  Specific production protocols are not required, but instead recommended 
production guidelines are provided in an effort to enhance cow-calf operators’ 
returns.  They must commit a minimum of sixty head of cattle of the same sex into 
the alliance and are charged an alliance fee of $5/head and an additional 
$0.02/head/day on feed.  The feedlot is flexible in terms of the ownership of cattle 
and will purchase up to a one-half interest in cattle entering into the alliance in order 
to reduce the capital commitment required by cow-calf operators.  Currently about 
forty percent of cow-calf operators retain ownership and the feedlot partners with 
the remaining sixty percent of suppliers (Weibert, 2004).                 
In terms of commitment, cow-calf operators can enter into the program at 
anytime.  Once they enter their cattle into the program they have to sign a feeding 
agreement that stipulates those cattle are part of the alliance and that the feedlot is 
responsible for marketing their cattle.  The latter is done on the basis of individual 
animal performance.  Cattle are tagged with an electronic ID tag upon entering the 
feedlot.  Once cattle have been in the lot for 70 days they are sorted twice based on 
different quality indicators and commingled in mixed ownership lots in order to 
optimize cattle performance on the grid.  Therefore, an individual cow-calf 
operator’s cattle may be in several different lots and will be sold at different times 
(Weibert, 2004).  The electronic ID tags manage information on an individual 
animal basis.   
The idea behind Decatur’s system is that electronic ID tags and commingling 
avoid the problems associated with one cow-calf operator’s cattle being separated 
into one lot throughout the production process, which often results in inefficient lot 
sizes and groups of cattle that vary in terms of weight and finishing times.  The 
sorting process centers on the use of the Micro Beef Technology ACCU-TRACTM 
Electronic Cattle Management System, which allows the feedlot to measure and sort 
individual cattle based on different quality and economic indicators.  To implement 
the ultrasound technology and sorting system the feedlot spent approximately U.S. 
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$650,000.  It also pays a yearly license and data management fee to Micro Beef 
(Weibert, 2004).         
The feedlot alliance has incurred costs to implement the system and also has 
higher ongoing costs as a result of the increased management and sorting that occurs 
in the program.  The alliance fees cover the increased management and marketing 
costs and the cost of the electronic identification tag.  While the feedlot receives 
some payback directly, the system it has implemented also enhances the paybacks 
received by cow-calf operators and the quality of information that this sector has 
access to.  Cow-calf operators that perform well within the alliance usually increase 
the number of head they enter into the program, and they also typically evolve to 
retaining ownership.  For the feedlot, less time is spent procuring cattle; they have a 
more constant income stream as a result of custom feeding fees, and are able to 
operate at an optimum capacity.                
Cow-calf operators in the program are located throughout the United States, 
with the majority being from Kansas, Nebraska, Wyoming, and Montana.  Feeder 
calves are assembled and fed at Decatur and then sent to the Excel processing plant 
in Dodge City.  Key to the success of the alliance is the fact that it markets all of its 
cattle into one Excel plant.  Besides premiums, the alliance is providing cow-calf 
operators with data on carcass performance.  For this data to be reliable the alliance 
must focus on selling to one plant in one location, as opposed too moving around 
and reducing the traceability of animals and flow of information. Excel provides the 
alliance with weekly market access and manages the data through an in-house 
electronic tracking system.  There is no written contract or commitment between the 
alliance and Excel in terms of the number of cattle to be supplied.  Consequently, the 
alliance can focus on selling cattle based on their optimal finishing times.  
Furthermore, it does not have to spend a great deal of time gathering and managing 
data from several different processors (Weibert, 2004).   
The cattle from one individual cow-calf operator may be sold through several 
different lots at different times.  After the last animal is sold, suppliers receive 
individual animal close outs that include its feedlot performance, measured carcass 
data and the programs that individual animals were allocated to, a net return 
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statement based on premiums received and costs incurred, and a comparative report 
that compares the cow-calf operator’s cattle to others in the alliance.  Especially 
significant is the focus on the overall net return instead of just the premiums 
received, as this balances premiums against the increased costs incurred to obtain 
those premiums.   
The Decatur Beef Alliance is a fairly flexible marketing alliance.  Cow-calf 
operator requirements are low and commitment to the program is limited to one 
production cycle.  Alignment with one Excel processing plant and its branded beef 
programs reduces the marketing required by the alliance and allows for the 
formation of an ongoing partnership that benefits both the alliance and the packer.  
Currently the alliance is growing at a rate of 10-15% each year and has been quite 
successful in achieving its goal of producing high quality cattle that return premiums 
to the cow-calf operator in addition to the provision of quality information (Weibert, 
2004).   
In 1999, 99.74% of the cattle marketed in the alliance had a yield grade of 3 
or better, 57% made Choice grade or better, and 97% made Select grade or better.  
Outliers in the program totaled 3.37% compared to an industry average of 9.71% 
(Decatur Beef Alliance Fact Sheet, 2003).  Hitting such a high quality target through 
the focus on individual animal management over average lot management resulted in 
participants receiving average premiums of U.S. $15/head.  Timely marketing on the 
grid resulted in additional producer premiums of U.S. $5-10/head (Decatur Beef 
Alliance Fact Sheet, 2003).  Decatur has focused on continuously looking at 
different opportunities to provide differentiated beef products and add value at the 
cow-calf, feedlot, and packer level.  Marketing alliances, such as the Decatur Beef 
Alliance, are structured in a way that allows for different segments to maintain their 
independence and a large amount of flexibility, while still being able to increase 
transparency of information and add value along the system. 
 
2.6.3 Ranchers Renaissance 
 Ranchers Renaissance is a new generation closed cooperative that 
commenced operation in 1997.  Ranchers concentrated in Texas and Colorado own 
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it, but others are located as far away as Alberta.  Ranchers Renaissance is a 
vertically aligned beef production system based on the creation of partnerships 
between ranchers, feeders, a processor (Excel), and retail end users (Ranchers 
Renaissance Website, 2003).  The stated goal of the cooperative is to bring together 
all industry players to build trust, better understand the consumer, lower costs, share 
information, improve the quality of beef being produced, and ultimately share in the 
additional value created by a branded beef program (Pearcy, 2000, 1).   
Using a value-based marketing system where producers and others in the 
supply chain are paid for a high quality product, the cooperative’s mission is to 
create “a customer-focused, vertically coordinated beef production system, with 
profits derived from increased efficiency and consistent, high-quality finished 
products” (Ranchers Renaissance Website, 2003).  The finished products derived 
from the Ranchers Renaissance cooperative are sold under several retail product 
labels including King Soopers’ Cattleman’s Collection, Harris Teeter Rancher, 
Sobey’s Select, and Safeway’s Angus Ranchers Reserve.  All of these brands 
guarantee their beef products to be consistent, tender, and flavourful (International 
Beef Industry Congress, 2003, 2).  The labels that Ranchers Renaissance produces 
under are owned by their respective retailers.  The cooperative itself does not own a 
brand name label, as in the retail environment a rental fee must be paid to gain shelf 
space for a product.  This space is quite expensive to rent and cooperatives often 
cannot afford to pay the fees.  Participants (cow-calf operators) are limited in the 
amount of investment they are willing to make in order to participate in a 
cooperative and if the capital required becomes too substantial it is unlikely the 
cooperative will be able to recruit participants.  Instead, cooperatives often prefer to 
produce for brands that are store owned (Butler, 2003).     
Unlike marketing alliances that often focus on guaranteeing attributes that 
are measured under existing government grading programs, producer-driven 
cooperatives, such as Ranchers Renaissance, tend to rely less on current grading 
standards as a measurement of quality and have more detailed program 
specifications.  The programs discussed above typically do not require members to 
comply with detailed specifications, as the increased identity preservation and 
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monitoring requirements would require a large amount of resources.  In a new 
generation cooperative, members are driving the program and can more readily 
observe whether program specifications are met.  They are likely to also be more 
motivated to follow program requirements given that they own the program and will 
profit directly from its success.        
Under the Ranchers Renaissance system, twenty-three quality control points 
verifying genetics, source, production and processing procedures, animal health and 
welfare, and feed programs have been implemented in order to provide consumers 
with quality assurance and a consistently tender product. Third party verification 
ensures that all members comply with specifications and electronic ear tags are used 
to collect data on each animal, which is then shared among all segments of the 
supply chains (Ranchers Renaissance Website, 2003). 
As a closed cooperative, membership is required in order to produce beef 
under the Ranchers Renaissance program.  Membership is broken into two classes, 
A and B, which are based on the number of cattle supplied to the program.  In order 
to be in Class A, members must provide a high volume of animals, whereas Class B 
members are required to provide a lower volume of animals.  Fees vary based on 
membership class, with class A members, paying a one time entry fee of U.S. 
$25,000 and from there the fee moves to as low as U.S. $2,500, with the fee being 
determined based on the number of head an individual is committing to market 
through the cooperative.  Currently there are 21 Class A members.  Several of the 
Class A members individually own and process around 30,000 head of cattle 
through the program each year.  Higher initial investments are required for larger 
suppliers given the fact that they are providing a large percentage of the animals that 
flow through the program.  Their long-term commitment is necessary to reduce 
variability in quality and to ensure the long-term stability of the program. 
New members are interviewed in order to ensure their operations fit within 
the program and that they are willing to provide a long-term commitment to the 
program.  Their operations are also audited to ensure that they comply with all 
production standards and program regulations.  Audits to ensure compliance are 
conducted by a third party.  In addition to initial inspections, evaluations of all 
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ranchers, feedlots, and the packer are performed each year (Butler, 2003).  A yearly 
fee of U.S. $3 per head is also assessed in order to cover promotion and 
administration costs.  The cooperative is a non-profit organization and any 
remaining funds at the end of the year are dispersed for research or redistributed to 
members (Ranchers Renaissance Website, 2003).      
Ranchers are required to commit a minimum number of cattle each year 
based on a three year rolling average of their prior commitments.  Each feedlot has 
to guarantee feeding space to a certain number of Ranchers Renaissance cattle each 
year in addition to paying an initial membership fee similar to that paid by cow-calf 
operators.  Every lot of cattle is contracted with Excel in order to coordinate 
production and ensure a constant flow into packing plants.  Four key retailers, which 
include Kroger, Harris Teeter, Sobeys, and Safeway are also contracted to purchase 
a given quantity of beef each year under their various brand names (Butler, 2003).  
Commitment between cow-calf operators and feedlots is achieved through required 
initial investments and incentives for premiums based on quality performance.  
Contracts are used to ensure the commitment between Ranchers Renaissance and the 
packer and retailer.  A mutual partnership also exists with these partners, as they 
both have an incentive to maintain their relationship with the program.  Packers gain 
from the premiums received and retailers gain from the ability to sell a differentiated 
beef product that increases their sales of meat.           
John Butler, the President of Ranchers Renaissance, stated that the most 
important element for success of the program has been the long-term commitment of 
all participating members (Butler, 2003).  As ranchers retain ownership of the 
product until it is sold to the retailer, alignment of the entire supply chain is 
necessary in order to ensure that each segment of production and processing adheres 
to the quality and process control standards of the cooperative.  An incentive-based 
grid pricing system is used to reward all supply chain members, with payments 
based on the end performance of cattle.  In addition to compliance with program 
specifications, which will improve the conformity of the cattle produced, the grid 
measures the performance of cattle based on specific yield, marbling, texture, and 
colour criteria (Butler, 2003).  Since inception, the Ranchers Renaissance approach 
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to producing branded beef products appears to have been very successful, with the 
cooperative processing over 200,000 head of cattle in 2003 and achieving over 30 
percent growth since production began in 2001 (Butler, 2003).      
New generation cooperatives, such as Ranchers Renaissance, are structured 
so that all segments act as partners in a coordinated supply chain.  This means that 
there should be transparency of information along the entire system, which allows 
for Ranchers Renaissance to verify the source, process, and genetics of all of its beef 
and produce a differentiated product (Butler, 2003).  Through the use of formal 
arrangements via contracts and equity investments, the commitment of supply chain 
members is ensured.  This differs from licensing and packer-owned programs where 
more loose and informal arrangements are used between supply chain partners.  As 
will be discussed in the next chapter, the underlying reason behind this higher level 
of commitment is to protect the specialized investments that have been made by 
supply chain members to meet the more detailed production and processing 
requirements of cooperative based programs. 
 
2.6.4 Future Beef Operations 
 Future Beef Operations was a comprehensive production to retail beef 
system with close vertical coordination along the supply chain.  It was initiated in 
the U.S. in 2001 (Bastian, 2001, 3).  Similar to Ranchers Renaissance, it tried to 
bring together all members of the supply chain, but was different in that the program 
was neither producer nor packer driven.  Instead, a new corporation was formed with 
major investors coming from different segments of the supply chain and outside of 
the industry.     
 The overall plan of Future Beef Operations was to coordinate genetics, 
production, and processing to deliver consistent high quality beef products tailored 
to a major chain of retail stores.  To achieve this, investors from the industry were 
brought together to build a new processing and packing plant that would supply 
1,700 Safeway stores in North America with branded beef products.  They then 
partnered with feedlots and cow-calf operators using a grid pricing system to 
provide incentives for producing high quality cattle (Bastian, 2001, 3).   While 
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Future Beef Operations’ system of coordination was very similar to that of Ranchers 
Renaissance, it differed in the fact that ownership of cattle was not retained by cow-
calf operators throughout the system.  Also, significant investment was incurred to 
build a plant, whereas Ranchers Renaissance does not own any cattle or processing 
facilities and is merely a non-profit organization facilitating the production of 
branded beef products.  Future Beef Operations is also different from a marketing 
alliance in that it was not initiated by an existing entity in the industry and instead 
was started as a new organization.          
 Less than a year after Future Beef Operations began production it filed for 
bankruptcy and ceased operation.  There are several reasons behind the demise of 
Future Beef Operations, some of which are related to the structure of the branded 
beef program and some that are attributed to bad timing and technical failures. The 
biggest downfalls included the fact that Future Beef Operations had an exclusive 
contract with Safeway and no other customers (Ishmael, 2002).  This left them open 
to opportunistic behaviour by the retailer.  They also did not adequately address risk 
within their contract with Safeway, and when Future Beef began to lose money, 
Safeway backed away from the risk sharing arrangements that existed (Ishmael, 
2002).  The failure of Future Beef Operations does not mean that this type of 
management structure is not viable, but issues can arise that would not arise under 
the structures outlined above.  The largest mistake may have been that no retailer, 
processor, or cattle supplier foresaw the creation of such a firm as a potentially 
profitable venture and consequently did not lead the initiative.  This resulted in a 
lack of commitment from different supply chain participants and a short-term versus 
long-term focus (Ishmael, 2002).       
Future Beef Operations made a significant investment in the construction of 
a new processing plant, which was intended to process large volumes of cattle from 
the start.  At the same time, relatively loose formal agreements were in place with 
their supply chain partners.  As a result Future Beef Operations was vulnerable 
(Kovanda and Schroeder, 2003, 17).  This vulnerability was enhanced by the fact 
that Future Beef Operations had focused specifically on the production of beef for 
one retailer, Safeway, while not ensuring the commitment of that retailer to the 
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project (Ishmael, 2002).  Of the total U.S. $50 million invested into the project no 
single investor held more than a 20 percent stake in the operation.  When economic 
losses were incurred in the first year supply chain members began to shy away from 
the venture, which resulted in the system falling apart (Ishmael, 2002).           
Losses are common in the first year due to unexpected problems and 
additional costs that may arise.  Partners in the system must be committed to making 
the system work.   Typically, due to the large investments made by members, there 
is a long-term commitment created.  This was the case for Ranchers Renaissance 
where losses were incurred in the short-run, but sunk investments resulted in supply 
chain members having a long-term focus and a commitment to the program that 
enabled it to succeed.  Future Beef Operations had incurred significant investments, 
but did not have sound relationships among its various partners through contracts or 
adequate equity commitments to protect these investments (Kovanda and Schroeder, 
2003, 17).  This type of structure could be viable, but it requires that all supply chain 
members are committed to the venture via well-constructed contracts and equity 
investments that provide for long-term stability.               
 
2.7 Summary and Conclusions 
 The objective of this chapter was to provide a brief background of the beef 
industry, examining how the North American industry is currently structured, the 
declining demand for beef, and the underlying reasons behind this decline in 
demand.  The chapter also examined the reasons behind the current transformation 
within the beef industry and its move away from the production of commodity-
oriented beef products, focusing specifically on why consumers prefer branded beef 
products.  The last two sections of the chapter discussed branded beef programs first 
generally and then through the use of case studies.  Currently, four main types of 
programs have emerged with the structure of these programs varying significantly, 
as to their management, degree of coordination, and the types of beef products that 
they brand.  The next chapter will further examine the structure of branded beef 
programs and how they have affected supply chain coordination in the industry.  
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Transaction Cost Economics is used to explain the movement towards improved 
coordination in the beef industry.   
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3 SUPPLY CHAIN COORDINATION 
3.1 Introduction 
 The purpose of this chapter is to provide a brief discussion of the current 
reorganization of the beef industry and why the industry has been slow to move in 
the direction of branded beef programs.  This chapter will also describe the existing 
vertical coordination continuum, focusing on the different types of supply chain 
structures and the characteristics of these structures.  Leading from that, a succinct 
discussion of transaction cost economics and its key building blocks will be 
provided in order to show how transaction costs affect vertical coordination in the 
beef industry.         
 
3.2 Beef Industry Reorganization 
From the prior chapter, it is apparent that beef quality and consistency are 
important aspects of consumers’ demand for beef.  The beef industry could gain by 
marketing branded products containing guarantees that reduce the number of 
unsatisfied customers.  In addition, the premiums associated with branded products 
have the potential to increase the low or negative profits that often occur in the beef 
industry (Bliss and Ward, 1992, 2).   
Even though it has been determined that consumers appear willing to pay a 
premium for differentiated beef products, the industry has been slow to move in this 
direction due to the immense reorganization of the supply chain that would be 
required.  The supply chain in the beef industry is currently set up to deal with 
commodity production.  Previously, commodity agriculture was regarded as an 
efficient method of organizing production and distribution due to economies of scale 
advantages (Hayes et al., 2003, 1).  With the increased movement towards product 
differentiation, however, the commingling that occurs with bulk handling in a 
commodity agriculture systems means that demand signals for specific attributes 
cannot be sent from consumers along the supply chain (Hayes et al., 2003, 1).   
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For example, consumers desire tender and consistent beef products for which 
they are willing to pay a premium, but the farmer does not get this price signal due 
to commingling of the output of many suppliers.  As a result of this system, there is 
no incentive to improve production methods, as the same price will be received 
regardless of the final quality.              
Price is an important signal for encouraging the production of consumer-
oriented beef products and commodity production results in a failure of this 
incentive.  The price system is supposed to transfer information on consumer 
preferences back to cattle suppliers to ensure that the livestock produced correspond 
with what consumers are willing to pay for.  For the price system to work and ensure 
quality and consistency there must be a set of quality standards that identify all the 
attributes that are important to consumers.  Prices must mesh with those standards in 
order to provide rewards for the production of particular attributes (Purcell, 2002, 7; 
Barkema, 1994, 544).   
The development of a grading system that isolates all of the attributes being 
demanded by consumers has not occurred for several reasons.  Firstly, the numbers 
of attributes demanded by consumers are numerous and vary from consumer to 
consumer, overwhelming the ability of the traditional marketing system to classify 
and identify all important attributes (Barkema, 1994, 544).  Secondly, the ability to 
accurately monitor and measure for the presence or absence of particular 
characteristics such as specific production processes, welfare practices, inputs, and 
safety attributes can be limited due to excessive costs.  These costs arise because 
production practices must be monitored and finished products must be tested when 
the presence or absence of a particular attribute is not easily verifiable by inspecting 
live animals or meat products (Kovanda and Schroeder, 2003, 5).      
 Purcell (2002) compares the beef industry to a firm and states that if the beef 
sector was a firm managed by a central control center, the first job would be to make 
sure livestock being produced were consistent with quality controlled products at the 
consumer level (Purcell, 2002, 6).  Clearly, the beef sector is not a firm, there is no 
single control center, and therefore beef supply chains often lack the necessary 
coordination to achieve the goals of quality and consistency.  The result is an 
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industry that is disconnected, with poor communication of price and quality signals 
across market interfaces.  An industry that is not very adept in producing value-
added, branded products.   
 
3.3 Supply Chain Coordination  
 The failure of the traditional market structure to provide the “right” signal to 
supply chain participants has resulted in an increased movement to develop more 
coordinated supply chains to produce branded beef products.  The production and 
marketing channel for beef is segmented and complex, with numerous product 
ownership exchanges occurring throughout the supply chain.  These impede the flow 
of information (Ward, 2001, WF-563, 1).  In general, increased coordination 
improves information flow along the supply chain and enhances the ability of the 
beef industry to identify and adjust to changing consumer demands (Boehlje et al., 
1999, 1).  Increased coordination also typically results in the ability to gain enhanced 
control over the production and processing of beef products to ensure a certain 
standard of quality and consistency.            
 Vertical coordination is defined as all the ways of harmonizing the different 
stages of the production-marketing channel (Hobbs et al., 1996, 404).  Coordination 
results in the alignment and control of various factors including price, quantity, 
quality, and terms of exchange. The different methods for achieving vertical 
coordination have been conceptualized as a continuum that ranges from spot markets 
to complete vertical integration (Peterson and Wysocki, 1998, 2).  Most prior 
theoretical work has focused on the two ends of the continuum (spot markets and 
vertical integration), while the middle of continuum has been explored less 
thoroughly because it is a blend of the two extremes and no single theory completely 
explains the many different structures that can emerge.                
 Increased coordination in the beef industry has been characterized by a 
movement away from the traditional spot market system to the increased use of a 
variety of different market structures.  The five dominant market structures that 
currently exist or are emerging in the beef industry include spot markets, production 
and marketing contracts, informal strategic alliances, formal strategic alliances, and 
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vertical integration. With spot markets the intensity of coordination is low.  In a spot 
market, relatively homogenous goods with easily measurable characteristics are 
traded between multiple buyers and sellers, with the sole determinant of the final 
transaction being price (Hobbs, 1996, 19).  Due to the nature of spot market 
transactions, marketing commitments are made only after the production process in 
a particular industry segment is complete (Unterschultz, 2000, 3). 
 
3.3.1 Production and Marketing Contracts 
Production and marketing contracts are one way to overcome some of the 
limitations of the spot market system, as they allow for the transfer of more detailed 
information and the measurement of quality attributes other than price.  Market 
specification contracts typically stipulate price or a method of determining price, as 
well as when the product will be sold and delivered (Hobbs, 1996, 19). Production 
contracts give even more control to the buyer of a product, with the buyer actually 
participating in the production process through the inspection of the production 
process and/or specification of the inputs to be used (Hobbs, 1996, 19).   
In both cases, contracts are a method to legally enforce specific and detailed 
conditions of exchange other than price.  Parties in a contract can exercise control 
through the ex ante negotiation of contract specifications and incentives for meeting 
those specifications.  Ex post, parties can exert control through monitoring the 
contract as it is carried out to ensure all parties perform as stipulated, with third 
party enforcement being used to penalize any parties that violate the agreement 
(Peterson and Wysocki, 1998, 6).  
Contracts have typically been used between packers and feedlots, while their 
emergence has been less apparent between cow-calf operators and feedlots.  This 
will be discussed later in this thesis, but several motivations can be identified as to 
why feedlots and packers have increasingly used contracts.  In a survey by Lawrence 
et al. (2001), packers were queried regarding the importance of specific reasons for 
entering into marketing contracts with feedlots.  Packers used contracts mainly to 
secure higher quality cattle and more consistent quality cattle (Lawrence et al., 2001, 
378).  Being guaranteed a specific quality and supply of beef enables packers to 
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establish supply contracts with retailers and other end users that are demanding beef 
with specific attributes.                                       
Another potential benefit that packers realize from the use of contracts is 
reduced operation costs that are a result of improved of supply and quality of inputs.  
Many large packing plants involve extensive investments and they must establish a 
constant flow of uniform inputs to manage operating costs.  When plants are 
operating near capacity, significant cost savings are realized.  It has been estimated 
that increasing plant utilization from 70 percent to 90 percent reduces operating 
costs by $16/head (Hayenga et al., 2000, 48).  Such sizeable cost savings serve as a 
major motivation for beef packers to develop closer relationships with their input 
suppliers.  Ensuring a constant flow of cattle into the plant is important and can be 
difficult when operating in the spot market, especially if inadequate supplies exist.  
In these situations, higher prices must be paid to ensure the plant is operating at an 
efficient level.  Increased coordination reduces this concern through the assurance of 
a constant flow of cattle at, presumably, a more consistent price.            
A feedlot’s primary incentive to enter into contracts is to secure quality 
premiums and obtain a higher price for cattle.  Also important is the receipt of 
detailed carcass data when a grid-based pricing system is used in the contract 
arrangement (Lawrence et al., 2001, 379).  Under the grid pricing systems, typical of 
many branded beef programs, packers return slaughter summaries and other carcass 
performance data to feedlots to provide them with information on how their cattle 
performed.  This information allows feedlots to identify problem areas and make 
appropriate adjustments to better suit grid specifications and capture premiums.  
Feedlots that enter into contracts also benefit from having a guaranteed market outlet 
and in some cases a guaranteed price that increases revenue stability and allows 
them to concentrate their management efforts on the production process instead of 
market and price discovery functions (Hayenga et al., 2000, 24). 
 
3.3.2 Strategic Alliances 
Strategic alliances are similar to contracts in that they reduce the 
segmentation in the production and marketing channel for beef by linking 
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production stages more closely together (Ward, 2001, WF-563. 2).  Strategic 
alliances are agreements between or among firms to cooperate in an effort to 
accomplish some strategic purpose and work jointly for mutual benefits (Sporleder, 
1994, 533).  It is an exchange relationship in which firms share the risks and benefits 
emanating from mutually identified objectives, with joint control being exerted both 
ex ante and ex post.  Ex ante, the control process involves building the relationship 
to help ensure that mutual interests are in fact present.  Ex post, monitoring the 
relationship and performance is essential.  If performance is sub-optimal, mutual 
resolution of concerns or a mutual decision to dissolve the relationship can occur 
under a strategic alliance (Peterson and Wysocki, 1998, 7).   
Strategic alliances allow supply chain participants to maintain their 
independence while increasing supply chain coordination to improve the flow of 
information and the production of beef products tailored to consumer demands.  By 
sharing information about products and markets, in addition to market prices, 
information flow is more efficient and alliance participants are able to respond more 
quickly to market signals (Ward, 2001, WF-563, 2).  Alliances also allow for the 
participation of several phases of the beef production and processing sectors, 
whereas contracts typically organize transactions between only two participants in 
the supply chain.  The involvement of multiple supply chain participants further 
improves coordination, as participants such as cow-calf operators that typically do 
not receive information about consumers’ demands have the opportunity to respond 
to these market signals (Beshear and Lamb, 1998, 63).  The increased level of 
coordination also improves the ability to trace products throughout the supply chain 
and ensure that any segregation and production requirements are met.      
Several alliance structures currently exist within the beef industry and they 
vary considerably with respect to their degree of coordination, commitment, and use 
of supplementary agreements to sustain the alliance.  Generally, alliances have taken 
two paths in design structure, equity-based and non-equity based.  Equity-based 
alliances, also known as formal alliances, typically require a contractual obligation 
and a financial investment to participate.  Non-equity alliances, also known as 
informal alliances, may or may not require the use of a contract and do not require 
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an initial financial investment to participate (Kovanda and Schroeder, 2003, 3).  
While informal alliances rely heavily on trust, more formal alliances typically have 
joint assets, which result in participants having an obligation to each other that leads 
to an ongoing relationship (Kovanda and Schroeder, 2003, 2).  In some informal 
alliances and most formal alliances there is also the presence of an organization that 
has an identity distinct from the individual participants and is designed to be their 
joint agent in transactions (Peterson and Wysocki, 1998, 8).  For example, Ranchers 
Renaissance is a cooperative under which cow-calf operators, feedlots, a packer, and 
retailers work together, while still operating as separate entities.           
 Based on the discussion in the previous chapter, informal alliances can be 
further broken down into brand licensing organizations and marketing alliances.  
Similarly, formal alliances can be associated with new generation cooperatives of 
cow-calf operators that have emerged within the beef industry.  For the vast majority 
of alliances, pricing via grids has become the most common method of determining 
cattle value, as grid pricing sends clearer signals.  Informal alliances typically rely 
on the sole use of such grids, with the Decatur Beef Alliance (Chapter 2), being a 
good example of an informal alliance.  More formal alliances rely on the 
organization of a new generation cooperative that mixes price incentives with non-
price controls to produce cattle with particular traits (Beshear and Lamb, 1998, 61).  
An example of such an alliance is the Ranchers Renaissance cooperative mentioned 
in Chapter 2.           
Supply chain participants are motivated to become involved in an alliance for 
several reasons.  In addition to the motivations discussed above, alliances allow for 
more control of the supply chain, with the degree of control depending on whether 
their structure is informal or formal.  In both cases, alliances allow for improved 
traceability and the ability to transfer more detailed information among participants, 
with the degree of traceability and information transfer depending on the level of 
coordination involved.  In turn, this improves the ability of participants to produce 
beef with the specific quality characteristics that are desired by consumers and 
respond quickly to any market changes (Kovanda and Schroeder, 2003, 6).  The 
restricted membership of formal alliances also provides increased stability for 
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farmers who are guaranteed a given level of market access and are more likely to 
receive premium prices given the limited market size (Boland and Katz, 2000, 109).   
 A significant difference between contracts, informal alliances and formal 
alliances is that the joint investment, which occurs in a cooperative situation, 
provides additional assurances that supply chain participants are committed to the 
quality of their product.  This type of arrangement also typically works to provide 
downstream users with a more consistent and guaranteed supply of cattle to reduce 
inefficiencies associated with fluctuations in supply (Boland and Katz, 2000, 109).  
The commitment of supply chain members becomes especially important when the 
goal of a branded program is to provide a beef product with many detailed 
specifications or attributes that cannot easily be detected or controlled for along the 
supply chain.  High levels of communication and trust between all segments of the 
supply chain are required in this scenario to ensure consumer preferences are 
conveyed and that all production and process specifications are met along the entire 
supply chain. 
 
3.3.3 Vertical Integration 
Vertical integration represents the most closely coordinated supply chain 
structure, with all stages of the supply chain owned and controlled by one firm 
(Kovanda and Schroeder, 2001, 1).  Instead of independent supply chain participants 
using a price discovery process to transact with other participants, products move 
between various stages of the supply chain as a result of within-firm managerial 
orders (Hobbs, 1996a, 19).  Vertical integration further improves traceability and the 
transfer of information along the supply chain to reduce quantity and quality risk, 
generates efficiencies in moving a product through the system, and potentially 
captures profits from all levels of the supply chain (Hayenga et al., 2000, 2).   
 The benefits of increased supply chain coordination in the beef industry are 
clear: to produce branded beef products with more detailed specifications and 
numerous attributes, a more coordinated system is required in order to ensure 
information is passed along the supply chain and reduce the relative costs incurred to 
assure product quality.  The movement towards full integration of the beef industry, 
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however, has been limited for several reasons.  Firstly, combining various stages of 
production can be problematic in that the varying scale of operation that each stage 
requires to function efficiently may result in cost disadvantages (den Ouden at al., 
1996, 280).  Cow-calf operations are found to typically operate on a relatively small 
scale and, as a result, tend to expend minimal resources to increase herd size and 
reduce variations in cattle quality.  It is also thought that to increase operation size in 
order to supply adequate volumes of animals into an integrated production and 
processing system would result in an increase in costs.  These costs arise because 
cow-calf production is land intensive and in order to produce the volumes that would 
be required by an integrated system, production would likely have to be dispersed 
over a large geographical area.  Consequently, high monitoring costs would be 
incurred, as it is difficult to manage cow-calf production when it is dispersed over a 
large geographical area.  These high costs may discourage vertical integration.            
Vertical integration also consumes a large amount of capital resources.  For 
vertical integration to be practical large capital investments need to be offset by 
substantial cost savings, or returns greater than an integrated firm’s cost of capital 
(den Ouden et al., 1996, 280).  The increase in monitoring costs in the cow-calf 
sector when the scale of cow-calf operations is increased to facilitate integration 
may offset any cost savings from integration.  As a result, there is little incentive for 
individuals within the beef industry to vertically integrate all aspects of the industry.     
 
3.4 Limitations to Increased Supply Chain Coordination 
 Why has coordination in the beef industry slow to emerge? Based on the 
previous discussion it is clear why the industry has not moved towards complete 
integration, but the movement away from spot markets towards other methods of 
coordination has also been slow to occur.  The use of contracts and alliances may be 
the most effective way to coordinate production and market activities given the 
limitations to vertical integration in the beef industry.  At the same time, the beef 
industry faces several challenges in moving away from the traditional marketing 
system towards contracts and alliances and improving vertical coordination.  These 
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challenges have limited its ability to become more competitive with the pork and 
poultry industries which did not encounter similar challenges.    
 One of the primary differences with pork and poultry involves the speed with 
which biological changes such as genetic improvement are possible.  While the 
biological process to produce changes is twenty-four months for beef cattle, it is 
twelve months for pork, and five months for poultry (Ward, 2001, WF-552, 1).  
Shorter biological processes mean cost-reducing genetic improvements can be 
accomplished at a faster pace and more rapid progress towards improved 
consistency is possible.  This reduces the costs associated with monitoring 
production to ensure consistency and consequently reduces the costs associated with 
vertical integration.  Also, while the genetic bases of poultry and pork are narrow 
and becoming narrower, the beef genetic base is actually widening due to the lower 
degree of vertical coordination and a wider geographic dispersion.  A widening 
genetic base reduces consistency of production and means that it is more difficult to 
recognize desirable genetic traits and separate them to breed for those specific traits 
(Ward, 2001, WF-552, 1).   
The number of industry stages has also affected the degree of vertical 
coordination.  Pork and poultry have two key production stages (farrowing/finishing 
and hatching/growing) while beef often has three stages (seedstock/cow-calf, 
background feeders, and finishing feeders).  Each stage has different resources and 
management needs and thus it is more difficult to manage a vertically integrated 
beef production unit (Ward, 2001, WF-552, 2).  Consequently, the number of 
differentiated value-added products has been limited due to reduced coordination 
and less control over the quality and quantity of beef supplies.   
 Geographic concentration has also affected the emergence of vertical 
coordination.  Beef production is dispersed, while the pork and poultry industries in 
the U.S. are concentrated within specific regions.  This dispersion of production may 
in part be due to the substantially larger land requirements for beef production.  
Dispersed production results in a wide variation in the production and management 
practices used, genetics, and overall profitability across environments.  As well, the 
geographic dispersion combined with an added production stage means that the beef 
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industry incurs costs as animals are moved from dispersed cow-calf operations to 
more concentrated backgrounding areas and to still more concentrated cattle feeding 
areas (Ward, 2001, WF-552, 2).   
While the majority of pork and poultry operations are relatively large, 
intensely managed operations, the beef industry has been limited in its ability to 
adopt a similar structure.  This is partly a result of the high management and 
monitoring costs in the cow-calf sector.  It is difficult to organize and manage a 
large number of small production units.  Consequently, improved coordination 
between the cow-calf sector and other industry segments has been limited.  This in 
turn has reduced the ability of the beef industry to exert control over the supply 
chain and ensure quality and consistency (Ward, 2001, WF-552, 5).  Based on the 
current limitations to integration in the beef industry, it is expected that the industry 
will continue to rely on the use of contracts and alliances.  Contracts and alliances 
will probably be refined to improve coordination mechanisms and substitute for 
vertical integration where it is not viable.     
The use of contracts is likely to be limited to coordinating transactions at the 
feedlot-packer interface.  This is where the development within the beef industry 
will likely have to diverge from the current pork and poultry models, which are 
dominated by the use of production contracts and vertical integration.  A different 
system is necessary to align consumers’ demands with industry production and 
facilitate the unique transaction interface between the cow-calf sector and the rest of 
the industry.  The issue of improving coordination between the cow-calf sector and 
the rest of the industry will be examined later on in the thesis where conjoint 
analysis is used to identify cow-calf operators’ preferences for different transaction 
characteristics.        
 
3.5 Degree of Coordination: Evidence 
Currently, in the U.S. beef industry the use of cash markets, marketing 
agreements and informal alliances dominate transactions.  In 2001, a survey of 
feedlots was conducted in the largest cattle feeding states (Iowa, Kansas, Nebraska, 
and Texas) to examine changes in marketing methods for fed cattle.  The percentage 
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of fed cattle sold under different types of contracts and alliances has increased over 
time, from 23 percent in 1996 to 52 percent in 2001 and is expected to increase to 65 
percent by 2005 (Schroeder et al., 2002, 1).  The survey does not specify the specific 
types of contracts and alliances included under this classification, but it is expected 
to include market contracts, production contracts, and both informal and formal 
alliances.   
The survey identified three distinct trends regarding the use of contracts and 
alliances within the beef industry.  Firstly, the participation in alliances (formal and 
informal) has increased, with 45 percent of respondents indicating that in 2001 they 
marketed at least some cattle under an alliance as compared to only 11 percent in 
1996.  This represents an estimated 8 percent of total fed cattle marketings in 1996 
and 27 percent in 2001.  Secondly, it was found that larger operations were more 
likely to participate in a marketing agreement than smaller operations.  Thirdly, the 
survey identified that a shift in the price system has occurred, with the industry 
shifting away from pricing cattle on a live weight basis towards grid-based pricing 
that focuses on carcass quality.  Between 1996 and 2001 the use of grid-based 
pricing had increased 16 percent to 45 percent and was expected to reach 62 percent 
by 2006 (Schroeder et al., 2002, 4).  Similar research has also found that pork and 
beef packers have increased the output that they have committed to retailers and 
other end-users under long term arrangements, with current commitments being 
around 40 percent of total output (Hayenga et al., 2002, 19).     
Similar data regarding changes in the marketing of fed cattle in Canada was 
not available, but data from the three largest packers in Alberta suggest that cash 
sales are still the predominant means of marketing slaughter cattle.  In 2002, 60% of 
fed cattle were procured on a cash (live weight) basis, 22 percent were procured 
through some type of marketing agreement, and 18 percent were packer owned 
(Canfax Research Services, 2003).  Data was also not available for the U.S. or 
Canada on the marketing methods used between cow-calf operators and feeders, but 
it is expected that cash sales remain as the predominant means of marketing feeder 
cattle given the minimal consolidation and coordination in the cow-calf sector.    
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The statistics described above reveal that, despite limitations to coordination, 
a transformation is slowly occurring in the beef industry.  The traditional divisions 
between the market segments are becoming less distinct and the prior pricing system 
is being replaced with other devices that improve coordination and information 
transfer among supply chain segments.  In a sense, the beef industry is currently in 
disequilibrium; consumer demands have changed and the market is adjusting to 
supply the products being demanded, but has not fully transformed from the existing 
system. It is not yet clear where equilibrium will be reached in terms of the optimal 
vertical coordination mechanism.   
Ultimately it is likely the beef industry will operate through several different 
coordination mechanisms.  This is because of the many different attributes that are 
demanded by consumers and the fact that different levels of coordination are 
required to guarantee these attributes.  In addition, different strengths of guarantee 
can be provided for a single attribute, which will affect the degree of coordination 
required and the cost of production.  Some programs have more detailed production 
and processing requirements, requiring greater coordination and increased costs, but 
also facilitating increased assurance of tenderness and other quality attributes.  
These programs will charge a higher price and some consumers may not be willing 
to pay for that extra assurance and will therefore buy product from a different type 
of program with lower prices.           
The key question is why one method of coordination will be preferred over 
another to accomplish the goals of producing a beef product with particular 
attributes?  Transaction cost economics provides one possible approach to 
understanding supply chain coordination in the beef industry. 
 
3.6 Transaction Cost Economics 
 In economics, the predominant neoclassical paradigm has provided for only a 
limited understanding of market organization and the operation of supply chains due 
to its key assumptions.  Neoclassical theory is based on the concept of a single 
product firm that operates in a perfectly competitive industry with a large number of 
other firms that produce the same product in a stable or near equilibrium market 
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environment (Hobbs, 1996, 15).  Transactions that move products between separable 
stages in the production, processing, and distribution chain involve the transfer of 
homogenous products, which means there are no costs to measuring the value of a 
given product, as there is no variation in the quality of products.  It is also assumed 
that economic agents possess perfect information, which results in no price 
uncertainty, or other uncertainty associated with product characteristics and the 
behaviour of other individuals (Hobbs, 1996, 16).  Along with its underlying 
assumptions, neoclassical economics fails to provide a rationale for the existence of 
firms and, instead, simply accepts them as a facet of production.               
 Coase’s (1937) seminal paper “On the Nature of the Firm” created a new 
approach to understanding market organization.  Instead of accepting the underlying 
assumptions of neoclassical economics and the existence of firms, Coase questioned 
why firms arose as a method of coordinating transactions.  He proposed that firms 
and markets were alternative means of economic organization, with the mode (firm 
or market) being chosen depending on the costs incurred under each structure 
(Williamson, 1986b, 176).  In doing so, Coase recognized that there are costs to 
using the price mechanism, which may be reduced by forming an organization to 
direct resources internally.  Costs of using the price mechanism include costs 
associated with discovering what the relevant prices may be and costs associated 
with negotiating separate contracts for every transaction that occurs (Coase, 1937, 
391).  The ideas that Coase put forth became the basis for New Institutional 
Economics and the costs that he referred to became know as transaction costs.     
 New Institutional Economics, views a firm as a way of organizing 
transactions internally and avoiding the costs of using the market to organize these 
same transactions.  Firms will become larger as additional transactions are organized 
internally (Coase, 1937, 393).  As firms get larger, however, the administrative costs 
of internally organizing transactions may increase, which will result in there coming 
a point where the costs of organizing an extra transaction within the firm are equal to 
the costs involved in carrying out the transaction in the market.  At this point, a firm 
will no longer expand to organize an additional transaction within the firm, as the 
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costs of doing so are equal to the costs of carrying out the transaction in the open 
market (Coase, 1937, 395).                   
 Coase’s initial contribution has since been extended with one of the major 
contributors to transaction cost theory being Oliver E. Williamson.  Transaction cost 
theory has been used to advance the current understanding of how transactions are 
carried out along supply chains and why different types of supply chain coordination 
structures emerge.  A transaction occurs whenever a product must move between 
separable stages in production, processing, or distribution (Hobbs et al., 1996, 404).  
Transaction costs are the costs of carrying out a transaction, with the nature and size 
of these costs determining the optimum method of vertical coordination.  Economic 
activity will be organized in such a way as to minimize these costs in the long run 
(Hobbs, 1998, 525, Martinez et al., 1998, 302).                
 In order to identify particular transaction costs and how they affect the 
optimal method of vertical coordination it is useful to separate these costs into three 
main categories: information costs, negotiation costs, and monitoring costs.  
Information costs are the costs that individuals and firms face in the search for 
information about price, inputs, and buyers or sellers.  Negotiation costs are the 
costs associated with the actual transaction that for example, are incurred while 
negotiating and writing contracts.  Negotiation costs also arise when a third party or 
intermediary is required to facilitate a transaction.  After an exchange has been 
negotiated a transaction may require that a firm or an individual monitor the quality 
of goods from a supplier, monitor the behaviour of either party to ensure that all the 
conditions of the transaction are met, or monitor the activities of employees to 
ensure managerial orders have been carried out. The costs associated with this action 
are known as monitoring costs and will also include any costs incurred if it is 
necessary to legally enforce an agreement (enforcement costs) (Hobbs, 1996, 17).          
 
3.6.1 Key Concepts of Transaction Cost Economics 
 Transaction cost economics recognizes that markets do not always operate 
under perfectly competitive conditions.  Agents to a transaction do not always 
possess perfect information, which results in uncertainty associated with prices, 
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product quality, and the actions of other individuals in the market.  Transaction cost 
economics maintains that economic agents are characterized by bounded rationality 
and opportunism.  It also maintains that many transactions are characterized by 
imperfect information, either incomplete information or asymmetric information, 
and conditions of asset specificity are widespread (Williamson, 1986b, 181).  These 
four underlying concepts are important in examining how transaction costs affect 
vertical coordination in a particular supply chain. 
 Bounded rationality means that people’s capacity to accurately evaluate all 
possible decision alternatives is limited even if they intend to make a rational 
decision.  Bounded rationality becomes a problem in situations where transactions 
are complex and a degree of uncertainty exists, as the ability of an individual to 
make an accurate and all encompassing decision on how to best carry out a 
transaction is limited (Hobbs, 1996a, 17).  This means that agreements made 
between individuals in a supply chain may be incomplete and subject to 
opportunism. 
 Opportunism means that firms and individuals operating in the market are 
often placed in situations where it is possible to exploit others to their own 
advantage (self-interest seeking with guile).  Certain market situations can increase 
the ability of one transacting party to alter the terms of an agreement ex post to their 
own advantage.  Market circumstances that encourage or support opportunistic 
behaviour include situations where there are few alternative suppliers for a particular 
input, or the reverse where there are few alternative buyers for a particular output.  
This is known as a small numbers bargaining situation (Williamson, 1986a).  
Restricted market size may result in one party demanding a different price than was 
previously agreed, as the other party is limited in its ability to locate new buyers or 
suppliers after committing resources (Hobbs, 1996a, 17). Opportunistic behaviour 
associated with restricted market size is more likely when asset specificity is present.    
 Asset specificity occurs when one partner in an exchange invests in assets 
that are specialized to the needs of that particular exchange and have little or no 
value in an alternative use (Hobbs, 1996a, 17).  Investment in specific assets 
generates quasi-rents, which are defined as the value of an asset in excess of its 
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salvage value or the value in its next best use (Martinez et al., 1998, 303).  If the 
quasi-rents generated are high, other partners in an exchange may try to act 
opportunistically and extract some of the rent from this investment.  Extraction of 
quasi-rents by other firms will occur up to the point that the investing firm’s 
operating costs are just covered, as they will have little choice but to accept the new 
arrangements given their investment has little or no value in an alternative use 
(Hobbs, 1996a, 17).     
 The fourth concept underlying transaction cost analysis is information 
asymmetry.  Neoclassical economic theory assumes that all parties in an exchange 
possess perfect information.  The concept of information asymmetry recognizes that, 
while some information is public and available to all parties in a transaction, other 
information is only available to selected parties.  Opportunistic behaviour can arise 
as information can be hidden prior to a transaction that may result in adverse 
selection by buyers.  For example, hidden information may prevent buyers from 
detecting a sub-standard product and, as a result, suppliers may cheat and supply 
sub-standard products while being the paid for the higher quality product (Hobbs, 
1998, 527).  Problems associated with information asymmetry can also arise after a 
transaction has occurred, as an individual’s actions after a transaction may not be 
readily observable to others (moral hazard) (Hobbs, 1996a, 17).         
 
3.7 Vertical Coordination and Transaction Cost Economics 
 Vertical coordination can be viewed as a continuum of different 
organizational forms.  Spot markets lie at one extreme and operate in circumstances 
where homogenous goods are exchanged, with price being the sole determinant of 
the transaction.   Moving along the continuum, contracts, informal alliances, formal 
alliances, and vertical integration provide for the increased coordination and control 
of transactions between supply chain participants (Hobbs, 1996a, 19).  Transaction 
cost economics suggests that the type of vertical coordination and supply chain 
structures that emerge within the beef industry will depend both on the production 
costs and the transaction costs incurred to produce a particular product.  Williamson 
proposed that the three main characteristics that determine the nature and level of 
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transaction costs are the degree of uncertainty surrounding a particular transaction, 
the frequency with which transactions occur, and the degree to which transaction 
specific investments are made (Williamson, 1986a, 105).  Consequently, the 
likelihood of observing a particular supply chain structure is a function of the 
transaction characteristics, with organizational form being the dependent variable 
and asset specificity, uncertainty, and transaction frequency being the independent 
variables (Shelanski and Klein, 1995, 338).  
 Some assets are specific to the production of specific goods in closed supply 
chains with bilateral trading relationships.  In the beef sector, such investments can 
include improved herd genetics, specialized inputs related to the production process, 
computer chips to maintain the identity of individual animals during production and 
processing, new processing technologies, and investments related to specialized 
human capital.  Those who invest in specific assets have an incentive to protect 
themselves against opportunistic behaviour by trading partners that could try to 
appropriate any quasi-rents that exist.  Consequently, as asset specificity rises it is 
expected that the degree of vertical coordination will increase to create safeguards 
that protect the specific investments. Therefore, the probability of observing a more 
integrated governance structure will depend positively on the value of the 
transaction specific investments involved.  Where significant levels of assets are 
involved, the optimal governance structure will depend on the degree of uncertainty 
surrounding transactions and the frequency of trade (Shelanski and Klein, 1995, 
338).        
For example, as consumers’ tastes become less homogenous, a variety of 
animal types with a different but specific set of characteristics are required.  This 
means that producers and feedlots must tailor their output to the needs of individual 
production programs, which may result in increased average production costs for 
these supply chain participants.  Ideally, the increased costs should be more than 
offset by premium prices received for the production of the desired attributes, but 
the production of a specialized product has two effects.  Firstly, it removes the 
producer from the competitive market where prices are determined by market forces 
and into a smaller market with fewer buyers.  In this situation a small numbers 
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bargaining problem arises.  Prices must be negotiated on an individual basis with the 
buyer and upon investment the buyer may act opportunistically and want to 
renegotiate a lower price in order to take capture any quasi-rents.  Secondly, it 
leaves the farmer with a specialized product that could be heavily discounted by 
other buyers with different production requirements (Hobbs et al., 1996b, 405).   
Cow-calf operators and feedlots are vulnerable if they produce specialized 
animals using only the existing commodity market mechanism to transact with 
buyers, as they have a perishable product and few if any alternative buyers.  Buyers 
also become vulnerable to opportunistic behaviour by sellers.  If buyers have 
product commitments to meet further down the supply chain, spot markets may not 
provide them with a sufficient assurance that their demands for specialized inputs 
will be filled without incurring high information/search costs (Hobbs et al., 1996b, 
405).   To curb the tendency to act opportunistically and ensure adequate volumes of 
inputs, buyers and sellers will likely choose to move up the vertical coordination 
continuum when transaction specific investments are involved and use contracts or 
alliances as an alternative to carrying out transactions on the spot market. 
The degree of uncertainty surrounding a transaction is a result of several 
factors, including the length of the relationship among transaction partners, market 
conditions, incomplete information, and information asymmetry.   As a rule, 
uncertain demand and supply conditions cause firms to rely on non-market 
coordination methods.  When transactions are conducted under uncertainty it can 
become very costly or impossible to anticipate all future contingencies.  In this 
situation, alternative means of coordination that reduce uncertainty may be more 
desirable (Frank and Henderson, 1992, 946).  Similarly, where specialized assets are 
involved, uncertainty as to the longevity of a relationship will increase the reliance 
on non-market coordination methods to ensure that ongoing returns are sufficient to 
cover the cost of the initial investment. 
Incomplete information about the product generates uncertainty.  The degree 
of uncertainty depends on the attributes being produced and how easily they can be 
measured.  Cow-calf operators and feedlots producing cattle with specific attributes 
that are not easily measured should prefer methods of improved coordination that 
 57
move transactions away from the spot market.  Currently, cattle in the spot market 
system are priced based on the average quality of a lot (group) of cattle, but the 
quality of individual animals can vary significantly within a lot of cattle.  Increased 
coordination allows supply chain participants to move away from pricing based on 
average lot quality, and allows for pricing based on the identification of product 
attributes that are not easily measured under the existing system (Hudson and 
Purcell, 2003, 62).   
Processors will also prefer increased coordination in situations where 
uncertainty arises as a result of information asymmetry about product attributes.  
The presence of information asymmetry may result in processors purchasing sub-
standard products at a premium price (Hobbs, 1998, 527).  For example, in the 
absence of credible third party monitoring, producers have the incentive to identify 
their product as organic even if it is conventionally produced in order to obtain 
premium prices.  Given that it is difficult to detect this practice processors may 
unknowingly purchase a non-organic product.  Increased coordination, allowing 
processors increased control over and monitoring of the production process, reduces 
the uncertainty associated with information asymmetry.                         
The frequency of transactions also affects vertical coordination.  
Transactions that are repeated frequently may require less vertical coordination, as 
firms do not wish to tarnish their reputation by acting opportunistically.  Frequent 
transactions also allow for the increased transfer of information between transacting 
parties, which reduces information asymmetry and thus the need for higher levels of 
coordination.  The incentive to act opportunistically and exploit any information 
asymmetry that may be present will increase as transactions occur less frequently 
and will result in transacting parties choosing to operate under increased levels of 
coordination (Hobbs, 1996a, 20). 
 
3.8 Determining the Optimal Method of Vertical Coordination 
The complexity of a particular transaction is dependent on all of the 
transaction characteristics including asset specificity, transaction uncertainty, and 
transaction frequency and how they combine to affect a particular transaction.  
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According to TCE, the methods of vertical coordination that emerge will minimize 
the sum of transaction and production costs.  Transaction costs are dependent on the 
transaction characteristics, which are influenced by the underlying product 
attributes.  Minimizing transaction costs essentially reduces to minimizing the 
effects of bounded rationality and transaction uncertainty while simultaneously 
safeguarding the transactions in question against the hazards of opportunism that are 
associated with asset specificity (Williamson, 1986a, 111).  At the same time it is 
important to understand that different methods of coordination may also affect 
production costs and therefore the optimal method of coordination must minimize 
the total of production and transactions costs3.   
 Where transactions involve products with easily identifiable and measurable 
characteristics, spot markets are likely the most efficient and cost minimizing 
mechanism.  Transactions are highly standardized and information costs are 
minimized because neither buyers nor sellers face uncertainties with respect to the 
quality of the product, which can be determined through visual inspection and 
existing grading schemes.  Information costs associated with discovering price are 
also low, as prices initially determined on the spot market become a representative 
price and serve to reduce information costs for other buyers and sellers.  Negotiation 
costs are also minimal.  Everything but price is standardized or pre-determined, so 
there is little negotiation in the true sense of the word (Hobbs, 1998, 526).  
Transactions in the spot market also result in low monitoring costs.  When 
transactions involve relatively homogenous products whose quality is easily 
determined it is not usually necessary to monitor quality ex ante or ex post to the 
transaction occurring (Hobbs, 1998, 527).   
 While spot markets are a feasible and cost minimizing solution for 
standardized transactions, they can result in extremely high transaction costs when 
investments in specific assets are required to produce differentiated products.  
Required investments may result in an increased risk of opportunistic behaviour and 
higher transaction costs must be incurred to protect investments.  Otherwise there 
                                                 
3 Production costs are the fixed and variable costs incurred to produce a product.  Costs are incurred 
to purchase physical inputs, wages for employees, management costs, and capital requirements.  They 
are considered distinct from transaction costs.       
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will be limited incentive to invest in specific assets.  This is becoming apparent in 
the beef industry.  There is an increasing demand for more complex and 
differentiated products, with characteristics that cannot easily be determined by 
visual inspection and that may require investments in specific assets.  Without a 
long-term commitment and assurance of a continuing relationship to prevent 
opportunistic behaviour, there is little incentive to produce specialized beef 
products.  
Increased vertical coordination reduces opportunism through the use of more 
sophisticated mechanisms that realign incentives.  This typically involves the use of 
a reward/penalty mechanism for early termination.  Similar mechanisms are also put 
in place to provide incentives for ensuring the production of particular attributes, 
such as the implementation of grid-based pricing systems that allow for more 
specific price signals and information to be transferred back along the supply chain.   
The move towards increased vertical coordination encourages the use of specialized 
conflict resolution mechanisms that minimize enforcement costs and ensure the 
commitment of partners in a transaction.  Information and monitoring costs are also 
reduced, as it is easier to obtain information on product quality and monitor 
production under structures where different supply chain segments are more closely 
linked (Williamson, 1986b, 183).                   
As asset specificity increases and the attributes being guaranteed under 
branded beef programs become more difficult to measure, supply chains will 
become more closely coordinated.  From a transaction cost perspective, contracts are 
one alternative that have the potential to reduce costs for both producers and 
processors.  Specified pricing formulas that are included in contracts reduce the 
information costs associated with daily price discovery for producers.  These costs 
include time spent collecting, analyzing, and monitoring feeder cattle and fed cattle 
market conditions and prices (Hayenga et al., 2000, 48).  Time spent negotiating 
prices, delivery terms, and quality specifications are also expected to be reduced 
with the increased use of contracts (Hayenga et al., 2000, 48).           
Processors also benefit from the use of marketing agreements.  In their 
absence, processors are often not willing to invest in new facilities, processing 
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technologies, or other branded product developments, as the supply of beef in the 
spot market is highly variable and product attributes may be difficult to measure 
(Purcell, 2002, 8).  A processor’s information costs are also reduced when contracts 
are used to procure beef with specialized attributes.  Processors face lower 
procurement and search costs as they deal with the same suppliers on a constant 
basis instead of dealing with many different firms.  Monitoring costs are also 
reduced, as contracts allow for the implementation of incentives based systems and 
protocols that make it easier to monitor the production process.   
It is less clear whether negotiation costs will be reduced with the increased 
use of contracts.  Although negotiations will be less frequent and processors will 
deal with fewer suppliers, the complexity of negotiating long-term contracts can be 
costly.  Long-term contracts are typically incomplete given the difficulty in 
specifying both anticipated and unanticipated events in the future (Sporleder, 1994, 
535).  Even if it were feasible to specify all possible future events that could affect a 
contract, it would be prohibitively costly to do so.  Due to this incompleteness, 
parties who invest in transaction specific assets are left exposed to opportunistic 
behaviour if circumstances change and trading partners are able to circumvent the 
contract and expropriate any quasi-rents that exist (Shelanski and Klein, 1995, 336)      
Short-term contracts reduce the risks associated with incomplete contracts, 
but can be problematic if asset specific investments are quite significant and have a 
long amortization period.  High levels of asset specificity favour the use of long-
term contracts that ensure the returns to transaction specific investments are 
adequate (Williamson, 1971, 116).  Long-term contracts are problematic due to 
bounded rationality.  Contracts are also problematic when information asymmetries 
are high due to the fact that buyers would still incur high information costs prior to a 
transaction in order to determine the quality of a product.  They would also incur 
ongoing monitoring and enforcement costs after the initial contract is in place to 
ensure that sellers adhere to the quality standards stipulated in the contract (Hobbs, 
1998, 527).        
Contracts are also not ideal when coordination needs to occur between more 
than two parties in the supply chain, as such contracts are often more complex and 
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result in increased information, negotiation, and monitoring costs due to the larger 
number of participants involved in a particular transaction.  Consequently, in 
situations where high levels of asset specificity, bounded rationality, and/or 
numerous participants are involved, it is likely that closer coordination will occur.      
In this situation, it is likely that supply chain participants would want a 
vertical coordination method with increased controls to monitor quality.  Informal 
alliances that use grid-pricing initiatives result in low negotiation costs.  Price and 
quality specifications are laid out in the grid and the only issue to be determined 
between supply chain partners is delivery.  Information costs are also reduced for 
processors involved in an alliance.  The incentives created under a grid pricing 
system result in producers that can provide the attributes self-selecting an alliance, 
as they will be paid premiums.  Thus, processors will not have to search for 
suppliers.  Meanwhile those that do not comply with the specifications and would be 
penalized under the grid will not want to be involved in the alliance and sorting costs 
will be lower.  It is less clear as to whether information costs for the producer will be 
lower.  Initial search costs will be high to find an appropriate alliance in which to 
participate, but over the long-term price discovery costs will likely be considerably 
reduced.       
For an informal alliance to be beneficial, the reduction in information and 
negotiation costs must be lower than the increase in monitoring costs.  Processors 
under a grid-based alliance will still have to monitor production practices if the 
attributes demanded cannot easily be detected or tested.  They will still have to test 
for other quality attributes in order to identify how an individual animal grades on 
the grid. If the monitoring costs incurred as a result of information asymmetries are 
higher than the reduction in information and negotiation costs under an informal 
alliance, it not likely that this type of structure would be used to coordination 
transactions.     
Another consideration is that producers’ costs may increase due to the fact 
that they may have a greater interest in monitoring the transfer of their cattle to the 
processor to ensure that carcass quality is not reduced through poor handling.  This 
is expected to only have a small effect on monitoring costs; packers have an 
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incentive to ensure that beef quality is not diminished and an incentive to maintain a 
good reputation with suppliers in order to have the assured supply that is need for 
branded programs.       
Informal alliances are not ideal when high levels of asset specific 
investments are involved, as they are loose informal arrangements that do not 
require any long-term commitment.  When transaction specific investments are large 
or high levels of information asymmetry exist, resulting in a higher risk of 
opportunistic behaviour, a move to a more formal alliance structure is predicted.  A 
more formal alliance structure is especially beneficial when it is extremely costly to 
detect the presence/absence of particular attributes and/or monitor the production 
process.  When both parties to a transaction invest equity into a new venture, the 
shared equity becomes a “hostage asset”.  Each firm has effectively posted a bond, 
which would be lost or only partially redeemable if operations ceased because one 
partner chose to act opportunistically or did not comply with the conditions of the 
alliance (Oxley, 1997, 390).   
The returns from a formal alliance also depend on the profits of the venture 
as a whole and as such interests of different supply chain members are aligned 
(Oxley, 1997, 390).  The potential short-run gains from opportunistic behaviour may 
be more than offset by the potential long-term gains from maintaining the alliance 
and obtaining the benefits from improved coordination.  Formal alliances are better 
able to minimize the costs associated with monitoring the production process and 
eliminate the need for negotiating all-encompassing contracts.  They also improve 
information flow along the supply chain, as participants now have harmonized 
interests and are working to maximize joint profits.              
At the same time the use of a formal alliance can result in higher initial 
negotiation and information costs.  Given the commitment required to join a formal 
alliance, prospective members typically will invest more time searching and 
obtaining information on different organizations prior to committing to a particular 
one.  More detailed information on an organization’s reputation, longevity, 
requirements, and pricing structure will be sought out given the barriers to exit once 
participants have made a long-term commitment.  Contracts are typically used 
 63
between a formal alliance and its participants.  This can result in higher initial 
negotiation costs than would otherwise be incurred under a more informal alliance 
structure.  These costs can become quite high for the same reasons as long-term 
contracts.  As a result, a formal alliance is only beneficial if the one-time negotiation 
and information costs are offset by ongoing reductions in information and 
monitoring costs.           
Aside from formal strategic alliances, complete vertical integration will 
eliminate opportunistic behaviour and harmonize incentives along the supply chain 
through the integration of different industry stages under one firm.  While 
transaction costs will be internalized under such a structure, this is not likely to be 
the dominant vertical coordination method given that the costs associated with 
internalizing different industry stages may be prohibitively high for the reasons 
discussed previously.  The greatest limitation to integration is probably the large 
monitoring and managerial costs that must be incurred when cow-calf production is 
integrated with other stages of the supply chain.  These costs arise as a result of the 
large land base required and geographical dispersion of this sector.   
 
3.9 Summary and Conclusions  
 The objective of this chapter was to provide a discussion of the current 
reorganization of the beef industry and why the beef industry has been slow to move 
in the direction of branded beef programs.  The chapter also described the existing 
vertical coordination continuum, focusing on the different types of supply chain 
coordination structures and the characteristics of these structures.   A discussion of 
transaction cost economics and its key building blocks were provided in order to 
understand how transaction cost economics can explain vertical coordination in the 
beef industry.  The next chapter will develop the transaction cost model further.  It 
will discuss on how different attributes affect transaction characteristics, namely 
asset specificity and informational asymmetry, and consequently how attributes 
affect transaction costs.  This analysis will be used to identify why different supply 
chain structures are chosen to produce branded beef products with particular 
attributes.   
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4 THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK 
4.1 Introduction 
 The purpose of this chapter is to provide an extension of the discussion in 
Chapter 3 regarding the relationship between transaction cost economics and supply 
chain coordination in the beef industry.  This chapter develops a predictive 
transaction cost model that identifies how different attributes affect transaction 
characteristics and consequently transaction costs.   The initial analysis is extended 
to identify why specific supply chain structures are chosen to produce branded beef 
products with particular attributes.  
 
4.2 Theoretical Model 
The key objective of the model is to predict the type of supply chain structure 
that is likely to emerge based on the attributes guaranteed by different branded beef 
programs.  The influence of these attributes on transaction characteristics and costs 
and subsequently on supply chain structures forms the basis of the predictive model.  
Supply chain structure is the “dependent variable” and transaction characteristics are 
the “independent variables” in this approach.  Using these variables the model 
focuses on the number and types of coordinated links in the supply chain that are 
required to brand a beef product that guarantees specific attributes.  Particular 
attention is paid to identifying those supply chain members who have a direct impact 
on the presence/absence of a specific attribute.  Identifying the key players necessary 
in branding a particular beef attribute sheds further light on the key transaction 
characteristics and related costs.     
It should be noted that the predictive model does not encompass seedstock 
producers and backgrounding feedlots.  It was felt that the influence of these sectors 
was similar to that of cow-calf operators and finishing feedlots.  Therefore, cow-calf 
operators and seedstock producers are grouped together and background and 
finishing feedlots are grouped together to simplify the model.       
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4.3 Branded Beef Attributes 
A wide variety of attributes are currently being provided in branded beef 
products.  These attributes vary in terms of how they are produced and how they are 
guaranteed.  The production of different attributes often involves making changes to 
production practices, using specialized inputs, and/or using specialized processing 
systems and technologies.   In the end, the production and bundling of these 
different attributes into branded beef products is supposed to provide consumers 
with a higher quality product, with product quality being described as a bundle of 
characteristics (attributes) (Caswell and Mojduszka, 1996, 1248).   
The market for food quality is not perfect; the agents involved in the 
production of food are often better informed about quality attributes than consumers 
(Caswell and Mojduszka, 1996, 1249).  The information available to consumers 
depends on the particular attribute being branded and whether it is a credence, 
experience, or search attribute, with the amount of information increasing as an 
attribute moves along the continuum from credence goods to search goods.  Search 
attributes are characterized by plentiful and easily obtainable consumer information 
(Caswell and Mojduszka, 1996, 1249).  Search attributes can normally be evaluated 
prior to purchase through visual examination, touch, or smell (Hobbs, 1998, 527).   
Several search attributes were considered in this research, including 
appearance, convenience and product presentation, USDA or CFIA grade, and 
leanness.  After some consideration, all but convenience and leanness were excluded 
from the model.  Attributes such as government grades and appearance are relatively 
standard across all branded beef programs that are attempting to produce a high 
quality beef product.  Instead, they appear to act as proxy variables for other 
attributes such as tenderness, freshness, and flavour.  Leanness is an important 
attribute to include, as consumers are increasingly health-conscious and demand 
products with lower levels of fat.  Further, the leanness of a beef product is 
controlled for primarily in the production process through both the genetics chosen 
and feed protocols implemented.  Consequently, the production of leanness is 
expected to affect the type of supply chain structure chosen to coordinate production 
and processing.   
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Convenience is also an important search attribute.  Increasing participation of 
women in the labour force means that there is reduced time available to prepare 
meals and, as a result, consumers are looking for convenient meal solutions.  
Convenience is interesting because it is typically provided through processing of 
beef into further value-added products at a processing facility and is not as 
dependent on other segments of the supply chain.  This has implications for the 
coordination of the supply chain that differs from other attributes.  It will be 
discussed further on in the Chapter. 
Experience attributes are those whose quality can only be determined after 
purchase when the product is consumed.  Information problems are limited in 
situations where consumers make repeated purchases of a product, as their choices 
will be based on prior experience with product quality or on communication with 
other consumers.  Firms rely on having a good reputation with consumers to obtain 
repeat purchases.  As a result, they have a stronger incentive to disclose product 
quality and continually provide that quality (Caswell and Mojduszka, 1996, 1250). 
The most common experience attributes that are branded include freshness, 
consistency, and tenderness.  Freshness and consistency have been excluded from 
the model, as a high quality brand typically implies that a product will be fresh.  
Similarly, quality, however it is defined, is assumed to be consistent in order to 
fulfill the guarantees provided.  Tenderness is the most common attribute currently 
being branded.  Some consumers have not been satisfied with the tenderness 
provided under the existing grading system and have turned to purchasing brands 
that provide a guarantee of tenderness.  The production of a tender beef product is a 
result of both production and processing practices.  Tenderness is affected by 
genetics, feeding and production practices, and the techniques and technologies used 
during processing.  Consequently, in order to produce a tender product several 
different stages of the supply chain must be involved. 
Credence attributes are those attributes whose quality cannot be determined 
by a buyer even after they have purchased a product (Hobbs, 1998, 527).  This 
means that access to information about product quality by consumers is limited.  
Typically this occurs when branded attributes are process attributes, which do not 
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alter the physical attributes of the product.  As a result, it is difficult to predict their 
presence through the use of search or experience related cues.  Hence, the branding 
of credence attributes typically requires labelling and disclosure of information to 
consumers.  A certification or verification process may also be necessary to ensure 
firms are providing the quality they have guaranteed consumers. 
Common credence attributes that are provided in branded beef products 
include no hormones and antibiotics (natural), organic, free of genetically-modified 
organisms, grass fed, enhanced food safety, animal welfare friendly, 
environmentally friendly, source verification, and process verification.  These 
attributes have emerged due to increasing consumer concern over the safety of the 
food they consume, environmental awareness, and heightened interest in farm 
animal welfare.  Source verification and process verification are unique in that they 
are not a tangible attribute, but enable individuals to confirm the presence of 
credence attributes.  They are included in the model, as increasingly they are being 
branded and promoted in concert with other credence and experience attributes.  
Breed and product origin, other commonly branded credence attributes, arise from 
consumers’ association of superior quality with particular breeds of cattle or specific 
production regions.  Both of these attributes are unique in that along the supply 
chain up to the processing level they could be classified as search attributes.  The 
identification of a specific breed or region from which cattle are produced is 
relatively easy to verify up to the processing sector.  Upon processing and at the 
consumer level, breed and product origin become indistinguishable and cannot be 
easily detected for, resulting in their classification as credence attributes.  
Table 4.1 displays all of the attributes that will be discussed in the predictive 
transaction cost model.  The method used to classify these attributes is significant 
for two reasons.  First, an attribute that is classified as being either a credence, 
experience, or search attribute remains as such along the entire supply chain, with 
the exception of breed and product of origin.  This provides a level of uniformity to 
the model.  Secondly, the transaction characteristics, as will be discussed below, are 
often similar for attributes within the same category allowing for a more general 
comparison across the three categories. 
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Table 4.1 – Beef Attributes Included in the Predictive Transaction Cost Model        
Credence Attributes Experience Attributes Search Attributes 
No Hormones/Antibiotics Tenderness Lean 
Grass Fed  Convenience 
Organic & GM Free   
Animal Welfare Friendly   
Environmentally Friendly   
Enhanced Food Safety   
Product Origin   
Breed   
Source Verification   
Process Verification   
 
4.3.1 Commonly Branded Beef Products 
 It is not typically the case that a branded product only provides one of the 
attributes mentioned above.  Instead, these attributes are often provided in specific 
combinations in an effort to meet consumers’ demands.  Based on information 
compiled from the U.S. Livestock Marketing Information Center (LMIC) and Beef 
Magazine, Kovanda and Schroeder (2003) created a chart identifying the largest 
U.S. branded beef alliances.  These alliances vary in their structures and are either 
producing a branded product themselves or they are producing for a separate 
branded beef program.  The alliances identified by Kovanda and Schroeder were 
reviewed so as to identify key attribute combinations that are currently being 
branded.  Many different attribute combinations were identified and Table 4.2 
displays the most common combinations. 
 Table 4.2 indicates that natural, organic, and tenderness are three core 
underlying attributes of branded beef programs4.  Natural and organic programs are 
provided in response to consumer concerns over health, with additional attributes 
being provided in some programs to also meet demands for higher food quality, 
animal and environmental welfare concerns, and further confirmation of how a 
product is produced.  Tenderness programs are a response to consumers’ demand for 
increased consistency in the palatability and eating quality of beef.  Additional 
                                                 
4 Natural products are guaranteed to contain no hormones or antibiotics.  Organic products are 
guaranteed to be produced using no synthetic chemicals (i.e. pesticides, fertilizers, genetically 
modified organisms, and other growing aids) and, in the case of livestock, use organic feed.   
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attributes often included in tenderness-based programs include grass fed, enhanced 
food safety, leanness, product origin, breed, convenience, and source and process 
verification.  Breed and product origin are often provided in addition to tenderness, 
as they are frequently proxy indicators of eating quality.  In the case of enhanced 
food safety, lean or grass fed beef, programs are focusing on niche markets of 
health-conscious consumers and in the case of convenience; programs are catering to 
the on-the-go consumer lifestyle. 
Table 4.2 - Key Branded Beef Attribute Combinations 
 Attributes 
1 Natural 
2 Natural, Grass Fed, Enhanced Food Safety, Process & Source Verified 
3 Natural, Grass Fed, Animal Welfare & Environmentally Friendly, 
Enhanced Food Safety 
4 Natural, Tender 
5 Organic, GM Free, Process & Source Verified 
6 Organic, GM Free, Animal Welfare & Environmentally Friendly 
7 Tender 
8 Tender, Enhanced Food Safety, Process & Source Verified 
9 Tender, Grass Fed 
10 Tender, Product Origin 
11 Tender, Lean 
12 Tender, Breed  
13 Tender, Lean, Breed  
14 Tender, Convenience 
Source: Adapted from Kovanda and Schroeder (2003) 
The identification of three major market directions of branded beef 
programs: natural, organic, and tenderness will be used in describing differences 
between transaction characteristics to predict the organizational form of supply 
chains.  Similar to classifying attributes as being credence, experience, or search 
attributes, this narrows down the focus of the model and allows for a more detailed 
analysis of specific programs.   
 
4.4 Asset Specificity 
Transaction cost economics recognizes that conditions of asset specificity are 
widespread, that economic agents do not always possess perfect information, and are 
characterized by bounded rationality and opportunistic behaviour.  Based on these 
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four underlying concepts, three key transaction characteristics can be identified: 
asset specificity, transaction uncertainty, and transaction frequency.  The degree to 
which these transaction characteristics affect transaction costs is dependent on the 
type of attribute being guaranteed and how they affect overall transaction 
complexity.   
Asset specificity is one of the key variables of interest in determining how an 
attribute will affect transaction complexity and costs.  As defined by Williamson 
(1986), three different types of asset specificity exist. The first is site specificity, in 
which agents in a supply chain are in a fixed relationship to minimize transportation 
costs or produce a region specific product and assets are immobile due to program 
restrictions or high costs.  Site specific investments are apparent when the attribute 
being branded is product origin or environmental preservation.  In the case of 
product origin, a producer and processor must be located in a specific region to use a 
region specific brand name that consumers associate with high-quality products.  
Examples of this type of branded program include Alberta Beef and Nebraska Corn-
fed Beef, which are promoting their province/state as the origin of high-quality beef 
products.  The branding of environmental preservation often requires that 
transportation distances are minimized and production does not occur in regions that 
are environmentally sensitive.  This results in investment in specific sites that are 
located near other supply chain participants and in compliance with environmental 
preservation requirements.  Industry participants are vulnerable when site specific 
investments are made because they cannot easily switch production once resources 
specific to a regional brand have been developed. 
The second type of asset specificity is physical asset specificity, which refers 
to relationship specific investments in physical assets such as feed and health 
protocols, genetics, capital improvements, and technologies associated with food 
safety and the testing, grading, and processing of beef.  Credence beef products, 
such as natural beef, typically requires that cow-calf operators, backgrounders, and 
feedlots invest in specialized feed and health protocols that eliminate the use of 
certain inputs, such as growth hormones and antibiotics.  Instead, other regimes are 
substituted that are often more expensive and require a longer production period.  
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The provision of credence attributes in branded products may also require that 
processors invest in technologies to test for the presence/absence of particular inputs 
in order to reduce the incentive to cheat.  For those products that provide additional 
assurances of animal welfare and environmental preservation, cow-calf operators, 
feedlots, and processors may be required to make physical improvements to their 
operations in order to upgrade and comply with animal welfare and environmental 
guidelines. 
A specific investment in physical assets is also required when producing 
experience and search attributes associated with high-quality tender products.   
Producers often invest in specific breeds and genetic lines, as some breeds have been 
associated with producing more tender beef and some branded beef programs are 
based on a specific breed.  It is important to note that a producer will probably only 
participate in a breed-based program if they already produce a particular breed.  As a 
result, investments in breed are often smaller, as it is unlikely that a producer will 
adopt a completely new production system.  Instead they will be more focused on 
making ongoing improvements in their herd genetics.   
Often, tenderness-based branded programs also require producers and 
feedlots to invest in specific feed protocols to improve meat quality and consistency.  
Technology associated with testing, grading, and processing beef is also used in 
tenderness programs at the processor level to sort incoming cattle, measure 
tenderness and consistency, and improve overall product quality. 
The third type of asset specificity is human asset specificity.  This term is 
used to describe transaction specific knowledge or human capital with specialized 
training or experience that performs functions specific to the production of a 
particular attribute (Shelanksi and Klein, 1995, 341).  Certain production and 
processing knowledge is standard across all beef products and does not require 
specialized human capital, but other knowledge is specialized to the attribute being 
produced.  This is the case with certain production and management protocols, 
record keeping, and certification processes.   
The production of credence attributes implies that attributes cannot be easily 
tested for along the supply chain.  As a result, other methods must be used to ensure 
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that consumers are provided with a product that fulfills the guarantees provided by a 
branded program.  The implementation of a certification process and record keeping 
is typically the best way to manage credence attributes along the supply chain, but 
adoption of these systems sometimes requires a large investment of time, specialized 
management skills, and in some cases specific technologies.  Different supply chain 
participants must be monitored and a large amount of information must be managed 
within different segments of the supply chain in order to guarantee an attribute.     
If an attribute is either an experience or search attribute, this type of 
compliance mechanism is typically not required.  However, the production of 
attributes such as tenderness and leanness do require supply chain participants to 
invest time and knowledge to create detailed production and management plans.  
These plans typically outline a purchasing protocol and how animals will be 
managed during the production process to maximize performance and quality, which 
can vary significantly if a proper management plan is not used in combination with 
suitable levels of physical investment.  Investment into human resources may also be 
required to develop management plans that ensure proper procedures are in place to 
provide animal welfare and environmental preservation attributes.    
Table 4.3 provides a summary of the asset specific investments required to 
produce different attributes.  This table is intended as an outline; types of 
investments required may be more or less for a particular attribute depending on the 
level of consistency and guarantee a particular program is providing to consumers.  
From the table it is apparent that certain attributes require common specific 
investments, which may make it conducive to provide these attributes in 
combination under a branded beef program.  Several of the combinations listed in 
Table 4.2 support this idea.  Many of the attributes that are commonly combined 
require similar specific investments.  While consumers often desire different 
combinations of attributes in order to maximize their own utility, common specific 
investments implies that the cost of providing an additional attribute may be 
minimal.  In determining the benefit received from increasing the number of 
attributes provided, it is expected that another attribute will only be added if the 
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additional costs incurred, as a result of the increase in asset specificity, are less than 
the increase in consumers’ willingness to pay.     
Table 4.3 - Asset Specific Investments Incurred to Produce Particular Attributes  
C – Credence Attribute E – Experience Attribute S – Search Attribute 
 The total transaction costs incurred as a result of different supply chain 
participants investing in transaction specific assets varies significantly and depends 
on the investment necessary to produce a particular attribute.  As the degree of 
transaction specific assets required producing a particular attribute increases, 
negotiation costs are expected to increase.  Participants will move away from 
transacting in the spot market towards increased vertical coordination and more 
Attributes Site Physical Human 
Natural 
(C)  
 Feed/Health Protocol Records/Certification 
 
Organic & GM 
Free 
(C) 
 Feed/Health Protocol Records/Certification 
 
Grass Fed 
(C) 
 Feed Protocol Records/Certification 
 
Enhanced Food 
Safety 
(C) 
 Feed/Health Protocol, 
Testing/Grading/Processing 
Tech 
Records/Certification 
Prod/Mgmt Protocol 
Animal Welfare 
(C) 
Yes Physical Improvements Records/Certification 
Prod/Mgmt Protocol 
Environmental 
Preservation 
(C) 
Yes Physical Improvements Records/Certification 
Prod/Mgmt Protocol 
Source & Process 
Verification 
(C) 
  Records/Certification 
Product Origin 
(C) 
Yes  Records/Certification 
 
Breed 
(C) 
 Genetics Records/Certification 
 
Tender 
(E) 
 Genetics, Feed Protocol, & 
Testing/Grading/Processing 
Tech 
Production/Management 
Protocol 
Lean 
(S) 
 Genetics, Feed Protocol, & 
Testing/Grading/Processing 
Tech 
Production/Management 
Protocol 
Convenience 
(S) 
 Processing Technology  
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long-term relationships.  This will be done in order to protect asset specific 
investments, reduce the risk of opportunistic behavior, and minimize negotiation 
costs.  As firms use more detailed and coordinated arrangements to reduce 
opportunistic behaviour, it is expected that negotiation costs will increase.  Often 
such arrangements require large amounts of time, exhaustive stipulation, the hiring 
of lawyers, and other third party involvement.  Increased coordination and higher 
negotiation costs will also arise when the number of attributes that are provided 
under a branded program increases, as it is expected that this will increase the 
overall level of asset specificity.     
 
4.5 Transaction Uncertainty 
The second main transaction characteristic that affects the type of supply 
chain coordination that emerges is transaction uncertainty.  Uncertainty surrounding 
transactions can be broken down into four main categories: information asymmetry, 
incomplete information, price uncertainty associated with quality variability, and 
price uncertainty associated with the number of buyers in a market.      
 
4.5.1 Information Asymmetry 
The verification of different production and processing practices in a branded 
beef program may be difficult due to information asymmetries between different 
supply chain participants.  Problems associated with information asymmetry exist 
with all of the credence attributes branded, as shown in Table 4.4.  Table 4.4 shows 
those industry sectors where information asymmetries can occur when transacting 
with other segments of the supply chain. 
The overall level of information asymmetry that exists for a particular 
attribute does vary.  For example, with the branding of natural beef, production 
practices have to be closely monitored to ensure that the final product is in fact 
“natural”.  Cow-calf operators and feedlots have an incentive to cheat and use 
growth-hormones and antibiotics in order to capture the premium associated with an 
increased consumer willingness to pay for natural products without incurring the 
costs.  In the case where attributes such as enhanced food safety, environmental 
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preservation and animal welfare are branded, cow-calf operators, feedlots, and 
processors must be monitored.  This is because there is an incentive to cheat in all 
stages of production and processing.  Cow-calf operators, backgrounders, finishing 
feedlots, and processors could cheat.  They could use prohibited feeds or avoid 
incurring the initial investments and ongoing costs associated with complying with 
higher environmental and welfare standards, while capturing the premiums 
associated with these higher standards.  In these scenarios monitoring is required, 
with the degree of monitoring being dependent on the number of stages involved.   
Table 4.4 - Relationship between Attributes and Information Asymmetry    
 Information Asymmetry 
Attribute Cow-Calf 
Operators 
Feedlots Processors 
Natural (C) Yes Yes  
Organic & GM Free (C) Yes Yes  
Grass Fed (C) Yes Yes  
Animal Welfare (C) Yes Yes Yes 
Environmental Preservation (C) Yes Yes Yes 
Product Origin (C) Yes Yes  
Food Safety (C) Yes Yes Yes 
Breed (C)   Yes 
Tender (E)    
Lean (S)    
Convenience (S)    
C – Credence Attribute      E – Experience Attribute      S – Search Attribute
 The presence of credence attributes and information asymmetries requires 
that some sort of traceability or identity preservation system be in place in order to 
ensure that particular production and processing practices are implemented.  
Otherwise, end-products that contain credence attributes are indistinguishable from 
products without these attributes.  Obtaining sufficient information about production 
and processing practices when branding credence attributes involves increased 
transaction costs, more specifically information and monitoring costs.    
Increased information costs arise when supply chain participants cannot 
determine the presence of a particular attribute and consequently focus on trying to 
determine the reputation of other supply chain partners in order to minimize the risk 
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of cheating.  Information costs associated with determining the reputation of a 
supply chain partner are expected to increase as the degree of measurability for a 
particular attribute decreases and monitoring for the attribute along the supply chain 
becomes more difficult.  As such, information costs are expected to be highest for 
credence attributes and lowest for search attributes, which are more easily measured.  
The costs associated with determining reputation are also expected to be low for 
experience attributes, as participants rely on having a good reputation if they wish to 
maintain an ongoing relationship. 
As information costs increase, the cost of transacting through the spot market 
will rise and supply chains become more closely coordinated.  Similarly, closer 
vertical coordination may emerge to reduce monitoring costs that arise from 
monitoring the activities of different supply chain participants to ensure that stated 
standards are adhered to and to facilitate the transfer of product quality information.  
Monitoring costs are also expected to increase with an increase in the number of 
supply chain segments where information asymmetries exist.  For example, 
producing natural beef requires that only cow-calf operators and feedlots are 
monitored, while producing environmentally friendly beef requires monitoring of 
the cow-calf, feedlot, and processing stages.  
The implementation of certification institutions for monitoring the 
production and processing of particular credence attributes may reduce monitoring 
costs.  These institutions typically focus on developing a common set of industry-
wide standards and, as a result, monitoring costs are lowered.  The presence of 
organic certification institutions is quite common in Canada and other countries.  
These institutions act as a neutral third-party that supervises production and 
processing to ensure that organic standards are complied with at various stages of 
the supply chain.  If these institutions were not in place, buyers would have to 
implement their own systems to monitor sellers.  This would likely be more costly 
as industry-wide standards would be replaced with numerous different individual 
sets of standards.     
To summarize, information asymmetries result in an increase in information 
and monitoring costs, with these costs increasing as the degree of measurability and 
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ease of monitoring decreases.  The presence of certification institutions can aid in 
reducing monitoring costs, but they have not been established for many of the 
credence attributes currently being provided.  Instead, internal monitoring and 
certification processes must be developed for individual programs.  As a result, 
monitoring costs are expected to be high due to the inefficiencies created when 
many smaller non-uniform mechanisms are used.  Information and monitoring costs 
are also highly dependent on the number of attributes being branded.  As the number 
of attributes increases it is expected that monitoring and information costs will also 
increase.  
 
4.5.2 Incomplete Information  
With the provision of certain branded beef attributes, problems associated 
with incomplete information can exist as neither party to a transaction may have 
perfect information about the presence of a particular attribute.  While credence 
attributes are typically either present or absent, and there is less uncertainty with 
respect to their quality, other attributes can vary widely in terms of quality.  
Incomplete information on quality is readily apparent in the production stages, when 
the attributes being produced are leanness and tenderness.  The level of leanness or 
tenderness cannot easily be measured until livestock is processed. 
When animals are being transferred between cow-calf operators, feedlots, 
and processors, it is difficult to obtain precise measures of the level of tenderness or 
leanness and payment is typically made on a live weight basis instead of on a quality 
basis.  Although proxy variables for the attributes are often used in a live weight 
pricing system, they are often poor indicators of actual quality.  As a result, 
incomplete information regarding attribute quality exists.   The presence of 
incomplete information has one main effect.  Producers and feedlots that are paid on 
a live weight basis are not penalized for producing lower quality products and are 
not rewarded for producing higher quality products.  Consequently, there is little 
incentive for them to follow program guidelines put in place to reduce variability 
and improve product quality.  Hence, in order to obtain the desired attributes 
increased transactions costs will be incurred.   
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Technologies exist to measure for tenderness and leanness when the animal 
is still alive.  The problem is that these technologies are relatively new and 
expensive, which has resulted in their limited use.  Instead, monitoring and the 
transfer of product quality information along the supply chain are relied upon to 
reduce variability and increase product quality when tenderness or leanness is being 
provided.  
As with information asymmetry, information costs will be incurred to 
determine the reputation of other participants in the supply chain.  In this case 
packers (feedlots) will focus on determining whether or not feedlots (cow-calf 
operators) provide a product that is of the right quality.  For transactions between the 
packer and feedlot, a packer can measure tenderness and leanness qualities to some 
extent upon purchase.  This means that feedlots have an incentive to maintain a 
positive reputation with packers.  If quality is low, packers will choose not to 
purchase from them again.  The effect of reputation on transactions between packers 
and feedlots suggests that information costs will be lower between feedlots and 
packers than between cow-calf operators and feedlots.  In the latter interface, 
information regarding reputation is more difficult to obtain because quality cannot 
be determined even at purchase.  Transactions are also more numerous and 
infrequent due to the large number of small cow-calf operators. 
Monitoring costs will also arise in programs that brand tenderness.  This is 
because, even after processing, the actual level of tenderness cannot be completely 
guaranteed, as measurements are often based on proxy variables.  Technologies exist 
to measure tenderness at processing, but thus far they have not been implemented on 
a commercial basis due the high costs of implementation and operational problems 
that need to be overcome.  Another reason for monitoring production and processing 
is that the identity of an individual product cannot be easily traced back from the 
consumer to the feedlot or cow-calf operator.  If consumers dislike a product they 
may switch away from the brand entirely, and demand signals will fail to 
differentiate between high and low quality.  Therefore, production and processing 
standards are often implemented that reduce quality variability and raise tenderness 
levels to ensure consumer satisfaction.  These standards must be monitored in order 
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to ensure compliance, as there is an incentive to cheat given the limited ability to 
track tenderness throughout the supply chain.     
Monitoring costs associated with obtaining product quality information along 
the supply chain are expected to increase as production and processing guidelines 
become increasingly detailed and stringent to ensure quality.  As a result, 
transactions between supply chain participants may move away from the spot 
market, with vertical coordination increasing to offset increased transaction costs.  
The implementation of more detailed standards will also result in increased 
negotiation costs, as agreements between transaction partners become more complex 
in order to ensure compliance with program requirements.   
As with information asymmetry, institutions exist that reduce the level of 
incomplete information and improve the transfer of product quality information 
along the supply chain.  Branded beef programs have begun to focus on the use of 
grid pricing initiatives.  Grid pricing allows for the transfer of product quality 
information back to both cow-calf operators and feedlots.  This results in a 
realignment of incentives, as cow-calf operators and feedlots are penalized for the 
production of poor cattle and rewarded for the production of high quality cattle.  
Consequently, less monitoring is required.      
Grid pricing institutions also have an effect on information and negotiation 
costs.  The benefit of reduced monitoring costs must be considered against the 
increase in these costs when a grid pricing structure is used.  Information costs 
associated with searching for price information may initially increase under a grid 
pricing system, as participants must search out detailed information on how the grid 
works and also identify a grid that best suits their existing operation to maximize 
returns.  There are also information costs in gathering carcass quality information at 
the time of processing and transferring this information back along the supply chain.  
In the long run, the costs associated with searching are expected to be lower, as 
individuals commit production to one grid and receive information on the quality of 
cattle produced on an ongoing basis.  Increased coordination may be considered if 
the information costs associated with transferring quality information back along the 
supply chain are high. 
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Negotiation costs may also increase, as negotiations will include determining 
the structure of the grid pricing system instead of just a single price.  Costs will also 
be incurred because under a grid pricing system there is typically a delay between 
the times when a transaction occurs and when payment is actually received.  This is 
because quality cannot be determined until the product has actually been processed.  
The costs associated with payment delay are expected to be larger for cow-calf 
operators, which retain ownership, than feedlots because the delay in payment will 
be longer.  These costs will also depend on the payment system used.  Various 
payment systems exist, including a single payment at the time of processing or for 
cow-calf operators a partial payment can be made at the time calves are sold to the 
feedlot, which is then followed by a final payment upon processing. 
The reduction in monitoring costs by buyers, as a result of a grid pricing 
initiative, may also be offset by an increase in monitoring costs for feedlots and 
cow-calf operators.  Due to the nature of grid pricing systems the final price received 
by feedlots and/or cow-calf operators is dependent on the end quality measurement.  
There is a risk that processors will under-grade carcasses.  Feedlots and cow-calf 
operators may have an incentive to monitor the grading process.  The risk of 
processors actually doing this is considered to be small given that it is to their 
benefit not to damage relationships with high-quality feedlots and cow-calf 
operators that retain ownership, who can supply them with product on an ongoing 
basis.   
In order to determine whether a grid-pricing system will be used, the increase 
in information and negotiation costs must be less than the decrease in monitoring 
costs.  Whether or not a grid-pricing institution is implemented, supply chain 
participants may move towards increased vertical coordination when problems 
associated with incomplete information arise.  Increased vertical coordination will 
offset the overall rise in transaction costs and eliminate some of the costs involved 
when a grid-pricing system is implemented.  It is difficult to determine the optimal 
degree of coordination.  It is not easy to value the tradeoff between increased 
information costs, as a result of transferring information back along the supply 
chain, against reduced long run information costs arising because production 
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segments have easier access to quality information.  It is expected that the empirical 
analysis may provide some insight into the tradeoffs made between the short and 
long run. 
The role of other institutions also needs to be considered, as they will have 
an impact on the use of grid pricing and the degree of coordination required 
implementing grid-based systems.  With the implementation of programs such as the 
Canadian Cattle Identification Agency and its associated national standardized 
tagging program, increased numbers of database tracking systems are being 
developed and provided at a lower cost.  This should make it easier to track 
production and transfer information along the supply chain.  Systems like this could 
reduce the degree of coordination required to facilitate information transfer and 
traceability and allow increased flexibility in terms of the nature of beef industry 
coordination programs.  They could also reduce the costs associated with current 
information transfer.   
 
4.5.3 Price Uncertainty – Quality Variability 
 Price uncertainty can arise as a result of the variability in quality for different 
experience and search attributes (i.e. tenderness and leanness).  The price received 
by a seller is uncertain when tenderness and/or leanness attributes are provided and 
grid-based pricing systems are used.  Although some price discovery can help to 
determine general market prices, the actual price that will be received cannot be 
readily predicted given uncertainty over final quality until after final processing is 
complete. 
Uncertainty as to the price received makes it difficult to plan and market 
appropriately in order to obtain a specific reserve price.  Price is more difficult to 
establish when quality cannot be determined prior to a transaction and, as a result, 
sellers face an increased risk that they will obtain a lower than expected price.  In 
situations where price uncertainty exists, transaction costs are expected to be similar 
to those in the previous discussion regarding imperfect information.  Information 
costs are a key cost incurred by sellers in an effort to reduce price uncertainty 
associated with incomplete information on quality.    Negotiation costs also arise in 
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establishing agreements that minimize price uncertainty and reduce the risk of a 
seller not obtaining their reserve price.  It is predicted that as price uncertainty 
increases, and consequently price discovery and negotiation costs increase, supply 
chain participants will move towards increased vertical coordination in an effort to 
reduce this uncertainty and minimize the associated transaction costs. 
 
4.5.4 Price Uncertainty – Number of Buyers 
 The size of a market for a particular attribute can be defined in two different 
ways.  First, the number of consumers and market share of a particular attribute can 
be identified.  Second, the number of buyers at different transaction points in the 
supply chain can be used to define the market size for a particular seller.  The latter 
definition of market size seems to be more important when considering the impact 
that market size will have on price uncertainty and supply chain structure.  This is 
because the number of buyers available to sellers will affect the risk of sellers not 
obtaining their reserve price.  It is expected that the risk of selling at a reduced price 
increases when there are a smaller number of buyers resulting in a reduction in 
sellers’ bargaining power. 
Determining the actual number of buyers at different points along the supply 
chain is difficult as limited statistics are available on the numbers and types of 
branded beef programs that currently exist.  The limited information is, in part, a 
result of the relative newness of branded beef products in Canada and the U.S.  
Branded beef programs have been increasing in the U.S. market over the last ten 
years and are just recently emerging in the Canadian market.  The lag in the 
development in the Canadian market will be discussed in Chapter 6.  Only general 
estimations on the number of buyers can be made, based on information pertaining 
to the largest branded beef alliances currently operating in the U.S.  This 
information, which was compiled by Kovanda and Schroeder (2003), was used to 
determine the most common combinations of attributes currently being branded. 
Kovanda and Schroeder (2003) do not identify the number of buyers for each 
particular attribute.  Instead the information provided by Kovanda and Schroeder 
(2003) is used as a proxy to estimate the expected number of buyers.  The branded 
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beef programs identified by Kovanda and Schroeder (2003) were examined with 
respect to the attributes they provided.  Twenty-five programs out of a total of thirty-
two identified by Kovanda and Schroeder (2003) were examined, as information on 
the other seven programs could not be found.  The number of branded programs 
identifying a particular attribute was divided by twenty-five to obtain a percentage 
value.  This value is an approximation of the proportion of branded beef programs 
that include a particular attribute. 
Although this method does not identify the number of buyers, it does provide 
an insight into the presence of certain attributes in the market.  Consequently, it 
provides a rough approximation of the market size for certain attributes.  Using this 
method, it is assumed that market size is correlated with the number of buyers.  A 
smaller market size is assumed to result in a smaller number of buyers and a larger 
market size implies that a larger number of buyers exist in the market.  Clearly, this 
method only establishes a proxy variable.  In certain cases the market for a particular 
attribute could be large, but a monopoly or monopsony situation is present.  In this 
situation, price uncertainty will remain considerable even though the market is large.  
The absence of information on the actual number of buyers in a market is a 
limitation of the study. 
Table 4.5 identifies the branded attributes and the percentage of programs 
that include these attributes.  Percentage values range from zero to eighty-eight 
percent.  Those attributes with zero percent do not mean that programs containing 
these attributes do not exist.  Instead, it means that programs with these attributes 
have a very small market share and, as such, were not considered in the 
identification of the largest U.S. branded beef programs by Kovanda and Schroeder.  
Predicted market size in terms of the number of buyers in a market was categorized 
as being either small (0-30% of branded beef programs), medium (30-60% of 
branded beef programs), or large (60-100% of branded beef programs).  Small 
markets, with few downstream buyers, are niche markets that exist on a small-scale 
in the North American beef industry.  Medium sized markets are those that have 
several buyers along the supply chain.  They produce branded beef products that are 
growing in demand, but still only capture a small portion of the total market share of 
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beef.  Large markets are those that produce branded beef products with attributes 
that appear to be the most highly demanded by consumers.  Consequently, there are 
a large number of buyers in these markets. 
Table 4.5 - Predicted Market Size in Terms of Number of Buyers 
Attribute Branded 
Programs  
Percentage
5
 # of 
Buyers 
Price  
Uncertainty 
Natural 8 32 Medium Medium 
Organic & GM Free 0 0 Small High 
Grass Fed 1 4 Small  High 
Enhanced Food Safety 0 0 Small High 
Animal Welfare 3 12 Small  High 
Environmental Preservation 2 8 Small  High 
Product Origin 2 8 Small  High 
Source Verification 0 0  Small High 
Process Verification 0 0 Small High 
Breed 12 48 Medium Medium 
Tender 22 88 Large Low 
Lean 5 20 Small High 
Convenience 0 0 Small  High 
Source: Adapted from information in Kovanda and Schroeder (2003) 
Table 4.5 indicates that the number of buyers for the majority of attributes is 
expected to be small.  Breed and natural attributes are the exception; the number 
along the supply chain is expected to be in the middle range.  Also, for tenderness 
the number of buyers is expected to be large.  When measuring the number of 
buyers, the transaction interface (cow-calf operator/feedlot or feedlot/processor) is 
not considered.  Instead, it is assumed that if a small number of buyers exist at the 
feedlot/packer interface, a small number of buyers will also exist at the cow-
calf/feedlot interface.  Similarly if a large number of buyers exist at the 
feedlot/packer interface a large number of buyers are also assumed to exist at the 
cow-calf/feedlot interface.         
 The method used to determine the estimated number of buyers is arbitrary, 
but it allows for the provision of a general comparison of the types of markets that 
exist for different branded beef attributes.  The above analysis can be used to 
                                                 
5 Percentages were calculated by dividing the number of branded beef programs that provide a 
particular attribute by the total number of programs identified (25) in Kovanda and Schroeder’s 
paper.    
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identify the transaction costs associated with both the number of buyers and price 
uncertainty.  It is expected that as market size decreases, and the number of buyers 
available for a specialized product decreases, the information costs incurred by a 
seller will increase.  Sellers operating in a market with a small number of buyers will 
have to spend more time searching out buyers, identifying their specifications, and 
obtaining price information.  This information may not be readily available when 
only a small number of buyers exist in a market.  In a smaller market, with fewer 
buyers, increased costs will also be incurred to determine a buyer’s reputation and 
whether or not they are likely to act opportunistically and pay a lower price than was 
initially agreed. 
When a small number of buyers exist, negotiation costs will also be incurred 
to reduce the risk of opportunistic of behaviour and to reduce the risk of price 
uncertainty.  Price uncertainty is expected to increase as the number of buyers in a 
market decreases.  With fewer buyers there is a higher risk that sellers will not be 
able to obtain the price they expected for their product.  In an effort to protect 
themselves against the risks associated with opportunistic behaviour and price 
uncertainty, sellers will spend increased time and expense negotiating with buyers to 
establish an agreement that minimizes their risk. 
An additional issue is the relationship between price uncertainty arising from 
the number of buyers and asset specific investments.  With a smaller number of 
buyers in the market, there is an increased risk that buyers will act opportunistically 
and attempt to capture any quasi-rents associated with any asset specific investments 
made by sellers.  Consequently, if asset specific investments are low, less emphasis 
will be placed on the number of buyers because there is less incentive for them to act 
opportunistically.  As a result, when asset specificity is low it is expected that 
transaction costs incurred as a result of fewer buyers in the market will be lower. 
 
4.5.5 Number of Sellers 
The number of sellers available also has an impact on the degree of supply 
chain coordination.  With fewer sellers for a particular attribute, processors face 
increased risks that they will not be able to procure a constant supply of product.  
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This limits their ability to establish supply agreements with retailers and other end-
users for a specialized product.  As a result, the number of sellers in a market also 
has an influence on transaction costs and the optimal degree of vertical coordination.   
 When the number of sellers in a market decreases it is expected that 
information costs will increase, given that buyers will spend more time searching out 
suppliers and will also incur costs in an effort to determine a supplier’s reputation.  
A seller’s reputation becomes important if there is a risk that they could act 
opportunistically and request a higher price than was initially arranged, knowing that 
the buyer needs the product to fulfill its downstream commitments.  Negotiation and 
enforcement costs will also be higher, as there will be increased incentive to 
establish and enforce agreements that reduce the risk of opportunistic behaviour and 
minimize a buyer’s price uncertainty.   
 It is apparent that both the number of buyers and sellers in a market can 
significantly impact transactions costs, with transaction costs increasing as the 
number of buyers and sellers decrease.  Hence, it is likely that as market size 
becomes smaller and transaction costs increase, supply chain participants will 
choose to increase coordination to minimize transaction costs.  The level of asset 
specificity required to produce a particular attribute will affect the degree of 
coordination.  Smaller market size and the associated higher transaction costs are 
relatively less important in situations where the degree of asset specific investments 
is low.    
Under conditions of asset specificity and transaction uncertainty, 
enforcement costs may also arise to ensure compliance with agreements negotiated 
between supply chain partners. Enforcement costs may not actually be incurred 
every time an agreement is made, but the possibility exists that an agreement 
between supply chain participants will be breached.  Then partners to an agreement 
would have to incur enforcement costs, for example, to cover court or arbitration 
costs.  It is expected that as the degree of asset specificity and transaction 
uncertainty increases, the risk of opportunistic behaviour and, as a result, the risk of 
breaching an agreement will increase.  In order to minimize these higher transaction 
costs, beef industry participants may choose to increase supply chain coordination. 
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4.6 Transaction Frequency 
The frequency with which transactions occur between supply chain 
participants is another transaction characteristic that will affect vertical coordination.  
The probable number of transactions between different industry segments is outlined 
in Table 4.6.  Typically, cow-calf operators are on a one-year cycle.  They calve 
once a year and sell their total production over a brief period later in the year.  
Larger cow-calf operators may switch their production plan so that they have cows 
calving at two or three different times during the year, which will result in the sale of 
their production being staggered into two or three transactions per year.  Such 
changes in production are difficult to adopt in Canada though, due to the increased 
costs of wintering calves born in the fall.  As a result, transactions between cow-calf 
operators and feedlots are limited to one or two per year, with most cow-calf 
operators focusing on only making small adjustments in their marketing schedules to 
provide cattle to feedlots at alternate times of the year.   
Feedlots, which often operate on a significantly larger scale than cow-calf 
operators, typically have a continuous flow of cattle going through their operations 
to packers.  This is done in order to cover fixed costs year round and maximize 
operational efficiency in both feedlots and packing plants. 
Table 4.6 - Transaction Frequency 
Transacting Parties Transactions/Year 
Cow-Calf Producers – Feedlots 1 to 2 
Feedlots - Packers/Processors Multiple 
 
As transactions become more frequent there is increased reliance on trust.  It 
is in the best interest for participants that transact frequently to not act hide 
information or act opportunistically that could jeopardize their ongoing relationship.  
When transactions are more frequent and reputation and trust are increasingly relied 
upon, the transaction costs incurred to reduce information asymmetries, incomplete 
information, and price uncertainty are reduced.  Consequently, a lower degree of 
vertical coordination is expected when transactions occur on a more frequent basis.   
 88
Transaction frequency differs from other transaction characteristics in that, 
while frequency varies between different segments of the supply chain, this variation 
is essentially constant across all attributes.  Differences are more a result of 
differences in concentration across industry sectors.  Therefore, the effect of 
frequency on transactions costs, as a result of the production of different attributes, 
is expected to be minimal and has not been included in the model.  Instead, 
consideration needs to be given to how transaction frequency affects coordination 
between different industry participants.  It is expected that more coordination will be 
required at the cow-calf/feedlot interface than at the feedlot/processor or 
processor/retailer interfaces where transactions occur on a more constant basis.  
When transactions occur on a more frequent basis between supply chain 
participants, negotiation costs will be lower as participants will have a greater 
incentive to maintain ongoing relationships by not acting opportunistically. 
  
4.7 Additional Factors that Affect Vertical Coordination 
 Additional transaction characteristics may also affect the transaction costs 
and degree of vertical coordination required to produce a particular attribute.  The 
number and types of links required to provide an attribute and the implementation of 
source/process verification systems also need to be considered when examining 
transaction costs and the optimal degree of vertical coordination.   
 
4.7.1 Number of Links 
 It is important to identify the number of links or stages in the vertical supply 
chain that have an influence on the provision of a particular attribute.  As more links 
are required, there are an increased number of transactions where information other 
than the price of a product must be transferred between participants.  Downstream 
users of products require information on the quality of inputs, and in some cases 
upstream suppliers also need to obtain information on end-product quality.  The ease 
with which information is transferred depends on the type of attribute being 
produced, with the costs being highest for credence attributes and lowest for search 
attributes.  The costs associated with experience attributes are expected to lie 
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somewhere in between.  In the case of experience attributes, information may flow 
back to the production stages when attributes such as tenderness are being produced 
where quality cannot be determined until after processing.  In this situation, 
information may be relayed back to cow-calf operators and feedlots in the form of 
price premiums/discounts, as well actual carcass quality data that provides cow-calf 
operators and feedlots with more detailed demand signals and price incentives to 
better align their production with consumer demands. 
Table 4.7 identifies the different branded beef attributes and the supply chain 
participants that influence these attributes.  For example, natural beef requires that 
no hormones or antibiotics are used, which only occurs in the production stages.  
Therefore cow-calf operators and feedlots are the critical participants.  As another 
example, tenderness can be affected by genetics, feed, other factors in the production 
process, and the processing techniques used.  Therefore, when providing a 
guaranteed tender product, all of these stages (cow-calf operator, feedlot, and 
processor) need to be involved with information being transferred as to the required 
production and processing practices and the quality of finished products. 
Table 4.7 - Supply Chain Participants that Affect the Presence of an Attribute  
Attribute Cow-Calf  Feedlot Processor 
Natural (C) X X  
Organic & GM Free (C) X X  
Grass Fed (C) X X  
Food Safety (C) X X X 
Animal Welfare (C) X X X 
Environmental Preservation (C) X X X 
Source Verification (C) X X X 
Process Verification (C) X X X 
Product Origin (C) X X  
Breed (C) X   
Tender (E) X X X 
Lean (S) X X  
Convenience (S)   X 
C – Credence Attribute E – Experience Attribute S – Search Attribute 
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Similar to previous tables, it should be noted that Table 4.7 excludes 
seedstock producers, background feedlots, and the retailer.  These participants have 
been excluded in order to simplify the model.  In the production stages, finishing 
feedlots and background feedlots have a very similar influence on the production of 
particular attributes.  Seedstock producers and commercial cow-calf operators also 
have a similar influence on the production of particular attributes.  Therefore, it is 
easier to group commercial cow-calf operators and seedstock producers into one 
group and background and finishing feedlots into another group.  
Retailers have been excluded from the model, as it has been assumed that 
their impact on the production of particular attributes is minimal, with the exception 
of certain processing and value-added practices.  The retailer’s involvement in these 
processes has also diminished significantly.  Increased processing and value-added 
production is being undertaken by packers, where case-ready products are produced 
for retailers in replacement of in-store butchers.  This increases product consistency 
and captures the economies of scale available in large processing plants versus 
small-scale in-store production preparation. 
Of course, coordination with the retailer is essential in selling a branded beef 
product.  Retailers and other end users are the link between production and 
processing stages and consumers.  They facilitate the transfer of consumer demands, 
in the form of price signals, back along the supply chain.  Retailers also have 
reputations to maintain with their customers so they have a vested interest in 
ensuring consistency and quality. 
 
4.7.2 Source and Process Verification 
 Source and process verification have previously been included in some 
branded beef programs.  This has occurred in response to increasing demand by 
consumers that the production of attributes can be verified along the supply chain.  
New source verification and traceability systems are being brought into place that 
require investments into specialized I.D. technologies (tags, microchips, etc.), 
scanners, and data management systems.  The investments made by supply chain 
participants must be protected from opportunistic behaviour, which may result in 
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transactions becoming more complex.  At the same time these systems often 
facilitate easier monitoring and tracking along the supply chain, which can offset the 
increase in transaction costs associated with opportunistic behaviour.  Also, in the 
long run the implementation of a traceability system is expected to reduce 
information costs.  The creation of a comprehensive information management 
system increases the ease with which information is transferred between supply 
chain participants. 
 
4.8 Overview of Transaction Characteristics 
Linking together supply chain participants in order to facilitate the provision 
of differentiated attributes implies that supply chain participants will be working 
more closely together to transfer increasingly detailed information.  This results in 
transactions being moved away from spot markets and towards increased vertical 
coordination.  The actual level of vertical coordination chosen depends on all of the 
transaction characteristics combined and how they affect costs.  The method chosen 
will be that which minimizes the total transaction and operating costs.   
Table 4.8 provides an overview of transaction characteristics and their 
relationship with different branded beef attributes.  Several conclusions can be 
drawn from the table.  Firstly, the transaction characteristics associated with all 
credence attributes are very similar.  Information asymmetry exists when producing 
any credence attribute.  Consequently, the branding of any credence attribute implies 
that some sort of traceability or identity preservation system will be required.  The 
structure of such a system will depend on whether external institutions already exist 
for monitoring the production and processing of a particular attribute or whether a 
new traceability system has to be developed that is specific to an individual supply 
chain.  In addition, the number of buyers and/or sellers along a supply chain 
providing credence attributes typically ranges between small to medium.  This 
means that price uncertainty is higher and, as a result, transaction costs are higher.
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Table 4.8 – Overview of Transaction Characteristics 
Attribute Source 
Verification 
/Traceability 
Asset Specificity Information 
Asymmetry 
Price 
Uncertainty 
(Quality)
6
 
# of Buyers 
/Sellers 
Price Uncertainty 
(Buyers /Sellers)
7
 
Links Required 
Natural (C) Yes Physical, Human Yes No Medium Medium 
Cow–Calf Operators 
Feedlots 
Organic & GM Free (C) Yes Physical, Human Yes No Small High 
Cow–Calf Operators 
Feedlots 
Grass Fed (C) Yes Physical, Human Yes No Small High 
Cow–Calf Operators 
Feedlots 
Enhanced Food Safety (C) Yes Physical, Human Yes No Small High 
Cow–Calf Operators 
Feedlots, Processors 
Animal Welfare (C) Yes Physical, Human  Yes No Small High 
Cow–Calf Operators 
Feedlots, Processors 
Environmental Preservation (C) Yes 
Physical, 
Human, Site 
Yes No Small High 
Cow–Calf Operators 
Feedlots, Processors 
Source Verification (C) Yes Human Yes No Small High 
Cow–Calf Operators  
Feedlots, Processors 
Process Verification (C) Yes Human Yes No Small High 
Cow–Calf Operators 
Feedlots, Processors 
Product Origin (C) Yes Site, Human Yes No Small High 
Cow–Calf Operators 
Feedlots 
Breed (C) Yes Physical, Human Yes No Medium Medium Cow–Calf Operators  
Tender (E) Varies Physical, Human No Yes Large Low 
Cow–Calf Operators  
Feedlots, Processors 
Lean (S) Varies Physical, Human No Yes Small High 
Cow–Calf Operators  
Feedlots 
Convenience (S) No Physical No No Large* Low Processors 
                                                 
6 Price uncertainty arising as a result of variability in quality (e.g. If quality varies, price uncertainty will be present).   
7 Price uncertainty arising as a result of the number of buyers/sellers (e.g. If the number of buyers/sellers is small, price uncertainty will be high). 
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The biggest variance for different credence attributes is the level and type of 
asset specific investments required.  For example, beef products that brand product 
origin require supply chain participants to be located in a specific region.  It is most 
likely that instead of new investors coming into the region, existing operations 
located in the region will take part in the program and therefore site specific 
investments will actually be quite low.  Investment will only become high if new 
investors enter a region in order to participate in a program.  At the opposite 
extreme, as animal welfare and environmental preservation program standards 
become more stringent, the physical improvements required may be quite large and 
result in high levels of physical asset specificity and, consequently, higher 
transaction costs. Human asset specific investments also vary between attributes and 
will result in differences in the transaction costs incurred when producing particular 
attributes.  
Incomplete information on the production of particular attributes can result 
in transaction uncertainty when experience and search attributes are concerned, 
which will affect the transaction costs incurred to provide these attributes.  The 
number of buyers and/or sellers for experience and search attributes is often much 
larger than for credence attributes.  As a result, the risk of price uncertainty is lower 
for experience and search attributes and the transaction costs incurred to reduce the 
risk of opportunistic behaviour will be lower.  Asset specific investments also vary, 
with investment at the processor level increasing for experience and search attributes 
such as tenderness, leanness, and convenience.  Investment is required into both 
human capital and physical assets used in the production of these attributes.  For 
credence attributes, investments are often required in the cow-calf or feedlot sectors 
related to particular production processes. 
Shared asset specific investments and other transaction characteristics may 
help to explain the types of attributes that are commonly grouped together, as 
outlined in Table 4.2.  Although consumers ultimately guide the production of 
different combinations of attributes, the increase in transaction and operating costs 
must also be considered.  For example, providing a natural grass-fed beef product 
versus just a natural product does not require much more investment aside from 
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minor alterations to the feed protocol and certification/record keeping systems.  
Consequently, the marginal increase in costs will be small.  It is expected that for 
attributes to be provided in combination with others, the marginal increase in 
consumers’ willingness to pay for the two attributes combined has to outweigh the 
willingness to pay for each attribute individually.   It is also expected that for an 
additional attribute to be produced in combination with other attributes, the marginal 
cost of producing that attribute must be less than the marginal increase in 
consumers’ willingness to pay. 
The approach of comparing the marginal increase in consumers’ willingness 
to pay for additional attributes with the marginal increase in costs associated with 
providing these attributes can be applied to any of the attribute combinations in 
Table 4.2.  As long as consumers are willing to pay more for an additional attribute 
than the marginal increase in transaction and operating costs, supply chain 
participants should be willing to provide those attribute bundles.  It is likely that the 
marginal increase in costs for an additional attribute will be small due to common 
transaction characteristics.  This explains why branded beef programs often bundle 
several attributes. 
 
4.9 Predictive Model 
It is important to understand the relationship between transaction complexity 
and the supply chain structures emerging in the branded beef industry.  As discussed 
in the previous chapter, five main structures exist: spot markets, informal alliances, 
contracts, formal alliances, and vertical integration.  Informal alliances can be 
further broken down into brand licensing organizations and marketing alliances.  
Contracts can be broken down into marketing and production contracts.  Each 
supply chain structure is distinct in how it manages, or in some cases does not 
manage, various transaction characteristics.  Table 4.9 presents a model that predicts 
the type of supply structure that is expected to emerge based on the previously 
identified transaction characteristics. 
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Table 4.9 Predictive Model 
Informal Alliances Contracts 
Spot 
Market 
Brand 
Licensing 
Organizations 
Marketing 
Alliances 
Marketing Production Formal 
Alliances 
Vertical 
Integration 
Transaction 
Characteristics 
 
                                                                                                                                    
Overall Transaction 
Complexity 
Low Low Low/Medium Low Medium/High High High 
                                                                                                                                    
Asset Specificity None Low Low/Medium Medium/High Medium/High High High 
Information 
Asymmetry 
No No No No Yes Yes Yes 
Price Uncertainty 
(QualityVariability) 
No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Price Uncertainty 
# of  Buyers/Sellers 
Large 
Market 
Large Market 
Market Size 
Varies 
Market Size 
Varies 
Medium/Small 
Market 
Small 
Market 
Small 
Market 
Number of 
Participants  
2 >2 >2 2 2 >2 >2 
Traceability 
System 
No No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
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Each supply chain structure is examined with respect to whether it allows for 
the presence of a particular transaction characteristic.  In some cases, such as with 
asset specificity, the model identifies the level of a characteristic that can be 
managed within a particular structure. The model presented in Table 4.9 is based on 
the analysis of supply chain structures presented in Chapter 3.  Consistent with the 
predictions of transaction cost economics, supply chain structures are expected to 
emerge to minimize the production and transaction costs associated with different 
transaction characteristics.  For example, when information asymmetry exists for a 
particular attribute, supply chain participants will choose between carrying out 
transactions via production contracts, formal alliances, or vertical integration.  The 
transaction costs associated with information asymmetry will be minimized under 
these structures given the increased ability to monitor other firms in the supply 
chain, and ensure compliance.       
The optimal supply chain structure depends on the combination of 
transaction characteristics when producing a particular attribute.  For example, 
information asymmetry may exist when providing an attribute, but this attribute may 
also require high levels of asset specificity.  This will limit the optimal structure to 
using production contracts, a formal alliance or vertical integration.  Production 
contracts are unlikely to be used if agreements need to be established between cow-
calf operators and other sectors.  This is because negotiation costs will be high due 
to the large number of small cow-calf operators with which individual agreements 
would have to be negotiated.  Given the high capital costs associated with vertical 
integration in the beef industry, it is most likely that a formal alliance will be used to 
produce an attribute characterized by information asymmetry and a high degree of 
asset specificity.          
Price uncertainty associated with quality variability and the number of 
buyers/sellers does not appear to limit the type of coordination that will occur as 
much as other transaction characteristics.  This is expected because of the reciprocal 
nature of interactions between supply chain participants.  Buyers need a constant 
supply of a differentiated product on an ongoing basis to meet their commitments 
and suppliers also need access to a market that will accept the differentiated product 
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they produce.  It is likely that price uncertainty will result in production being 
coordinated outside the spot market; the outcome will be dependent on the 
combination of other characteristics.  In terms of quality variability, any system that 
can implement a grid-based pricing initiative will result in improved information 
transfer and reduced quality variability.  At the same time, it is expected that the 
number of buyers and sellers will be closely linked to the degree of asset specificity.  
Thus, as asset specificity increases and the number of buyers and sellers decreases, 
supply chain coordination will increase 
The number of participants that are involved with the production of a 
particular attribute is also important.  In situations where cow-calf operators, 
feedlots, and processors are involved in the production of a particular attribute they 
will likely choose an informal or formal alliance structure.  These structures are 
expected to be preferred over the use of contracts due to the fact that feedlots will 
likely be transacting with many cow-calf operators, resulting in high negotiation 
costs if contracts must be negotiated with each individual.  Contracts are also 
typically limited to coordinating transactions between two parties. When more than 
two parties are involved in the production of a particular attribute, contracts become 
complex and negotiation costs increase.   
The need for a traceability system to ensure the presence of a particular 
attribute does not appear to limit the type of coordination that will occur to any great 
extent.  Traceability systems can vary significantly in terms the types of information 
being transferred between supply chain segments.  It is expected that as the 
information required to be transferred along the supply chain becomes greater or 
more detailed the optimal supply chain structure will be higher along the vertical 
coordination continuum. 
 
4.9.1 Levels of Standards 
From the discussion of branded beef programs in Chapter 2, it was clear that 
programs differ in the stringency of their standards.  While two different programs 
may guarantee the same attribute, one will require a higher level of coordination due 
to its more stringent production standards, traceability systems, and other program 
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requirements.  The most common example is the production of tenderness.  Both 
Certified Angus Beef and Ranchers Renaissance are promoting the production of a 
consistently tender product.  Yet under the Ranchers Renaissance program, 
participants must comply with very detailed production, processing, and 
management protocols.  The focus is also to provide precise information back along 
the supply chain.  Given the high level of investment required to comply with the 
program’s physical and human capital demands, as well as detailed information, 
Ranchers Renaissance operates under a formal alliance structure.  Typically, this 
type of organizational structure is referred to as a new generation cooperative.  The 
cooperative uses membership fees and contracts to ensure participants make a long-
term commitment and supply high quality cattle into the program.     
In contrast, the Certified Angus Beef program also guarantees tenderness, 
but has minimal production requirements.  It focuses on the use of specific and 
narrow grading standards along with a grid-based pricing system, as its key method 
of transferring information back along the supply chain.  This type of system 
requires a lower level of coordination and operates under a brand licensing 
organization which lies on the opposite end of the coordination continuum.  Why are 
there two different structures that, in essence, are branding the same attribute? The 
key variant is the method used in achieving the attributes being guaranteed by their 
programs.   It appears that each method results in a different level of transaction 
costs.  Higher levels of standards and more detailed program requirements result in 
higher investments.  This will increase the transaction costs incurred by supply chain 
participants and coordination will increase in order to minimize these costs.     
More detailed program requirements typically require higher levels of 
investment in physical, human, or site specific capital.  For example, human capital 
investments in time, management, and the implementation of record/certification 
systems to guarantee compliance.  The type of asset specific investments required to 
produce different attributes varies depending both on the attribute and the stringency 
of program standards.  As a result, in order to understand the degree to which asset 
specificity contributes to overall transaction complexity, individual programs need 
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to be examined based on the combination of the attributes they produce and the level 
of standards implemented. 
 
4.9.2 Attribute Combinations 
The second issue that arises is the combination of attributes in a 
differentiated product.  The predictive model is essentially looking at the production 
of one attribute.  Therefore, the vertical coordination outcome that emerges will be 
the one that facilitates the production of all of the attributes.  It is expected that as 
the number of attributes provided in a differentiated product increases, coordination 
will increase.        
 
4.9.3 Managing Differences in Frequency of Transactions 
 With the production of different beef attributes, the management of supply 
becomes crucial to the success of the program.  In order to successfully market a 
brand to consumers, it needs to be made available to them on an ongoing and 
consistent basis.  One of the greatest challenges in developing a branded beef 
program is maintaining a consistent and adequate volume of production.  In the 
cow/calf sector, production occurs during specific months of the year, which results 
in inconsistent flows into the remainder of the supply chain.  As a result, information 
costs have to be incurred to search for adequate supplies of suitable cattle.  
Improving supply chain coordination is often used to ensure the consistent delivery 
of cattle on an ongoing basis, while minimizing the information costs incurred.   
The actual supply chain structure that emerges will depend on the attributes 
being branded.  If attributes are readily available due to a larger number of sellers, a 
lower level of coordination is expected.  As branded programs become more 
detailed, with a focus on higher levels of standards, multiple attributes, or attributes 
with a small number of sellers, it is expected that coordination will increase to 
reduce search costs.  Coordinating the supply of beef has also allowed large 
processors to maintain a consistent supply of inputs for the production of 
convenience and value-added products.  Producing convenience varies significantly 
from other attributes in that the majority of value is added in the processing segment.  
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This relatively new segment in the beef industry is consuming a large volume of 
beef.  In order to ensure a constant flow of supply into the plants and reduce their 
procurement costs, processors have focused on increasing coordination. 
 
4.9.4 Role of Institutions 
Institutions can result in transaction costs being lowered and consequently 
can affect the degree of coordination required to produce a particular attribute. 
Whether an institution is a grid-based pricing system, a third-party certification body 
or a standardized tracking and traceability system, it is likely to impact the degree of 
coordination required.  Processes that were previously implemented through a 
program become external.  This results in increased flexibility in terms of the 
coordination of a particular program.  The presence/absence of market institutions 
needs to be considered in terms of their impact on the optimal degree of supply 
chain coordination. Although the role of institutions was not outlined in the 
predictive model, it is expected that when institutions exist the degree of 
coordination required to produce an attribute will be lower.  The role of institutions 
will be investigated further in Chapter 6. 
 
4.10 Summary and Conclusions 
 The objective of this chapter was to explore the relationship between 
transaction cost economics and supply chain coordination in the beef industry.  The 
chapter also developed a predictive transaction cost model that can be used to 
identify how different beef attributes affect transaction characteristics and 
consequently transaction costs.  The model was then extended to identify why 
different supply chain structures have emerged to produce differentiated beef 
products with particular attributes.  Several issues including the stringency of 
program standards, combinations of attributes under branded beef programs, 
ensuring adequate supply flow, and market institutions were then discussed in terms 
of how they can also affect the optimal method of coordination when producing a 
particular attribute.  
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 It is important to extend the theoretical model and examine the links between 
transaction characteristics, transaction costs, and supply chain coordination 
empirically.  Currently, no data on transaction costs in the beef industry is available 
and these costs are difficult to measure.  The next chapter develops a producer 
survey that identifies the impact of different transaction characteristics on a cow-calf 
operator’s decision to become involved in different types of supply chain 
coordination. 
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5 COW-CALF OPERATOR EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS 
5.1 Introduction 
The previous chapter developed a predictive transaction cost model that can 
be used to identify how different attributes affect transaction characteristics.  This 
model was also used to examine why different supply chain structures are chosen to 
coordinate production when certain transaction characteristics are present.  It is 
apparent that significant benefits can be derived from increased coordination.  At the 
same time, coordination and the production of differentiated beef products can result 
in increased transaction costs.  Transaction costs arise as a result of the increased 
risks associated with participating in a more coordinated program and must be 
traded off against any cost savings in order to determine the optimal degree of 
coordination.   
 Currently, the degree of coordination between the cow-calf sector and the 
rest of the value chain is lower than the degree of coordination between other 
segments of the beef industry.  At the same time, cow-calf operators’ participation in 
the production of differentiated products is necessary.  Better linkages are needed 
between this sector and the rest of the supply chain to improve both information and 
product flow.  The question arises as to why coordination has been limited between 
the cow-calf sector and the rest of the supply chain.  It is expected that limited 
coordination at this transaction interface may be a result of the transaction 
characteristics arising when differentiated branded beef products are produced.  In 
determining what has limited participation of cow-calf operators in different supply 
chain structures, it is necessary to evaluate the importance of different transaction 
characteristics to cow-calf operators.  It is also important to examine the degree to 
which transaction characteristics affect their decision to participate in a particular 
supply chain relationship.   
This chapter empirically evaluates the importance of different transaction 
characteristics to cow-calf operators when they are choosing to participate in 
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different beef supply chain coordination programs.  In particular, the chapter 
discusses the use of conjoint analysis as a methodology for studying the importance 
of different transaction characteristics to cow-calf operators and develops a conjoint 
analysis experiment.  Following Hair et al. (1992), the conjoint experiment involves: 
(1) designing the stimuli, (2) collecting the data, and (3) estimating the model and 
interpreting the results.  These steps are followed in the chapter. 
 
5.2 Applications of Conjoint Analysis: Insights from the literature 
Conjoint analysis was used to evaluate cow-calf operator preferences for 
different supply chain structures based on the transaction characteristics that arise.  
From a family of stated preference methods, conjoint analysis is the appropriate 
technique in this case, as it allows the researcher to evaluate preferences for a range 
of hypothetical supply chain structures based on their underlying characteristics, etc.  
Conjoint analysis assumes that products can be defined as a set of characteristics and 
respondents evaluate the utility of a combination of characteristic levels when 
making a purchasing decision (Ness and Gerhardy, 1996, 1).  As conjoint analysis 
focuses on utility as the dependent variable instead of price, it is an appropriate 
framework to use when attempting to evaluate existing or hypothetical products, 
services, or programs.  
Conjoint analysis, therefore, can be used to evaluate the utility derived by 
beef industry participants entering into different supply chain structures.  Alliances 
and other methods of vertical coordination in the beef industry offer participants 
different combinations and levels of transaction characteristics.  Conjoint analysis 
can be used to measure the relative importance of the transaction characteristics that 
were discussed in Chapter 4.  It is expected that cow-calf operators will seek to 
maximize their utility and minimize transaction costs when making their decision to 
join a beef supply chain coordination program.            
 
5.2.1 Conjoint Measurement 
Conjoint measurement was developed primarily by mathematical 
psychologists and was introduced into the marketing literature by Green and Rao in 
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1971.  Conjoint analysis is consistent with Lancaster’s notion of consumer utility 
being a function of preferences for the characteristics inherent in a good.  Lancaster 
argued that utility is not derived from goods directly, but from their characteristics.  
As a result, goods are ranked according to utility only indirectly through the values 
assigned to levels of the characteristics that they are perceived to possess (Green and 
Wind, 1973, 20).   
Conjoint measurement involves examining respondents’ overall judgments 
about a set of product alternatives and breaking those judgments down into the 
contribution of each product/program characteristic and characteristic level 
(Steenkamp, 1987, 474).  This process is used frequently in market research, as 
researchers are often concerned with finding out which characteristics of a product 
or a service are most important.  Conjoint analysis is able to determine the 
contribution of each characteristic to a respondent’s total utility and provide insights 
into the relative importance of different product/program characteristics (SPSS Inc., 
1997, 1).  It enables researchers to identify combinations of product/program 
characteristics that give the respondent the highest utility.  It establishes a valid 
model that is useful in predicting the acceptance of any combination of product 
characteristics, including those not originally evaluated by survey respondents (Ness 
and Gerhardy, 1994, 5).  In this case, the methodology is useful in predicting the 
combination of branded beef program attributes preferred by cow-calf operators.       
 The conjoint experiment involves the combination of different levels of 
possible branded beef program characteristics to describe hypothetical supply chain 
coordination programs.  The hypothetical profiles are then presented to respondents 
who indicate their overall evaluations for each hypothetical profile through either a 
ranking or rating scale.  This is a strength of conjoint analysis, as respondents are 
asked to evaluate whole products/programs, much as cow-calf operators do when 
making a decision to participate in a particular supply chain coordination program.  
They must implicitly compare program features, and based on those features, make 
trade-offs between different programs (SPSS Inc., 1997, 2).  Based on the 
respondents’ choices, conjoint analysis allows for the estimation of utility scores.  
These utility scores measure the relative importance of each program characteristic 
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to the respondent’s overall preference for a program, as well as estimating which 
levels of each characteristic are most preferred (SPSS Inc., 1997, 7).              
Conjoint analysis allows elements of a product, service, or program to be 
evaluated through a relatively low cost and convenient method (Patterson et al., 
2003, 529). The scenarios presented to respondents do not have to describe existing 
products or programs.  Instead, hypothetical scenarios can be presented, which 
allows for the measurement of characteristics or combinations of characteristics that 
are not currently in the market.  This allows researchers to forecast preferences for 
different characteristics prior to the development of new products and services 
(Louviere, 1988, 33).  The only risk with the creation of hypothetical scenarios is 
that credibility problems can occur.  In order to ensure credibility, characteristics 
must be plausible and capable of being traded off by respondents (Hobbs, 1996b, 
516).  Another advantage that sets conjoint analysis apart from other multivariate 
methods is that it can be carried out at the individual level.  Using conjoint analysis, 
a researcher generates a separate model for predicting preferences for each 
respondent in the experiment.  This reveals individual preferences and allows for the 
segregation of respondents into different groups based on their preferences (Hair et 
al., 1992, 385).   
The majority of research using conjoint analysis has focused on consumer 
preferences for products and services.  However, conjoint analysis can be useful in 
almost any field where there is a need to measure people’s preferences or 
perceptions.  Conjoint analysis has been applied outside of consumer preference 
research.  Sy et al. (1997) focused on evaluating the preferences of cow-calf 
operators for different cattle characteristics and used conjoint analysis to estimate 
the marginal contribution of specific animal characteristics to overall cow-calf 
operator preference ratings (Sy et al., 1997).  Prentice and Benel (1992) used 
conjoint analysis to examine the perception of U.S. carriers regarding the desirability 
of obtaining loads in Canada versus returning empty to the Northern United States.  
Their analysis focused on the importance of selected elements of transborder 
movements (Prentice et al., 1992).        
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Hobbs (1996b) completed a study that used conjoint analysis to measure the 
relative importance of selected transaction costs in processors’ procurement 
decisions.  The study was based on the premise that each supply chain displays 
different characteristics, similar to how goods and services are often viewed as 
bundles of characteristics.  A processor’s preference for a particular supply chain 
channel is determined by the bundle of characteristics that are present in that 
channel.  The characteristics may result in transaction costs or may offset transaction 
costs.  The presence of these characteristics varies among supply chain channels and 
will affect a processor’s preference for a particular channel (Hobbs, 1996b, 514).              
A second study, which also ties in closely with the conjoint method 
developed in this chapter, was done by Stevens et al. (2002) and uses conjoint 
analysis to examine landowners’ attitudes toward specific forestland management 
program characteristics and requirements (Stevens et al., 2002,169).  The objectives 
of the study were to examine the characteristics that influence private landowners’ 
decisions to participate in forestland management programs.  The study also 
analyzed the tradeoffs between different management program characteristics.  In 
order to evaluate landowner response, hypothetical management programs, defined 
by several characteristics and levels were created.  Landowners were asked to 
indicate their willingness to participate in the different hypothetical programs.           
It is apparent that conjoint analysis is a very flexible and potentially powerful 
tool for exploring respondents’ preferences and perceptions for particular products, 
services, and more importantly in this case, program structures.  The discussion in 
Chapter 4 emphasized that programs in the beef industry vary significantly in terms 
of the attributes being produced and the transaction characteristics emerging, and are 
quite heterogeneous. Many current non-market valuation techniques do not facilitate 
the examination of multiple characteristics with different levels.  Conjoint analysis 
provides a potential solution to this problem (Sy et al., 1997, 15). 
The purpose of the conjoint experiment developed in this chapter is to 
analyze the choices made by cow-calf operators.  It investigates the hypothesis that a 
participant’s choice to operate within a particular supply chain program is influenced 
by the different transaction characteristics and levels of transaction characteristics 
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that emerge.  These transaction characteristics are a result of the various beef 
attributes being produced to satisfy consumer demands and are discussed in Chapter 
4.  In the analysis that follows, beef programs are characterized as bundles of 
transaction characteristics.  Conjoint analysis is used to measure the relative 
importance of selected transaction characteristics in a respondent’s decision to 
participate in a value chain alliance.   
A conjoint experiment was chosen to evaluate the importance of different 
transaction characteristics for two additional reasons.  First, the lack of experience 
with supply chain coordination and branded programs in the Canadian beef industry 
results in an absence of relevant data, making experimental methods like conjoint 
analysis the only way to evaluate participants’ perceptions and preferences for 
different potential programs.  Second, any publicly available data cannot be used, 
because it cannot reveal preferences for characteristics of programs.  This is because 
when intangible transaction characteristics are to be measured it is difficult to obtain 
quantitative data that allows for comparison between characteristics.  Conjoint 
analysis provides a means to measure these variables and compare them by creating 
a common scale that allows weights to be assigned to the various levels of each 
characteristic.  It is then possible to analyze how respondents tradeoff between 
characteristics when making their decisions (Sanderson, 2001, 56). 
 
5.2.2 Limitations, Reliability, and Validity 
There are a couple of limitations of conjoint analysis that must be 
considered.  In conjoint studies the researcher is assuming that the product/program 
being evaluated by respondents can be defined in terms of a few important 
characteristics.  As more characteristics and characteristic levels need to be defined 
due to increased complexity of an object, an increasing number of hypothetical 
scenarios must be presented to respondents.  Increasing numbers of scenarios are 
required in order to allow for the measurement of the relative importance of all the 
characteristics.  There is, however, a limit on the number of judgments that 
respondents can reasonable be expected to make, which restricts the number of 
characteristics and levels that can be used in the experiment.  This may affect the 
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reliability of the experiment due to the exclusion of certain characteristics that are 
significant to the overall valuation of a particular scenario (Louviere, 1988, 33).  In 
order to overcome this limitation and ensure all relevant characteristics are included, 
it is important to research all possibilities and pretest the survey.    
The other limitation of conjoint studies is that people may not actually do 
what they state they will in the hypothetical situation.  This is less of a concern 
though, as most applications, such as the one in this chapter, are intending to identify 
estimates of relative importance rather than absolute values.  In this situation there is 
less of worry about under or over estimates.  The over or understatement of values is 
not likely to affect the actual order of importance for characteristics, which is what is 
of interest (Kroes and Sheldon, 1988, 13).   
McCullough and Best (1979) evaluated the temporal stability and structural 
reliability of conjoint measurement.  In examining the temporal stability of conjoint 
measurement, McCullough and Best were focusing on the accuracy with which 
respondents can replicate their judgment of scenarios at different points in time.  In 
terms of structural reliability, the focus was on examining the degree to which 
preference patterns identified by conjoint measurement remained unchanged, as the 
scenario describing the object is altered.  In their paper it was concluded that the 
results of conjoint measurement were both stable over time and when characteristics 
were measured using alternative scales (McCullough and Best, 1979, 30).   
 
5.3 Designing Stimuli or Treatments 
The framework developed by Hair et al. (1992) provides a clear and concise 
method to design and execute a conjoint experiment.  Three main steps are involved 
in the research process: 1) designing the stimuli or treatments, 2) collecting data, and 
3) estimating and interpreting the model.  Figure 5.1 provides an outline of the 
design and execution of a conjoint experiment.  It will be used to describe the design 
of the cow-calf operator conjoint experiment. 
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Figure 5.1 - Conjoint Analysis Decision Process - Based on Hair et al. (1992) 
RESEARCH PROBLEM 
 
What are the elements of utility for the 
product/service/idea considered? 
 
What is the key decision criteria 
involved in the choice process? 
SPECIFYING 
CHARACTERISTICS & LEVELS 
Attributes to be used 
Levels for each characteristic 
SPECIFYING THE BASIC 
MODEL FORM 
Additive versus interactive 
Linear, quadratic or separate part-worths 
CREATING STIMULI Factorial 
design 
Fractional 
factorial 
design 
CHOOSING A PRESENTATION 
METHOD 
Full profile versus trade-off 
SELECTING A PREFERENCE MEASURE 
 
Metric (ratings) versus non-metric (rank order) 
SELECTING THE ESTIMATION TECHNOLOGY 
EVALUATING THE RESULTS 
Assessing reliability 
Assessing predictive accuracy 
APPLYING THE CONJOINT RESULTS 
Defining segments 
INTERPRETING RESULTS 
Aggregate versus disaggregate results 
Relative importance of attributes 
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5.3.1 Research Problem 
The purpose of the conjoint experiment is to identify how different 
transaction characteristics influence a cow-calf operator’s decision to participate in 
different supply chain alliances.  In Chapter 4 it was established that different 
transaction characteristics emerge as a result of the production of particular beef 
attributes.  Based on the production of these attributes, certain supply chain 
coordination methods are likely to be chosen to minimize the associated transaction 
costs.  In the following analysis, methods of supply chain coordination to produce 
particular beef attributes will be characterized as bundles of transaction 
characteristics.  Conjoint analysis will be used to measure the importance of selected 
characteristics in a respondent’s decision to participate in a particular supply chain 
coordination program.   
 
5.4 Specifying Characteristics and Characteristic Levels 
One of the most important aspects of the research design process involves 
the identification of appropriate characteristics and the specification of feasible 
levels for the characteristics (Ness and Gerhardy, 1994, 9).  In this study it is 
important to identify the appropriate transaction characteristics and characteristic 
levels that define a particular supply chain.  Hair et al. (1992) suggests that all 
characteristics that potentially create or detract from the overall worth should be 
included, with it being essential that both positive and negative characteristics be 
considered.  In determining characteristics it is also important to include those 
characteristics and characteristic levels that best differentiate between objects.  
While many may be considered important, they do not facilitate in the decision 
process if they do not substantially vary between objects (Hair et al., 1992, 388).          
 The characteristics and levels chosen must also be realistic in terms of 
whether or not they can actually be put into practice.  Characteristics that are not 
distinct in their definition and instead are fuzzy allow for misinterpretation by 
respondents and lead to a lack of comparability between individual responses.  The 
success of conjoint analysis relies on the ability of a researcher to adequately 
describe characteristics in order to allow accurate responses (Hair et al., 1992, 389).  
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To obtain accurate responses, Hair et al. (1992) suggest that each characteristic 
should be assigned the same number of levels.  They argue that respondents may 
focus more on the characteristics with more levels, biasing the results.  It has been 
observed that as the number of levels increases, the relative importance of a variable 
increases even if the end points stay the same (Hair et al., 1992, 389).         
 In choosing characteristics for this study it was necessary to limit the number 
of transaction characteristics considered in order to limit the number of hypothetical 
supply chain coordination programs to avoid overcomplicating the task for 
respondents.  Transaction characteristics were chosen based on the analysis in 
Chapter Four.  Eight possible categories of characteristics were identified.  These 
categories include: 1) Asset specific investments required, 2) Price uncertainty 
associated with quality variability, 3) Price uncertainty associated with the number 
of buyers, 4) Premiums received, 5) Information asymmetry, 6) Incomplete 
information, 7) Transaction frequency, and 8) Other benefits received.  Each of these 
potential characteristics is discussed below. 
 
5.4.1 Asset Specific Investments 
 The asset specific investments required to participate in a particular program 
was hypothesized to be a significant transaction characteristic and was included in 
the model.  This is because there is an increased risk of opportunistic behaviour as a 
result of asset specificity.  The seller incurs increased information and negotiation 
costs in order to determine a buyer’s reputation and reduce the risk of opportunism.  
It is expected that when asset specificity is present these costs will impact a cow-calf 
operator’s willingness to participate in a program.     
Four different asset specific investments were defined based on what has 
typically been required of cow-calf operators in existing beef programs.  The levels 
of investments included in the conjoint experiment were: 1) no additional 
investments, 2) adoption of a specific feed and health protocol, 3) capital 
expenditures for farm improvement, and 4) implementation of a record/certification 
system.  Further definition of these investments was provided in the survey, which is 
attached as Appendix A.  It is expected that the risk associated with opportunistic 
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behaviour varies with each type of investment.  The purpose of the conjoint 
experiment is to determine the relative importance of each investment and the 
degree to which each one limits cow-calf operator participation due to the associated 
risk of opportunistic behaviour. 
 
5.4.2 Price Uncertainty – Quality Variability  
Price uncertainty associated with quality variability was also hypothesized to 
influence a cow-calf operator’s decision to participate in a program.  As discussed in 
Chapter four, quality variability has resulted in an industry shift towards grid-based 
pricing systems.  When cow-calf operators move away from using a live weight 
pricing system, their short-term information costs can be higher due to the costs 
involved when searching out information on different quality-based pricing systems 
and determining a buyer’s reputation.  At the same time, ongoing information costs 
should be lower as information is transferred through the pricing system to feedlots 
and cow-calf operators and they are not required to search out additional quality 
information.  The impact on negotiation costs is indeterminate, as ongoing costs 
should be lower due to reduced negotiation of individual transactions, but a delay in 
payment can result in increased costs.     
Cow-calf operators’ preferences for different pricing systems will help 
identify the significance of different costs in the short-term and long-term and the 
degree to which they impact a cow-calf operator’s willingness to participate in a 
particular program.  Three different pricing methods were defined and included in 
the conjoint model: 1) grid-based carcass quality pricing, where price for cattle is 
determined based on the quality of the carcass upon processing, 2) live weight 
pricing, where price for cattle is determined at the time of sale based on their live 
weight, and 3) a combination of grid-based carcass quality pricing and live weight 
pricing, where an initial payment for cattle is determined at the time of sale and a 
final payment is made after processing when the quality of the carcass can be 
determined.  These three pricing methods are the ones that are most commonly used 
in the beef industry. The three different pricing levels are expected to be discrete and 
independent of each other, with no linear relationship expected.   
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5.4.3 Price Uncertainty – Number of Buyers 
The number of buyers available was also included in the model, as it is 
expected to have an effect on the level of transaction costs incurred.  As the number 
of buyers for beef with a particular attribute decreases price uncertainty and the risk 
of opportunistic behaviour by buyers is expected to increase.  Cow-calf operators 
will incur increased information and negotiation costs in determining a buyer’s 
reputation to reduce the risk of opportunistic behaviour.  Understanding the relative 
importance that different numbers of buyers will have on a cow-calf operator’s 
transaction costs and willingness to participate in a program will be determined 
using three different levels where: 1) a single buyer is available, 2) a small number 
of buyers are available, and 3) a large number of buyers are available. A linear 
relationship is expected to emerge whereby as the number of buyers increases, cow-
calf operator utility increases.    
 
5.4.4 Premiums Received 
The fourth characteristic included in the conjoint analysis was the premium 
paid to the cow-calf operator.  This is not an actual transaction characteristic, but has 
been included in the analysis to determine the extent to which cow-calf operators 
will trade off between an increase in the transaction costs that they must incur to 
produce a particular beef product and the premium they receive upon the sale of 
their product.  It is expected that if the benefits are greater than the increase in 
transaction costs, which arise due to different transaction characteristics, cow-calf 
operators will be more willing to participate in a particular program.  Four different 
premium levels were defined, based on the amount current programs in the beef 
industry are paying to cow-calf operators.  They include: 1) no premium, 2) 0-5% 
premium above current market price, 3) 5-10% premium above current market price, 
and 4) 10-15% premium above current market price.  The relationship between 
different premium levels is expected to be linear, with cow-calf operator’s utility 
increasing as the expected premium increases.        
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5.4.5 Other Characteristics 
Several other potential features of beef supply chain coordination programs 
could influence a cow-calf operator’s participation decision.  However, it was 
necessary to limit the analysis to four variables to avoid making the conjoint 
experiment too complicated.  When the number of characteristics included in an 
experiment increases, the task of trading off between characteristics becomes 
difficult for respondents and can lead to inconsistent responses and a low response 
rate.  For this reason, information asymmetry, incomplete information, and 
transaction frequency, while potential variables, were excluded from the conjoint 
experiment.        
In the production stages the risk of information asymmetry is minimal, as 
compared to later industry stages where uncertainty arises over the production 
methods used in earlier stages of production.  This characteristic was unlikely to be 
important to cow-calf operators.   However, they may be required to implement a 
record/certification system by downstream industry segments that are looking to 
reduce information asymmetries.  The costs and implications associated with this are 
captured within asset specific investments, where one of the options is the 
implementation of a record/certification system.  The issues associated with 
incomplete information were captured under pricing method, as this characteristic 
ties directly in with price uncertainty arising as a result of quality variability.   
Transaction frequency was also excluded from the conjoint experiment.  
While there is an increasing focus on getting cow-calf operators to provide cattle 
into programs on a more frequent basis, or to switch from spring to fall calving, this 
variable was felt to be relatively less important than the other four variables.  
Finally, other benefits received by coordination programs including carcass quality 
information and market access were not used in the conjoint experiment.  Again, 
they were deemed relatively less important based on the analysis in chapter four and 
were excluded to limit the overall complexity of the experiment.   A copy of the 
survey is included in Appendix A and contains combinations of the characteristics 
and characteristic levels presented in Table 5.1. 
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Table 5.1 - Characteristics and Characteristic Levels Used in Survey 
Characteristics Characteristic Levels 
Asset Specific Investments No Additional Investment 
Feed & Health Protocol 
Record/Certification System 
Farm Improvement Expenditures 
Pricing Method Carcass Quality 
Live Weight 
Live Weight & Carcass Quality 
Number of Buyers Single Buyer 
Small Number of Buyers 
Large Number of Buyers 
Expected Premium No Premium 
0-5% 
5-10% 
10-15% 
 
While Hair et al. (1992) recommended that the number of levels of all 
characteristics be equal, for the purposes of this conjoint experiment levels for the 
characteristics varied, with each one having either three or four.  Given the small 
variance between characteristic levels it was felt that varying levels would not have 
a significant influence on the relative importance of the different characteristics in 
the experiment.  While this may not be ideal, it is not always feasible to obtain the 
same number of levels for each characteristic and there are several examples in the 
literature where different numbers of levels have been used.  In a study done by 
Hobbs (1996), the characteristics examined in the conjoint analysis had between two 
and three levels.  Similarly, in a study done by Anderson and Bettencourt (1993) the 
number of levels for each characteristic examined ranged between 2 and 7.      
 
5.5 Specifying the Form of the Basic Model 
 As Figure 5.1 indicated, the next step is to specify the basic form of the 
model.  Both the composition rule and the part-worth relationship need to be 
specified.  The composition rule specifies how characteristic levels, are combined to 
obtain an overall preference rating for alternative programs.  It may be additive or 
interactive (Ness and Gerhardy, 1994, 6).  In the additive model, respondents are 
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assumed to obtain an overall preference or utility rating by implicitly adding the 
part-worth values for different characteristic levels in a scenario.  Part-worth values 
are the utility scores for each characteristic level, which are calculated by conjoint 
analysis based on respondents’ scores.  They are analogous to regression 
coefficients, with the dependent variable in the conjoint model being total utility and 
the part-worth values for different characteristic levels being the independent 
variables.  The interactive composition rule allows for the total value of certain 
combinations of characteristic levels to be more or less than the sum of their 
individual part-worths (Ness and Gerhardy, 1994, 6).    
The simplest and most commonly used composition rule, the additive model, 
is used in the current conjoint experiment.  This model is the most appropriate given 
that no interactive relationship is expected between the different characteristics 
specified.  It also requires fewer evaluations from the respondent, and it is easier to 
obtain estimates for the part-worth values (Ness and Gerhardy, 1994, 7).  The 
additive part-worth model assumes that the part-worth of each characteristic level is 
independent of other characteristic levels and as such a respondent’s preference for a 
particular beef program can be defined as sum of the different levels of transaction 
characteristics (Ness and Gerhardy, 1994, 8).  The underlying model is therefore:  
Preference of program =  part-worth of level i for transaction characteristic 1 + 
    part-worth of level j for transaction characteristic 2 + 
    part-worth of level k for transaction characteristic 3 + 
    part-worth of level l for transaction characteristic 4 
 The part-worth relationship specifies the relationship between the levels of 
each characteristic.  Three types of part-worth relationship exist, and include the 
linear or vector model, the quadratic or ideal model, and the part-worth model (Ness 
and Gerhardy, 1994, 6).  The linear model assumes that characteristic levels are 
linearly related and, as a result, overall preference changes proportionally as 
characteristics levels change (increase or decrease).  This differs from the quadratic 
model, where the assumption of strict linearity is relaxed and preference is 
represented by a convex or concave curve.  The part-worth model is the most 
general in that it assumes the relationship between overall preference and 
characteristic levels is entirely flexible and may not follow any set functional 
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relationship (Ness and Gerhard, 1994, 7). This type of model will be used for the 
current conjoint experiment, as the relationship between different asset specific 
investments and pricing methods is not expected to follow any specific functional 
form.  While linear relationships are expected for different levels of buyers and 
premiums the part-worth model was chosen due to its ability to handle the expected 
relationship between the levels of the other two transaction characteristics. 
 
5.6 Creating Stimuli 
            Once the different characteristic and characteristic levels have been defined 
and a model form has been chosen, hypothetical beef program scenarios were 
created.  The number of possible scenarios that can be created is dependent on the 
number of characteristics and the number of characteristic levels.  The total number 
of scenarios in a full factorial design is equal to the product of the number of levels 
associated with each characteristic.  In this experiment that would give rise to one 
hundred and forty-four different scenarios of beef programs (4x3x3x4).  Thus, even in 
a fairly small experiment the number of scenarios can become too many for 
respondents to reasonably evaluate.  
In order to avoid this problem, a fractional factorial design can be used.  A 
fractional factorial design selects a sample of characteristic levels, while preserving 
the ability to evaluate the relative importance of all the different characteristics 
presented (Halbrendt et al., 1992, 189).  Orthogonal arrays are the most commonly 
used method of constructing fractional factorial designs.  This type of experimental 
design allows a researcher to capture the main effects that need to be estimated with 
fewer scenarios than the full factorial design requires.  This reduces the evaluation 
task for respondents and reduces the risk of inconsistencies emerging due to the 
complexity of the task (Halbrendt et al., 1992, 189).  Using the fractional factorial 
design, sixteen hypothetical program scenarios were designed to capture the main 
effects of each transaction characteristic.  The fractional factorial design was created 
using the SPSS Version 10.0 conjoint analysis program.   
In addition, two holdout scenarios were generated in order to check the 
reproducibility of the model.  Respondents’ rate holdout scenarios, but the data 
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obtained is not used in the computation of the part-worth values for the model.  The 
holdout scenarios are instead used to test the validity of the conjoint model by 
comparing each individual’s preference score for the holdout scenarios with the 
individual’s actual preference scores (Hobbs, 1996b, 516).  The eighteen program 
scenarios designed are presented in the survey in Appendix A.  An example of the 
scenarios presented in the survey is shown in Figure 5.2, which is the first scenario 
that was presented to respondents. 
Scenario One 
Investment:               Record/Certification System 
Pricing Method:        Live Weight 
Number of Buyers:   Large Number of Buyers 
Expected Premium:  5-10% 
Highly unlikely to produce                      Highly likely to produce 
 
1       2       3       4        5       6       7       8       9       10       11       12  
Figure 5.2 - Example of Scenarios Used in Cow-calf Operator Survey 
 
5.7 Data Collection 
5.7.1 Presentation Method 
 When presenting the hypothetical program scenarios to respondents, two 
different methods of presentation are available.  The first method is the trade-off 
method, which requires respondents to compare attributes two at a time, ranking all 
combinations of characteristic levels from least preferred to most preferred.  This 
method of presentation is fairly simple to apply and reduces the information that 
must be taken in by a respondent.  At the same time however, it sacrifices realism, as 
in real situations respondents are confronted with products that are combinations of 
all characteristic levels and not in pairs (Ness and Gerhardy, 1994, 5).  The trade-off 
method cannot use fractional factorial design and as such the total number of 
required judgments can be quite large.  Respondents can become confused in 
ranking a large number of paired characteristics or may adopt a pattern in ranking 
choices (Green and Srinivasan, 1978, 108).   
The alternative to the trade-off method is the full profile method, which is 
used in this conjoint experiment.  The full profile method uses the complete set of 
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characteristics to construct program profiles that are then presented to the 
respondent.  This approach provides a more realistic description of scenarios and the 
decision process faced by respondents when they are making tradeoffs between 
different scenarios (Green and Srinivasan, 1978, 108).  This method also allows 
researchers to use a fractional factorial design to limit the number of profiles that 
respondents are required to evaluate.  While this approach does elicit fewer 
judgments, each judgment is more complex and may result in respondents being 
overloaded with information.  Respondents may be tempted to simplify the task and 
ignore variations in certain characteristics and focus only a portion of the 
characteristics presented.  As a result, the number of characteristics presented under 
the full profile procedure should be limited to, at most, five or six characteristics 
(Green and Srinivasan, 1978, 108).  Clearly in this experiment, four characteristics 
and a fractional factorial design allow the use of the full profile method.             
 
5.7.2 Preference Measure  
 Respondents can evaluate program scenarios under the full profile method 
through two different methods: non-metric (ranking) or metric (rating). With the 
ranking method, respondents are asked to rank different scenarios from least to most 
preferred.  Alternatively, respondents can be asked to assign a score to each profile.  
This is known as the rating method, with a higher score indicating a greater 
preference for that particular profile (SPSS Inc., 1997, 6).   
Ranking profiles is sometimes thought to be the preferred method, as it may 
be easier for respondents to say which scenario they prefer more rather than 
expressing a magnitude for their preference.  At the same time, as the number of 
profiles that respondents are required to rank increases it may become difficult for 
them to accurately rank them all.  In this situation, individually rating each profile 
becomes the preferred method in determining respondents’ preferences (Green and 
Srinivasan, 1979, 114).  For the purposes of this study the metric rating method was 
used due to the large number of scenarios that respondents had to consider.  Overall, 
the estimation methods do not seem to differ materially in their predictive powers.     
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5.7.3 Survey 
 The conjoint experiment portion of the survey asked respondents to evaluate 
18 different program profiles; using a scale of 1 to 12 according to how likely they 
would be to produce under the particular program profile outlined.  The profiles do 
not necessarily represent existing programs, but are combinations of the transaction 
characteristics that do typify existing beef coordination programs.  This is a strength 
of conjoint analysis, as it allows an evaluation of program characteristics and 
potential programs.               
 In addition to the conjoint experiment, the survey contained two other 
sections.  The first section asked questions regarding how important different beef 
marketing characteristics were to cow-calf operators.  It also gauged cow-calf 
operator perceptions on the performance of existing alliances in the beef industry.  
Cow-calf operators were asked to explicitly rate the importance of different 
marketing characteristics and the performance of alliances on a scale of 1 to 5.  The 
last section of the survey gathered socioeconomic data and information on the 
respondent’s beef operation.  This information was gathered to aid in identifying 
differences between cow-calf operators based on socio-economic characteristics.     
 Data was collected at the Western Stock Grower’s Association Annual 
meetings held in Saskatoon, Saskatchewan in December 2003.  The Western Stock 
Growers Association is a voluntary organization that works to support cow-calf 
operators and protect their interests.  It lobbies the government and promotes 
education of both the general public and beef industry members.  Cow-calf operators 
were approached during the conference and asked if they would be willing to 
complete the survey.  Respondents were provided an introductory cover letter 
outlining the purpose of the project and their rights as a respondent.  A copy of the 
introductory letter is included in Appendix A.  Respondents were also provided with 
a copy of the survey and a brief set of verbal instructions on how to complete the 
survey.  Completion of the survey took an average of 10 minutes and respondents 
were able to fill it out at any time during the conference period and then return it to a 
specified location.            
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 The survey was limited to the cow-calf sector of the beef value chain for two 
key reasons.  First, as discussed previously, coordination of cow-calf operators with 
the rest of the supply chain is not emerging to the same extent as coordination 
between other beef industry segments, limiting the ability of programs to ensure 
consistency and the production of branded attributes.  Therefore it is important to 
understand what is limiting cow-calf operator involvement in emerging value chain 
alliances in order to work with this segment and improve supply chain coordination.  
Conjoint analysis allows us to gain a better understanding as to what limits their 
involvement in particular programs and what can be done to encourage increased 
involvement in new and developing beef programs. 
Second, the application of conjoint analysis to other segments of the beef 
chain is likely less appropriate given the concentrated nature of the industry.  This 
would make it difficult to obtain sufficient data for the analysis to be statistically 
significant.  Detailed case studies are instead used to explore and analyze these 
segments of the supply chain, as is discussed in Chapter 6. 
 
5.8 Survey Results 
5.8.1 Respondent Profile 
 The survey was administered to 73 respondents in December 2003 at the 
Western Stock Growers Association annual meeting.  A comparison of the cow-calf 
operator survey population to the farm operator population represented in the 2001 
Canadian Census of Agriculture is provided in Table 5.2.  For some of the 
characteristics no comparable information was available through the Census of 
Agriculture data.  The survey sample did not follow Statistics Canada’s Census of 
Agriculture data closely.  The samples gross revenues were higher than those for the 
general Canadian farm population.  This is not surprising as typically these 
organizations are made up of full-time cow-calf operators.  The sample also has a 
higher education attainment than the general population of farm operators in 
Canada, as indicated by the 2001 census data.  Younger farm operators are also over 
represented in the sample.  Directly comparable data was not obtained for the 
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distribution of farm operators by herd size, but the average herd size of the sample 
appeared to be larger than was reported in the Census of Agriculture. 
Table 5.2 - Comparison of Sample and Canadian Census of Agriculture Data 
Percentage in Category  
Census of Agriculture 
(2001) 
Cow-calf operator 
Survey 
Gross Revenues (‘000’s) 
0-10 
10-49 
50-99 
100-249 
250-499 
500+ 
21% 
29% 
14% 
20% 
10% 
6% 
6% 
11% 
16% 
30% 
23% 
14% 
Farm Income Sources 
Other Farm Income 
Backgrounding Feedlot 
Finishing Feedlot 
No Other Farm Income 
No Comparable Data 
Available 
60% 
48% 
15% 
19% 
Alliance Participation 
Yes 
No 
No Comparable Data 
Available  
15% 
85% 
Herd Size 
0-50 
50-100 
100-150 
150-200 
200-300 
300+ 
Avg. Canadian Herd Size: 
53 Head 
Avg. Western Canadian 
Herd Size:  
67 head 
20% 
18% 
20% 
21% 
10% 
11% 
Education 
Less than Grade 9 
Grade 9 – 12 
Post Secondary (Non-
University)  
Post Secondary (University) 
14% 
48% 
27% 
11% 
0% 
29% 
51% 
20% 
Farm Operator Age 
Less than 35 
35-60 
60+ 
11.5% 
53.6% 
34.9% 
35% 
62% 
3% 
Source: Adapted from Statistics Canada Internet Site (2003) 
 
Figures 5.3, 5.4, 5.5, 5.6, 5.7 and 5.8 show the distribution of respondents by 
socioeconomic characteristics.  Of the 73 respondents, 67% had gross farm incomes 
above $100,000, 23% had gross farm incomes above $250,000 and 13% had gross 
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farm incomes above $500,000 (Figure 5.3).  Approximately 60% of all respondents 
have other sources of farm income.  Forty-eight percent of respondents’ background 
calves and 15% have a finishing feedlot (Figure 5.4). Fifteen percent of respondents 
have participated in some method of further coordination.  Participation ranges 
between the use of contracts and more formal alliances (Figure 5.5).  Herd size also 
varied, with 38% of respondents having cow herds of less than a 100 head and 41% 
having herds of between 100 to 200 head (Figure 5.6).  Of the individuals that 
completed the survey, 29% had a high school education, 51% had a college diploma 
or a certificate from a technical school, and 10.4% had either an undergraduate or 
graduate degree.  Thirty-five percent of respondents were less than 35, while 62% 
were between 35 and 60 and 3% were older than 60 years of age.  
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Figure 5.3 - Respondents by Gross Farm Income (n=73) 
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Figure 5.4 - Respondents by Farm Income Sources (n=73) 
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Figure 5.5 - Respondents by Participation in Alliances (n=73) 
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Figure 5.6 - Respondents by Herd Size (n=73) 
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Figure 5.7 - Respondents by Level of Education (n=73) 
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Figure 5.8 - Respondents by Age (n=73) 
 
5.8.2 Conjoint Results – Reliability and Validity  
 Having obtained the conjoint data, the objective was to estimate the different 
part-worth values for each different characteristic level included in the experiment.  
There are currently five commonly used estimation methods: Monanova, Linmap, 
Dummy Variable Regression, Logit analysis, and Probit analysis (Ness and 
Gerhardy, 1994, 8).  Given that a part-worth relationship is expected to exist 
between characteristic levels, a dummy variable regression model was selected.  
This model is used when a particular characteristic level is either present or not, and 
different part-worth values are expected for each level of each characteristic.  The 
Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) procedure is the most commonly used procedure to 
estimate part-worth values.  This method has been found to perform as well as 
others, and it has the advantage of being easier to use and interpret (SPSS Inc., 1997, 
4).  For the purposes of this conjoint experiment SPSS conjoint software using OLS 
was used to estimate the following model:  
 
U = β0 + β1I1 + β2I2 + β3I3 + β4I4 + β5P1 + β6P2 + β7P3 + β8N1 + β9N2 + β10N3  
+β11M1 + β12M2 + β13M3 + β14M4+ µ        (5.1) 
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 Where: 
 U = total utility  
 β0 = constant  
βi = part-worth values. Where i = 1….14   
 Ii = 1 if level i of Investment is present, 0 if not present.  i = 1…4 
 Pj = 1 if level j Pricing Method is present, 0 if not present.  j = 1…3  
 Nk = 1 if level k of Number of Buyers is present, 0 if not present. k = 1…3 
 Ml = 1 if level l of Expected Premium is present, 0 if not present.  l = 1…4  
 µ = error term 
 It is possible that certain characteristic levels included in the study may be 
collinear, with an example being the number of buyers and investments required in a 
program.  It could be argued that as the degree of investment changes, the preference 
for a certain number of buyers in the market will also change in order to reduce the 
risk of opportunistic behaviour.  While recognizing that there is a possibility of 
correlation between these two characteristics, the additive model was nevertheless 
used to estimate the conjoint experiment.  This is because the sample size was not 
felt to be sufficiently large to estimate the interactive effects along with the separate 
part-worth values.  If there is a correlation between the two characteristics the part-
worth values provided for these characteristics may be very sensitive to the addition 
or deletion of a few observations or the deletion of an apparently insignificant 
variable (Hill et al., 2001, 190).    
 Using the SPSS procedure, a separate model was estimated for each 
respondent and these responses were averaged in order to give results for the entire 
sample.  In addition to obtaining part-worth estimates showing the preferences for 
different characteristic levels, output from the conjoint analysis includes importance 
scores for the different characteristics.  The importance scores are derived from the 
part-worth estimates.  Output from the conjoint experiment also includes 
correlations relating predicted ratings from the conjoint model with observed ratings 
using the hold-out profiles.  Two hold-out profiles were generated from a random 
plan.  These were rated by respondents but were not included in calculating the part-
 128
worth values for different characteristic levels.  Instead, they are used to determine 
the accuracy and validity of the calculations (SPSS Inc., 1997).   
Pearson’s R and Kendall’s Tau statistics for each respondent were reported, 
based on the hold-out scenarios.  The Kendall’s Tau statistic represents the degree of 
correlation that exists between the observed and estimated preferences and confirms 
the validity of the model.  The Pearson’s R statistic measures how well the model 
was able to predict the respondent’s preferences by comparing how the respondent 
rated the hold-out profiles with the ratings predicted by the model.  For both 
statistical indicators a good model fit is signified by statistics that are close to 1.00 
(Hobbs, 1996b, 519).  The Pearson’s R statistic for the model was .994, indicating 
that the model is highly accurate in predicting respondents’ preferences for the hold-
out profiles.  The Kendall’s Tau coefficient was calculated both for the 16 program 
profiles and the 2 hold-out profiles and were .950 and 1.0 respectively, indicating a 
high degree of correlation between the observed and estimated preferences.       
 
5.9 Conjoint Results – Estimated Model 
 Using the SPSS conjoint software, part-worth values for each characteristic 
level were estimated (i.e. the βi’s in the estimated equation).  These part-worth 
values are generated using a set of regressions on the ratings of the sixteen program 
profiles (SPSS Inc., 1997, 26).  The part-worth values calculated are expressed in a 
common unit and as such they can be added together to provide insights into the 
total utility of particular program scenarios.  Importance scores are then derived by 
taking the utility range for a particular characteristic and dividing it by the sum of all 
the utility ranges (SPSS Inc., 1997, 29).  It is expected that the greater the range of 
utility between levels for a particular characteristic, the more important this 
characteristics is in the decision to join a program.  The importance values for all 
characteristics sum to 100% for each individual respondent.   
 In order to better understand the importance measures, the part-worth values 
generated by SPSS conjoint software are used to determine the impact that each 
characteristic level has on a respondent’s preferences. Part-worth estimates for 
respondents as a collective group are provided in Table 5.3.   This table shows that 
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as premium levels decrease the utility received at each premium level is reduced 
when compared to other premium levels.  This is in line with the expectation that a 
linear relationship exists between premium levels where higher premiums result in 
higher relative levels of utility. 
Table 5.3 - Aggregate Part-Worth Values for Each Characteristic Level 
Characteristic Level 
 
Relative Importance Part-worth Value 
Constant  5.9977 
Expected Premium 41.99  
    No Premium  -2.3887 
    0%-5%  -.8853 
    5%-10%  1.3031 
    10%-15%  1.9709 
Asset Specific Investments 23.93  
    Farm Improvements  -.7825 
    Record/Certification System   
    Feed & Health Protocol 
 .1421 
.1798 
    No Asset Specific Investment  .4606 
Number of Buyers   18.44  
    Single Buyer  -.5936 
    Small Number of Buyers  -.1878 
    Large Number of Buyers  .7814 
Pricing Method 15.64  
    Carcass Quality  -.3630 
    Live Weight  .1678 
    Carcass Quality & Live Weight  .1952 
 
Similarly, when cow-calf operators are required to incur capital expenditures 
for farm improvement, utility is reduced relative to other levels of investments. 
When cow-calf operators are required to invest in a specific feed and health 
protocol, a record /certification system, or not required to make any investments 
relative utility improves.  These results show that cow-calf operators are willing to 
make investments into specific assets in order to participate and that opportunistic 
behaviour is not always a concern, but as the degree of investments required 
increases, willingness of cow-calf operators to participate decreases as a result of an 
increasing risk of opportunistic behaviour.  The relationship between different 
investments levels follows a priori expectations, with higher levels of investments 
resulting in lower levels of utility.             
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 When the part-worth values for the number of buyers are examined, it is 
apparent that the cow-calf operators receive greater utility from having a large 
number of buyers available in the market, reducing the risk of opportunistic 
behaviour and the associated transaction costs.  At the same time most supply chain 
coordination programs that produce differentiated beef products do sell into a market 
with fewer buyers, which will result in a reduction in overall utility.  The importance 
of this attribute is smaller and the part-worth values are lower, thus it is likely that 
cow-calf operators will be more willing to accept a smaller number of buyers if 
other transaction characteristics exist in the program that increase overall utility.  
The relationship between the numbers of buyers is linear, as was initially expected, 
where relative utility decreases as the number of buyers decreases.     
Pricing method used is also of less relative importance to cow-calf operators 
indicating that there is relatively less concern over uncertainty associated with price.  
As a result, the transaction costs associated with this are likely to be lower than for 
other characteristics.  Cow-calf operators prefer a combination live weight and 
carcass quality pricing.  A pricing method based on carcass quality grades alone was 
less desirable than a live-weight pricing method.  The preferences towards a quality 
based pricing method may provide some insights into transaction costs.  The 
potential long term reduction in ongoing information costs may be greater than the 
short-term search costs that must be incurred.  Similarly, the negotiation costs 
associated with a delay in payment may be less than the overall gain associated with 
reduced negotiations over the long term under such a system.   
The aggregate importance measures for the Saskatoon-based survey are 
shown in Figure 5.9.  On average the expected premium was the most important 
program characteristic (41.99%).  Investments in specialized assets were the second 
most important program characteristic (23.93%).  Number of buyers was third in 
relative importance at 18.44% and pricing method was fourth at 15.64%.  These 
results help explain the value placed on different transaction characteristics by cow-
calf operators.  While pricing method was relatively less important, the premiums 
expected and investments required in specific assets both have an important impact 
on cow-calf operators’ preferences for different supply chain coordination programs. 
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Figure 5.9 - Transaction Characteristic Importance Measures (n=73) 
 
5.9.1 Trade-offs between Transaction Characteristics 
In addition to the initial insights regarding each transaction characteristic and 
its levels, by examining the contribution of part-worth values for different 
characteristic levels it is possible to determine the type of program that would be 
most preferred and least preferred by respondents.  These combinations were not 
evaluated by respondents but can be simulated by the part-worth values estimated by 
the model.  The most preferred program structure, based on the results presented in 
Table 5.3 is a program that allows cow-calf operators to receive a 10-15% premium 
above current market price, while having to make no asset specific investments and 
being able to operate in a market with a large number of buyers using a pricing 
method that considers both carcass quality and live weight. The least preferred 
program structure would be that where no premium was expected, cow-calf 
operators had to make expenditures on farm improvements, a single buyer existed in 
the market, and pricing was based solely on carcass quality.  
 Using the part-worth estimates, the total utility for the most preferred and 
least preferred program structures can be calculated.  Total utilities can also be 
calculated for the sixteen hypothetical program profiles provided to respondents in 
the survey by adding the aggregate part-worth values for each characteristic level 
along with the constant.  Comparing the total utility values for the different program 
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profiles provides a better understanding of how respondents implicitly trade-off 
between the different transaction characteristics and their associated levels. Table 
5.4 presents the total utility calculations for the most preferred and least preferred 
program structures, along with the total utility values for the sixteen hypothetical 
scenarios in the survey.  The two hold-out scenarios are omitted.  For ease of 
reference, the scenarios in the table have been sorted based on their total estimated 
utility in a descending order.     
Several conclusions can be drawn with respect to how cow-calf operators 
trade-off between different levels of the transaction characteristics when they make a 
decision to participate in a particular program.  One example is with respect to the 
trade-offs between programs when different expected premiums exist.  Expected 
premiums was the most important characteristic considered when cow-calf operators 
are choosing between different program types and yet Scenario 1, which has an 
expected premium of 5%-10%, is ranked higher than Scenario 4 which has an 
expected premium of 10%-15%.  It is clear that premium alone does not determine a 
cow-calf operator’s preference for a particular program.  In fact, cow-calf operators’ 
make trade-offs between different levels of all of the characteristics when they are 
determining which programs they would be willing to participate in. 
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Table 5.4 - Total Utility Calculations for Hypothetical Profiles      
Transaction Characteristic 
 
Characteristic Level Utility 
Most Preferred Program 
Expected Premium 
Asset Specific Investments 
Number of Buyers 
Pricing Method 
 
10%-15% Premium 
No Specific Assets 
Large Number of Buyers 
Carcass Quality & Live Weight 
Constant 
Total Utility 
 
1.9709 
0.4604 
0.1952 
0.7814 
5.9977 
9.4056 
Scenario 5 
Expected Premium 
Asset Specific Investments 
Number of Buyers 
Pricing Method 
 
10%-15% Premium 
No Specific Assets 
Small Number of Buyers 
Live Weight 
Constant 
Total Utility 
 
1.9709 
0.4604 
-0.1878 
0.1678 
5.9977 
8.409 
Scenario 1 
Expected Premium 
Asset Specific Investments 
Number of Buyers 
Pricing Method 
 
5% - 10% Premium 
Record/Certification System 
Large Number of Buyers 
Live Weight 
Constant 
Total Utility 
 
1.3031 
0.1421 
0.7814 
0.1678 
5.9977 
8.3921 
Scenario 15 
Expected Premium 
Asset Specific Investments 
Number of Buyers 
Pricing Method 
 
10%-15% Premium 
Feed & Health Protocol 
Single Buyer 
Carcass Quality & Live Weight 
Constant 
Total Utility 
 
1.9709 
0.1798 
-0.5936 
0.1952 
5.9977 
7.75 
Scenario 7 
Expected Premium 
Asset Specific Investments 
Number of Buyers 
Pricing Method 
 
10%-15% Premium 
Farm Improvement Expenditures 
Large Number of Buyers 
Carcass Quality 
Constant 
Total Utility 
 
1.9709 
-0.7825 
0.7814 
-0.3630 
5.9977 
7.6045 
Scenario 4 
Expected Premium 
Asset Specific Investments 
Number of Buyers 
Pricing Method 
 
10%-15% Premium 
Record/Certification System 
Single Buyer 
Carcass Quality 
Constant 
Total Utility 
 
1.9709 
0.1421 
-0.5936 
-0.3630 
5.9977 
7.1541 
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Scenario 2 
Expected Premium 
Asset Specific Investments 
Number of Buyers 
Pricing Method 
 
5% - 10% Premium 
Feed & Health Protocol 
Small Number of Buyers 
Carcass Quality 
Constant 
Total Utility 
 
1.3031 
0.1798 
-0.1878 
-0.3630 
5.9977 
6.9298 
Scenario 10 
Expected Premium 
Asset Specific Investments 
Number of Buyers 
Pricing Method 
 
5%-10% Premium 
No Specific Assets 
Single Buyer 
Carcass Quality 
Constant 
Total Utility 
 
1.3031 
0.4604 
-0.5936 
-0.3630 
5.9977 
6.8046 
Scenario 13 
Expected Premium 
Asset Specific Investments 
Number of Buyers 
Pricing Method 
 
0%-5% Premium 
No Specific Assets 
Large Number of Buyers 
Carcass Quality & Live Weight 
Constant 
Total Utility 
 
-0.8853 
0.4604 
0.7814 
0.1952 
5.9977 
6.5494 
Scenario 9 
Expected Premium 
Asset Specific Investments 
Number of Buyers 
Pricing Method 
 
5%-10% Premium 
Farm Improvement Expenditures 
Single Buyer 
Carcass Quality & Live Weight 
Constant 
Total Utility 
 
1.3031 
-0.7825 
-0.5936 
0.1952 
5.9977 
6.1199 
Scenario 16 
Expected Premium 
Asset Specific Investments 
Number of Buyers 
Pricing Method 
 
0%-5% Premium 
Feed & Health Protocol 
Single Buyer 
Live Weight 
Constant 
Total Utility 
 
-0.8853 
0.1798 
-0.5936 
0.1678 
5.9977 
4.8664 
Scenario 3 
Expected Premium 
Asset Specific Investments 
Number of Buyers 
Pricing Method 
 
0%-5% Premium 
Record/Certification System 
Single Buyer 
Carcass Quality 
Constant 
Total Utility 
 
-0.8853 
0.1421 
-0.5936 
-0.3630 
5.9977 
4.2979 
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Scenario 11 
Expected Premium 
Asset Specific 
Investments 
Number of Buyers 
Pricing Method 
 
No Premium 
Feed & Health Protocol 
Large Number of Buyers 
Carcass Quality 
Constant 
Total Utility 
 
-2.3887 
0.1798 
0.7814 
-0.3630 
5.9977 
4.2072 
Scenario 12 
Expected Premium 
Asset Specific 
Investments 
Number of Buyers 
Pricing Method 
 
0%-5% Premium 
Farm Improvement Expenditures 
Small Number of Buyers 
Carcass Quality 
Constant 
Total Utility 
 
-0.8853 
-0.7825 
-0.1878 
-0.3630 
5.9977 
3.7791 
Scenario 8 
Expected Premium 
Asset Specific 
Investments 
Number of Buyers 
Pricing Method 
 
No Premium 
Record/Certification System 
Small Number of Buyers 
Carcass Quality & Live Weight 
Constant 
Total Utility 
 
-2.3887 
0.1421 
-0.1878 
0.1952 
5.9977 
3.7585 
Scenario 14 
Expected Premium 
Asset Specific 
Investments 
Number of Buyers 
Pricing Method 
 
No Premium 
No Specific Assets 
Single Buyer 
Carcass Quality 
Constant 
Total Utility 
 
-2.3887 
0.4604 
-0.5936 
-0.3630 
5.9977 
3.1128 
Scenario 6 
Expected Premium 
Asset Specific 
Investments 
Number of Buyers 
Pricing Method 
 
No Premium 
Farm Improvement Expenditures 
Single Buyer 
Live Weight 
Constant 
Total Utility 
 
-2.3887 
-0.7825 
-0.5936 
0.1678 
5.9977 
2.4007 
Least Preferred 
Program 
Expected Premium 
Asset Specific 
Investments 
Number of Buyers 
Pricing Method 
 
No Premium 
Farm Improvement Expenditures 
Single Buyer 
Carcass Quality 
Constant 
Total Utility 
 
-2.3887 
-0.7825 
-0.5936 
-0.3630 
5.9977 
1.8699 
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 The estimation of part-worth values using conjoint analysis also allows for 
the analysis of hypothetical programs outside of the ones that were presented to 
respondents in the survey.  This is done by using the part-worth values for each 
characteristic level to estimate a total expect ‘utility’ for a new program scenario.  
Creating alternate scenarios and using them as a comparison allows researchers to 
gain a further understanding of the trade-offs between certain characteristics, while 
other characteristics in the scenarios are held constant.        
Table 5.6 presents an example of the trade-offs cow-calf operators make 
when they are determining which programs they are willing to participate in.  Two 
hypothetical scenarios (A and B) were created.  Both hypothetical programs 
presented have access to a single buyer and use a combined carcass quality and live 
weight pricing method.  They are different in that the premiums expected in 
Scenario A are between 5 and 10 percent and no investment is required, while in 
Scenario B premiums range between 10 and 15 percent and cow-calf operators are 
required to make farm improvement expenditures.  When utility is calculated for the 
two scenarios it is apparent that the preference for a lower level of investment is 
traded-off against the decrease in premiums.  Cow-calf operators are willing to 
accept a lower of level of premiums in exchange for the lower level of investment 
provided in Scenario A.           
Table 5.6 - Total Utility Calculations for Scenario A & B 
 Scenario A Scenario B 
Expected Premium 1.3031 (5%-10%) 1.9709 (10-15%) 
Investments 0.4604 (None) -0.7825(Farm Impr.) 
Number of Buyers -0.5936 (Single) -0.5936 (Single) 
Pricing Method 0.1952 (CQ & LW) 0.1952 (CQ & LW) 
Constant 5.9977 5.9977 
Total Utility  7.3628 6.7877 
  
While recognizing that trade-offs are made between premiums and other 
characteristic levels, it is important to understand that there are limitations in the 
willingness of cow-calf operators to participate in programs when certain trade-offs 
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are required.  For example, Scenario B is compared with a new hypothetical scenario 
(Scenario C) that requires no investments and has an expected premium between 0 
and 5 percent.  When total utility is calculated for the two scenarios the utility in 
Scenario B is greater than that in C even though cow-calf operators are required to 
make farm improvement expenditures. In this situation for scenario C, the decrease 
in relative utility, as a result of the reduction in expected premiums, outweighed the 
increase in relative utility from the lower level of investments required.  Cow-calf 
operators are unwilling to accept a decrease in premiums from 10%-15% to 0%-5% 
in exchange for the benefits of having to make no additional investments in their 
operation. 
Table 5.7 - Total Utility Calculations for Scenario B & C 
 Scenario B Scenario C 
Expected Premium 1.9709 (10%-15%) -0.8853 (0%-5%) 
Investments -0.7825 (Farm Impr.) 0.4604 (None) 
Number of Buyers -0.5936 (Single) -0.5936 (Single) 
Pricing Method 0.1952 (CQ & LW) 0.1952 (CQ & LW) 
Constant 5.9977 5.9977 
Total Utility  6.7877 5.1744 
  
As an additional example, a new hypothetical program scenario was created 
where cow-calf operators can expect a premium of 10%-15%, are required to 
implement a record/certification system, have access to a small number of buyers, 
and are paid using a grid-based carcass quality pricing system.  This type of program 
would have a total utility value of 7.5599 (1.9709 + 0.1421 + -0.1878 + -0.3630 + 
5.9977), which is obtained by summing the constant and the part-worth values for 
each of the transaction characteristic levels.  When the new profile is compared to 
Scenario 2 in Table 5.4, which has a total utility value of 6.9298, it is possible to 
understand the trade-off between different asset specific investments and premium 
levels.  The number of buyers and pricing system are held constant in both 
scenarios. When the type of investment changes from the implementation of a feed 
and health protocol, as in Scenario 2, to the implementation of a record /certification 
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system in the new scenario, and premium increases from 5%-10% to 10%-15% the 
total utility of the program increases.  Cow-calf operators are making a trade-off 
between an increase in premiums and a change in investments.  Based on the 
increase in utility it is apparent that cow-calf operators felt that the increased 
transaction costs incurred as a result of the change in required investments is less 
than the benefits received from an increase in the premiums paid.                
 Continuing this line of investigation, if another hypothetical program is 
considered where the expected premium is 10%-15%, cow-calf operators are 
required to incur capital expenditures for farm improvement, a small number of 
buyers is present, and they are paid using a grid-based carcass quality pricing system 
the total utility would be 6.6353 (1.9709 + -0.7825 + -0.1878 + -0.3630 + 5.9977).  
When this program is compared with Scenario 2, which has a total utility value of 
6.9298, it is apparent that the increase in utility, as a result of an increase in 
premiums, is offset by the change in required program investments.  As the expected 
transaction costs associated with specific investments increase, cow-calf operators 
become more sensitive and are less willing to participate in a program even if they 
have access to higher premiums. 
 It is apparent that cow-calf operators make implicit trade-offs in their 
decisions to participate in different beef programs.  Cow-calf operators are willing to 
incur increased costs (transaction and operating) for the transaction characteristics 
outlined in different programs.  They are willing to accept higher investment 
requirements, smaller number of buyers, and a move towards a quality-based pricing 
system, but only within a limited premium range.  At lower premium levels it is 
expected that cow-calf operators’ elasticity of supply will be greater and their 
willingness to participate in programs will be lower than it would be with higher 
premium levels.  This is because cow-calf operators become increasingly responsive 
to small changes in program requirements at lower premium levels and are less 
willing to participate in circumstances where their net benefit becomes quite low or 
even negative.   
 The responsiveness of cow-calf operators to changes in transaction 
characteristics will also vary based on the importance of the different characteristics.  
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Survey respondents placed more importance on expected premiums and investments 
required, being more responsive to changes in these characteristics than to changes 
in the number of buyers and pricing method.  This indicates that the transaction costs 
incurred as a result of asset specificity are larger than those incurred as a result of 
the other two transaction characteristics.  Consequently, the investments required by 
a program will have a greater bearing on a cow-calf operator’s decision to 
participate in a particular program.         
Based on comparing the differences in part-worth values for certain 
characteristic levels, more specific conclusions can be made regarding a cow-calf 
operator’s willingness to make trade-offs between different levels of the transaction 
characteristics included in the model.  Most significant is the effect a change in 
premium has on a cow-calf operator’s total utility.  If premium is reduced from 
10%-15% to 5%-10% utility is reduced by .6678, but if premium is reduced from 
5%-10% to 0%-5% utility declines by 2.1884 showing that cow-calf operators 
become more responsive to a change in premium as it decreases.   
Similarly, when cow-calf operators are required to implement a 
record/certification system or a feed and health protocol, their utility remains 
relatively constant and only declines a small amount from the scenario where no 
investment is required.  If, on the other hand, cow-calf operators are required to 
make farm improvement expenditures, the decline in utility from the scenario where 
no investment is required is much larger, being 1.2431. This may be a result of cow-
calf operators’ perceptions regarding the amount of human and capital resources 
required for each of the levels of investments considered in the experiment.  While 
the difference in the amount of human and capital resources required to implement 
either a record/certification system or a feed and health protocol was thought to be 
quite small, cow-calf operators perceived that a much greater amount of resources 
was necessary when programs required them to make farm improvements.     
Cow-calf operators are also responsive to a decline in the number of buyers, 
with utility declining by .9692 when the number of buyers moves from large to 
small and less responsive as the number of buyers moves from being small to a 
single buyer.  This again may be a result of cow-calf operators’ perceptions.  When 
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cow-calf operators make the choice between a program with a small number of 
buyers and a program with a single buyer the difference in the number of buyers is 
not felt to impact their risk of opportunistic behaviour substantially.  Whereas, it 
may be that cow-calf operators perceive that when the number of buyers increases 
from a small amount to a larger amount there is a much larger reduction in the risk 
of opportunistic behaviour and, as a result, a much greater change in utility.     
The decrease in utility when the pricing system moves from a combined 
carcass and live weight pricing system to a strictly live weight pricing system is 
smaller than when cow-calf operators have to move from a live weight pricing 
system to a grid-based carcass quality system.  This provides some insight into the 
willingness of cow-calf operators to accept increased price uncertainty associated 
with variations in quality, which occurs with the use of grid-based pricing systems, 
in exchange for increased access to premiums and quality information.  While they 
are willing to accept some risk that they will receive discounts due to variations in 
the quality of cattle they produce, they are not willing to accept a price that is 
completely dependent on carcass quality.  Consequently, the decline in relative 
utility is larger when programs use a pricing system that relies strictly on carcass 
quality.                     
Understanding cow-calf operators’ preferences for particular characteristic 
levels over others and the trade-offs that they are willing to make between different 
characteristics is essential when evaluating opportunities for the creation and 
expansion of coordinated programs to produce differentiated beef products.  This 
research provides an initial insight into the degree to which different transaction 
characteristics affect cow-calf operators’ willingness to participate in various types 
of coordination programs.  Conjoint analysis makes it possible to evaluate cow-calf 
operator preferences and the trade-offs they make between programs based on the 
different transaction characteristics they contain.  To ask cow-calf operators directly 
what their preferences are and how they would trade-off between different 
characteristic levels would be difficult.  Cow-calf operators may not be conscious of 
their preferences or how they would trade-off between different characteristics and 
characteristic levels, but allowing them to respond to realistic program descriptions 
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reveals this to a researcher based on preferences for comprehensive program 
scenarios. 
 
5.10 Socio-economic Groupings  
 In addition to analyzing the conjoint results as an aggregate group they were 
also analyzed based on sub-groups using the socio-economic information gathered 
in the survey.  This reveals whether preferences for different transaction 
characteristics varied based on characteristics such as operation size (# of head of 
cattle), current participation in a beef program, sources of farm income, and age.  
Results were also broken down by level of education, but no significant differences 
were found across different education levels so these results are not reported.  The 
following section provides a discussion of the results by different socio-economic 
groupings and the insights they provided regarding the importance of different 
transaction characteristics. 
 
5.10.1 Cow-calf Operation Size (Number of cows) 
 It is expected that cow-calf operator preferences will vary depending on the 
size of their cow-calf operation, with the size of an operation affecting the 
importance of different characteristics and also their ability to comply with different 
program requirements.  When required investments are considered, the relative 
importance of specific investments is expected to be lower for larger operations that 
may have greater access to additional human and capital resources.  Figure 5.10 
shows that while relative importance of investments remains the second most 
important characteristic for all herd sizes,  its relative importance was greater for 
smaller herd sizes (0-150 head) than for larger herd sizes (150-300+ head).  The 
relative importance of investments in specific assets for cow-calf operators that had 
0 to 150 head was approximately 26 percent, while the relative importance for larger 
cow-calf operators was 22 percent.          
Overall, the order of importance for different characteristics did not change 
from the order that appeared in the aggregate data, with the exception of cow-calf 
operators that had a herd size of 200-300 head, for whom pricing method was more 
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important than the number of buyers.  It is not clear why the relative importance of 
pricing method was higher than the number of buyers for this group.  It could be 
because when herd sizes are larger, cow-calf production is more likely to be the 
primary source of income for these operations and, thus, the method of determining 
returns becomes more important due to the effect pricing method can have on an 
operation’s net returns.     
The importance scores associated with the number of buyers did not appear 
to vary across different herd sizes. While the number of buyers available is relatively 
important to all cow-calf operators, the size of the operation does not seem to affect 
the relative importance.  The largest difference in importance scores occurred for 
expected premiums.  Premiums remained important throughout, but their relative 
importance ranged from 35.45% to 48.5%, with the most emphasis being placed on 
premium by those cow-calf operators with 150-200 head.  The relative importance 
of premiums for cow-calf operators with larger herd sizes (150-300+ head) was 
43%, while for smaller herds (0-150 head) it was around 40%.  The difference in 
relative importance may be attributed to the fact that farms with larger herd sizes 
may derive a greater portion of their income from cow-calf production.  
Consequently, the level of premiums they receive has a greater effect on farm 
returns and, as a result is of greater importance.  
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Figure 5.10 - Importance Measures by Cow-Calf Operation Size (n=73) 
 143
 
5.10.2 Alliance Participation 
Figure 5.11 summarizes the results of the conjoint analysis by participation 
in an alliance.  Respondents were asked if they had ever participated in some sort of 
an alliance and were able to choose whether it was a marketing contract, production 
contract, brand licensing program, marketing alliance, new-generation cooperative, 
or some other structure.  Of the total 73 respondents 11 answered yes that they had 
participated in some sort of alliance.  These eleven respondents were compared to all 
of the other respondents to see if the relative importance of program characteristics 
varied according to experience with alliances.  Given the low number of respondents 
that had participated in programs, the analysis was not further divided to evaluate 
the variance in importance scores for different program structures.       
Figure 5.11 shows that respondents who have previously participated in an 
alliance place less importance on premiums (36.27%) than those who have not 
previously participated in an alliance (43%).  Alliance participants may place less 
value on premiums given their improved understanding of the other benefits that can 
be derived from participation.  These benefits include improved market access and 
detailed production and quality information.  The additional benefits aid in offsetting 
any increase in production and transaction costs and, as a result, less importance is 
placed on the level of premiums received to offset these costs.    
Other variations across the two groups are minimal, with very little 
difference emerging in the relative importance of other characteristics.  The low 
level of variation for other characteristics may imply that cow-calf operator 
knowledge of these program characteristics is similar whether or not they have 
previously participated.  Consequently, being involved in an alliance has not brought 
any additional insights to these cow-calf operators that have led them to change their 
preferences, with the exception of expected premiums. 
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Figure 5.11 - Importance Measures by Alliance Participation 
  
5.10.3 Farm Income Sources 
 The results from the conjoint analysis were also evaluated based on the other 
sources of income a cow-calf operator derives from his farming operation.  The 
structure of producer operations varies considerably and may affect their willingness 
to participate in beef programs and their preferences for particular characteristics.  
Four major farm income categories were used to group data, which include income 
from background feeding, finishing feeding, other farm ventures, and no other farm 
income.  It is expected that those cow-calf operators that are also involved in further 
segments of the beef industry will place greater emphasis on the relative importance 
of premiums.  This is because their involvement in more than one segment of the 
beef industry results in their overall farm returns being highly dependent on their 
ability to capture premiums.  Figure 5.12 presents the relative importance of 
different characteristics based on this analysis. 
 Respondents that indicated they also ran a finishing operation placed less 
importance (16.7%) on the investment in specific assets than all other categories, 
with the relative importance being significantly lower than the aggregate importance 
for investment in specific assets, which was 23.93%.  In fact, the relative importance 
for the number of buyers (16.55%) for this group of respondents was almost 
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equivalent to that for investment in specific assets.  The relative importance of 
pricing method and number of buyers did not vary significantly though from the 
aggregate average.  The lower importance of investments in specific assets for cow-
calf operators with finishing operations may be a result of the fact that these 
operations already have greater access to existing human and physical capital.  This 
may result in their costs being lower when programs require investment into assets 
that they already have or can more easily implement due to their existing set-up.      
Cow-calf operators that operated either backgrounding or finishing feedlots 
placed a higher relative importance on premium levels with importance scores being 
44.76% and 47.47% respectively, whereas the other two segments importance scores 
were both around 41%.  The emphasis on premiums for those cow-calf operators 
that run feedlots may be a result of their ability to have greater control over the 
quality of production, as they manage more than one production segment.  As a 
result of the increased control over quality, cow-calf operators may be more focused 
on capturing a premium for their cattle. 
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Figure 5.12 - Importance Measures by Farm Income Sources 
 
5.10.4 Age 
 The results of the conjoint analysis broken down by age are provided in 
Figure 5.13.  The importance of both pricing method and number of buyers remains 
relatively constant across all of the different age categories.  Expected premium 
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becomes increasingly important as age increases, rising from an importance level of 
36.63 percent to 44.72 percent when age increases from 18-25 to 45-60.  At the 
same time, the relative importance for investments in specialized assets decreases as 
age increases (from 18-25 to 35-45) falling from 29.87 percent to 21.75 percent.  
Between the ages 45 and 60 the importance of investments in specialized assets rises 
again to 24.06 percent, which could be a result of a shorter expected time horizon in 
which individuals in this age group have to recover the investments they incur prior 
to retirement.            
While none of the differences in relative importance values show a distinct 
trend when examined based on different socio-economic groupings, the range in 
values does show us that cow-calf operators’ preferences vary considerably.  When 
developing new programs in the industry, it is important to understand the 
differences among cow-calf operations.  This is because, in order to encourage the 
participation of cow-calf operators, their preferences and limitations need to be 
taken into account and managed for within a program’s structure. 
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Figure 5.13 - Importance Measures by Age 
 
5.11 Additional Data Analysis 
5.11.1 Importance of Different Marketing Characteristics 
 Additional transaction characteristics could have been included in the 
conjoint analysis, but were excluded in order to reduce the number of profiles 
 147
respondents were required to rate and limit the overall complexity of the task.  In 
order to gather further information on the importance of different transaction 
characteristics cow-calf operators were asked to explicitly rate the importance of 
four marketing characteristics on a 5-point scale where 1 was “not very important” 
and 5 was “very important”.  Respondents were also asked to explicitly rate how 
well they think alliances manage different marketing characteristics on a 5-point 
scale where 1 was “not very good” and 5 was “very good”.  The mean of 
respondents’ explicit ratings is presented in Figure 5.14, where perceived 
importance of the marketing characteristics is on the horizontal axis and the 
perceived ability of alliances to provide these features is on the vertical axis. 
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Figure 5.14 - Importance and Performance for Different Marketing Characteristics 
 
Respondents felt that it was important to be able to receive a premium price 
for their animals and detailed data about the quality of animals they sold.  Relatively 
less importance was placed on having a secure buyer and locking in a price for 
animals a considerable time before they are sold.  At the same time, alliances are 
perceived by respondents to be a good method for securing a buyer for cattle, 
obtaining a premium price, locking in a certain price, and obtaining carcass quality 
information back on the cattle sold.          
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 Besides analyzing the relative importance respondents place on different 
characteristics as an aggregate group, they were also analyzed based on the socio-
economic information gathered in the survey.  This was done in order to determine if 
perceived importance ratings were different based on farm income sources, herd 
size, education, or age.  Variances found when data was analyzed using farm income 
sources, herd size, education, and age categories were small and as a result are not 
included in the discussion.  Figures 5.15 show the differences in importance and 
performance ratings based on whether respondent’s had participated in some form of 
alliance structure (Yes) or had not (No).  Participation in alliances did not seem to 
result in a significant difference in the importance ratings respondents assigned to 
the different marketing characteristics, with the exception of securing a premium 
price.  Securing a premium price was more important to non-alliance participants 
than alliance participants.  This is consistent with the results of the conjoint analysis.     
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Figure 5.15 - Importance and Performance for Different Marketing Characteristics 
Based on Alliance Participation 
 
 The perceived performance of alliances did, however, vary.  Most obvious is 
the difference in the perceived ability of alliances to provide carcass quality 
information, with respondents that have been involved in an alliance rating the 
ability of alliances to provide this information lower than those not currently 
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involved in some sort of alliance.  This is surprising, as alliances are typically 
thought to aid in providing cow-calf operators with data on carcass quality and may 
indicate the failure of previous alliances to provide this benefit.  The small number 
of respondents who had participated in an alliance could have an effect on perceived 
importance. A larger sample that represents more viewpoints is necessary to confirm 
the results.  If any of the alliance participants have been dissatisfied with an 
alliance’s ability to provide them with carcass information, the average could be 
lower than expected due to the small sample.    
 The perceived ability of alliances to secure a buyer also varies, with alliance 
participants rating their performance higher than non-alliance participants.  This 
could be attributed to the greater knowledge that alliance participants have regarding 
the benefits of an alliance.  Again, the small sample size is a caveat. 
 
5.11.2 Perceived Market Size 
 The survey also asked cow-calf operators their perceptions regarding the 
attributes demanded by consumers.  This is of interest to see if the predictions cow-
calf operators made corresponded with the market sizes that were estimated in 
chapter four for different attributes. Cow-calf operators were asked to rate several 
different attributes that are currently being branded in terms of whether they thought 
consumer demand for each attribute was large, medium, or small.  The results from 
the survey were then compared to the market sizes estimated in chapter four where 
the number of buyers and sellers was examined.  It was assumed that the number of 
buyers and sellers is directly correlated with level of consumer demand.  In 
examining the results of this analysis, it is important to understand that the type of 
measurement used can be ambiguous in the sense that cow-calf operators may vary 
in their evaluation of what constitutes a small, medium, or large market.  At the 
same time, this analysis does provide general insights into cow-calf operators’ 
perceptions of demand and new market opportunities.   
 Figure 5.16 illustrates the difference between the market sizes estimated in 
the previous chapter and consumer demand as perceived by respondents.  
Respondents recognize the large demand for tender products.  They also are aware 
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of the emerging market for natural and breed-oriented products.  With the exception 
of grass-fed products, respondents appear to overestimate the market size for other 
attributes such as leanness, product origin, and organic. 
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Figure 5.16 - Estimated and Perceived Market Size for Branded Beef Attributes 
  
5.11.3 Membership Fees 
 Many of the different supply chain structures require that members pay fees 
in order to participate.  Programs vary in terms of what types of fees they require 
participants to pay and the actual amount of fees. Two main fee structures occur 
within programs.  Programs may require a one-time entrance fee and a yearly fee per 
animal marketed through the program or they may just require a yearly fee per 
animal.  Typically one-time entrance fees are required to ensure a participant’s 
commitment to the program, while yearly per animal fees are paid in order to cover 
program administration and management costs.  Different membership fee scenarios 
and values could have been analyzed through the conjoint experiment, but were not 
included due to limited number of variables that can be considered using conjoint.       
In order to gain insight into the effect different fee structures and fees have 
on a respondent’s willingness to participate in a program, the survey included three 
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different program scenarios that varied in terms of the fees participants were 
required to pay (Appendix A).  Respondents were asked to select the minimum 
premium that they would be willing to accept in order to enter into a program with a 
particular fee structure from a range of premiums provided.  In Scenario A, 
participants were required to pay a one-time fee of $15,000 and then a yearly per 
head fee of $5.  In Scenario B, participants were required to pay a one-time fee of 
$2,500 to enter into the program and then a yearly per head fee of $5. Participants in 
Scenario C did not have to pay a one-time entrance fee, but were still required to pay 
a yearly per head fee of $5.  The values of fees were chosen based on examining the 
fees required within existing programs.  The range of premiums that respondents 
selected from was also representative of the premiums available in existing 
alliances.   
Figure 5.17 illustrates the premiums that respondents expect for them to be 
willing to participate in each of the program scenarios.  When one-time fees are 
quite high, as in Scenario A, 83% of respondents required a premium of at least 10% 
above current market price and 49% required premiums to be 15% to 20% above 
current market price in order to participate.  In Scenario B, where there was a lower 
one-time fee, 80% of respondents required a premium in the range of 5% to 15% in 
order to participate and 44% expected a premium between 5% and 10% in order to 
participate.  In Scenario C, where no one-time fee is charged, 82% of respondents 
were willing to accept a premium of less than 10% in order to participate and 48% 
of respondents were willing to accept a premium that ranged between 5% and 10% 
in order to participate.               
Understanding the effect different fees have on the willingness of cow-calf 
operators to participate in a program is tied in directly with cow-calf operators’ 
willingness to invest in specific assets, as when cow-calf operators pay fees they are 
committing capital to a program.  From the perspective of the program, higher fees 
ensure a cow-calf operator’s commitment to the program as they have a vested 
interest in its success.  At the same time, the willingness of cow-calf operators to 
make these investments decreases and the capital required increases due to the 
increased risk of opportunistic behaviour.  Cow-calf operators required to commit to 
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a program become locked into a specific supply relationship, with fewer buyers and 
increased costs associated with transferring out of the program.  Therefore, in order 
to pay the fees required, the benefits associated with entering into program must 
offset the transaction costs arising from the increased commitment required. 
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Figure 5.17 - Willingness to Participate in Programs Based on Membership Fees 
 
5.12 Summary and Conclusions 
When beef industry participants are developing programs to improve 
coordination and produce different beef attributes, cow-calf producer attitudes need 
to be kept in mind.  Cow-calf operators can have a significant impact on the 
production of different attributes, whether it is through the genetics they use, their 
production protocols, or the management systems they have in place.  Currently, 
coordination between this sector and other segments of the supply chain is not 
occurring to any significant scale.  As a result, information and incentives are not 
being transferred to cow-calf operators to improve coordination and provide 
consumers with the products they demand on a consistent basis.             
To improve coordination between cow-calf operators and other supply chain 
participants, programs being developed need to work with cow-calf producers and 
consider the trade-offs producers make between different program characteristics 
and requirements.  The values cow-calf operators place on reduced transaction costs 
and premiums has to be greater than the increase in transaction costs incurred as a 
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result of the production of different beef attributes.  This analysis has provided some 
insights into the trade-offs cow-calf operators are willing or are not willing to make.  
At the same time, the analysis is limited in its approach as several program 
characteristics could not be included in the conjoint experiment in order to minimize 
the overall task complexity for survey respondents.  Additional conjoint analysis 
would be beneficial in order to consider the trade-offs made when other benefits, 
membership fees, and program characteristics are included.                       
It is also important to consider other variables.    Operation and management 
characteristics at the cow-calf operator level may also limit or encourage 
participation in different programs and need to be considered in order to create 
suitable and successful programs that are able to work in the cow-calf operator 
environment effectively, as well as within the rest of the industry.  This segment 
faces significant challenges associated with individual cow-calf operator size and 
industry concentration that are not present and do not limit coordination between 
other segments of the beef industry.  Further discussion regarding these 
characteristics will occur in the next chapter.   
This chapter discussed the importance and degree to which certain 
transaction characteristics affect a cow-calf operator’s willingness to produce 
different beef attributes.  It did not discuss to any great extent the actual method of 
coordination chosen by beef industry segments to coordinate production, as was 
outlined in the predictive model presented in Chapter 4.  The choice of whether to 
use contracts, informal alliances, or more formal alliances is discussed further in the 
next chapter.  The purpose of the next chapter is to discuss the types of supply chain 
coordination programs emerging within the beef industry and the challenges, 
limitations, and opportunities associated with these different programs.  Key to the 
discussion in the next chapter will be an examination of the opportunities and 
constraints associated with different characteristics of the beef industry and alliances 
within the industry. 
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6 Insights from Case Studies of Beef Industry Alliances 
6.1 Introduction 
In the previous chapter, cow-calf operators’ preferences for different 
transaction characteristics were examined through the use of survey questions and 
conjoint analysis.  The purpose of this chapter is to provide in-depth case study 
analyses on the structure of alliances within the beef industry.  Information was 
gathered from interviews with key managers and directors of different beef value 
chain alliances in both Canada and the U.S.  The information obtained from these 
interviews is used to identify the critical success factors and challenges to improving 
coordination in the Canadian beef industry.   
The following chapter is divided into four main sections.  The first section 
(6.3) provides an overview of the structure of the alliances interviewed.  The second 
section (6.4) provides insights from the alliances interviewed on the importance of 
the different transaction characteristics outlined in the predictive model in Chapter 4.  
Following this, a succinct discussion of additional characteristics that have an 
impact on improving supply chain coordination will be discussed.  Section 6.6 will 
examine opportunities that exist to improve coordination and reduce the costs 
incurred by supply chain participants. 
 
6.2 Survey Methodology 
Conjoint analysis was not appropriate for the purposes of the analysis in this 
chapter.  While conjoint analysis is an effective method to determine individual 
preferences for specific characteristics, the use of conjoint analysis requires a large 
sample of individuals in order to ensure that the results are statistically significant.  
The high levels of concentration in the feedlot and packing sectors in both Canada 
and the U.S. limits the extent to which a survey could be used to gather data.  The 
small number of alliances in Canada and the U.S compounds this.      
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Due to these limitations, it was decided that interviews with key industry and 
alliance members would be the best method to elicit information regarding the 
importance of different transaction characteristics and the critical success factors and 
challenges for strengthening coordination in the beef industry.  Seventeen interviews 
were conducted with individuals who were either managers or directors of an 
existing alliance or involved in developing and managing information technology 
for the beef industry.  The alliances and companies interviewed are located in 
Kansas, Nebraska, Missouri, Saskatchewan, and Alberta.  The three U.S. states were 
selected because they have some of the largest breeding herds and feeding areas in 
the U.S.  Similarly, Alberta was chosen, as it is Canada’s largest beef producing 
province.  Ten interviews were completed in the U.S. and seven were completed in 
Canada.  The interviews were conducted in February and March 2004.      
It should be acknowledged that the interviews were limited to a relatively 
small geographical area given the dispersion of the beef industry throughout both 
Canada and the U.S., but both time and resource constraints precluded a more 
extensive interview process.  A sample that was more representative of Canada 
would also have been ideal, but was difficult to obtain as there are fewer value chain 
alliances currently within the Canadian beef industry.  It was also difficult to get the 
cooperation of Canadian industry members.  This may be a result of the shorter term 
focus in the wake of BSE and less experience with alliances in Canada.   
Interview participants were identified based on referrals from industry and 
academic contacts.  Individuals were then contacted by phone and email and their 
willingness to participate in a personal interview was established.  The interviews 
took approximately one hour and an outline of interview questions was developed in 
order to guide the discussion.  The interview guide is presented in Appendix B, 
along with a covering letter that was given to each participant and a consent form 
that participants were required to sign prior to being interviewed.  After the 
completion of the interviews, an interview transcript and a transcript release form 
were sent to each participant so that they could review the contents and release the 
transcript for use in the study.               
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The interview focused on the organizational characteristics of the alliance 
and structure of the program and/or company.  Questions were also asked about the 
pricing method used, average premiums, additional benefits received, and other 
issues surrounding pricing structure and market access.  In the last part of the 
interview, interviewees were queried regarding the current limitations and barriers 
their alliances had faced, expected growth, and the value of standardized traceability 
systems.  Table 6.1 provides a list of the organizations interviewed, their location, 
and approximate size of alliances in terms of the number of animals marketed 
through each program per year. 
Table 6.1 - Organizations Interviewed   
Organizations Location Size 
(# animals/year) 
PM Beef Group United States 65,0008 
Heartland Premium Beef Alliance United States 35,000 
Cow Camp Beef Alliance United States 1,500 
GeneNet United States 100,000 
Nebraska Corn Fed Beef United States 40,000 
Laura's Lean Beef United States 85,000 
Ward Feed Yard/ILS United States 90,000 
Beef Marketing Group United States 450,000 
Decatur Beef Alliance United States 50,000 
U.S. Premium Beef United States 692,000 
Highland Premium Alberta Beef Alliance Canada 2,000 
Tee Creek Premium Meats Canada 300 
Ranchers Renaissance Canada/United States 260,000 
Excel Meats/Cargill Canada/United States Not specified 
Sunterra Farms Canada Not specified 
Ranchers’ Beef Canada Not specified 
XL Foods Inc.  Canada Not specified 
ComputerAid Professional Services Ltd.  Canada N/A 
Viewtrak Technologies Inc.  Canada N/A 
 
6.2.1 Important Note 
 The following sections of this chapter will discuss information obtained from 
the interviews with different alliances. Due to the nature of the interviews, general 
conclusions have been made in the chapter based on the information obtained, with 
                                                 
8 Process approximately 200,000 head annually, with 65,000 being processed through their Ranch to 
Retail process/source verified system.   
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few direct references to specific alliances.  The results from the interviews have 
been written in this form mainly because in many situations similar conclusions 
were drawn from multiple alliance interviews, making it difficult to directly 
reference one or two specific alliances when writing the chapter.  As a result, readers 
should note that the information presented in the chapter was obtained from the 
alliances interviewed, but for much of the discussion, direct references to particular 
alliances may not necessarily be made. 
 
6.3 Overview of the Alliances 
6.3.1 Alliance Structures 
Tables 6.2 and 6.3 provide a synopsis of the different program structures, 
requirements, and benefits.  The programs listed in the tables are limited to those 
that can be classified as being either an informal or formal alliance.  Excel Meats, 
XL Foods Inc., and Ranchers’ Beef were excluded from Tables 6.2 and 6.3.  
Ranchers’ Beef is in an industry initiative to develop a mid-size producer owned 
processing plant in Alberta and is currently in the development stages.  Individuals 
at both XL Foods Inc. and Excel Meats were interviewed, but did not provide 
information, to any great detail, which could be used to provide a meaningful 
comparison between the alliances they are involved in and the other alliances 
interviewed.              
The alliances interviewed varied significantly, ranging from very informal 
and loosely coordinated alliances to very formal and highly integrated arrangements.  
The volume of cattle marketed annually through each alliance is included in Table 
6.1 and ranges from 300 head to over 650,000 head.  Alliances also varied in terms 
of who was driving the alliance and its ownership structure.  The sector of the 
industry that drives an alliance seems to be important in determining the 
organizational and ownership structure of an alliance.     
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Table 6.2 – Key Features of Alliances 
 
 
Alliance Initiating 
Party/ 
Ownership 
Packer/End User 
Involvement 
Attributes Branded 
Program 
Commitment Fees Pricing 
Method 
PM Beef 
Group (U.S) 
Packer 
Private 
Company 
- PM Beef 
- 2 mid-size 
retailers  
 
High Quality 
Process-verified 
Retail 
Brand 
Labels 
Annual 
Contract 
Per Head Fee 
$3/head Quality Grid 
(Futures) 
+ $3/cwt (live) 
Heartland 
Premium Beef 
(U.S) 
External 
(Service) 
Private 
Company 
- IBP 
- Smithfield Foods 
- No retailer 
Holstein 
High Quality 
 
No Verbal  Base Price 
+ % of Profits 
Cow Camp 
Beef Alliance 
(U.S) 
Feedlot 
Private 
Company 
- US Premium Beef 
- IBP 
- No retailer 
High Quality 
 
No Verbal 
 
↑ Custom 
Charges 
& Lease 
USPB Shares  
IBP Grid or  
USPB Grid  
GeneNet 
(U.S) 
External 
(Service) 
Private 
Company 
- Swift & Co. 
- No retailer 
Different 
Breeds 
High Quality 
 
No Per Head Fee 
Verbal 
$3 to $7 per 
head based 
on data type  
Quality Grid 
 
Nebraska 
Corn Fed Beef 
(NCFB) (U.S) 
External 
(Markets 
EndProduct)  
Non-profit 
Licensing 
Org  
- Swift & Co.  
- 1 mid-size retailer 
& other end-users  
High Quality 
Nebraska  
Corn Fed 
Nebraska 
Corn Fed 
Beef 
Per Head Fee 
Verbal 
$3 to $4 per 
head  & $1 
tag fee 
Swift & Co. 
Quality Grid 
Or Cash Market 
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Table 6.2 – Continued  
 
Alliance Initiating 
Party/ 
Ownership 
Packer/End 
User 
Involvement 
Attributes Branded 
Program 
Commitment Fees Pricing 
Method 
Laura’s Lean 
Beef (LLB) 
(U.S) 
External  
(Markets 
EndProduct) 
Private 
Company 
- Multiple packers 
- Multiple large &  
  mid-size retailers 
High Quality 
Lean 
Natural 
Laura’s 
Lean Beef 
Annual 
Contract 
 
 Lean/Quality 
Focused Grid 
Ward Feed 
Yard/ ILS 
(U.S) 
Feedlot 
Private 
Company 
- IBP 
- Other packers 
- No retailer 
High Quality  No Annual 
Feeding 
Agreement 
Fees to use 
different 
services 
Packer Grids 
Or Cash 
Market 
Beef 
Marketing 
Group (U.S) 
Group of 
Feedlots 
(Closed)  
- IBP (excl. agrmt.) 
- No specific 
retailer 
High Quality 
Volume   
No No Producers 
Feedlots own 
shares  
None Exclusive 
Deal:  IBP 
Grid or Bid 
Decatur Beef 
Alliance (U.S) 
Feedlot 
Private 
Company 
- Excel  
- No specific 
retailer 
High Quality No Annual 
Contract 
Per Head Fee 
$5/head + 
$0.02/head/ 
day on feed 
Quality Grid 
U.S. Premium 
Beef (U.S) 
Producer 
Cooperative 
(Closed)  
- National Beef  
(USPB majority 
owner) 
- Supplies several 
large retailers 
High Quality Nat’l Beef 
Brand 
Programs 
Buy/Lease 
Shares  (Cost 
is $138/share/ 
animal)  
Lease rate 
varies 
Member Fee: 
Life-time 
$500 
Annual 
$100 
Quality Grid 
 160
Table 6.2 – Continued  
 
Alliance Initiating 
Party/ 
Ownership 
Packer/End User 
Involvement 
Attributes Branded 
Program 
Commitment Fees Pricing 
Method 
Highland 
Premium 
Alberta Beef 
Alliance 
(Cdn) 
Feedlot 
Private 
Company 
- XL Foods 
(Natural) 
- Cargill  
(Non-natural) 
- 1 mid-size retailer 
- 1 internet based co. 
High Quality 
Natural 
Alberta Origin 
Highland 
Premium 
Alberta 
Beef, Blue 
LabelBeef   
Annual 
Feeding 
Agreement 
Per Head Fees 
$5/head Live-weight 
Pricing 
System 
(Natural) 
Quality Grid 
(Non-natural) 
Tee Creek 
Premium 
Meats (Cdn) 
Producers  
Private 
Company 
 
- Custom processed   
 @ Northwest Foods 
- 1 small retailer 
High Quality 
Natural  
Tee Creek 
Premium 
Beef 
Participants 
are all 
shareholders 
in the 
company 
None Live-weight 
Pricing 
System 
Ranchers 
Renaissance 
(U.S) 
Producer 
Cooperative 
(Closed) 
- Excel 
- Multiple large  
   retailers 
High Quality  Retail 
Brand 
Labels 
Membership 
Fee Between 
$2,500 and 
$25,000 
(Class A & B  
members) 
$3/head Price based 
off of boxed 
beef price 
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Table 6.3 – Requirements and Benefits Received from Participation in Alliances 
Program Requirements Average 
Premiums 
Other Benefits 
Alliance 
# of Head Ownership Protocols/ 
Certification   
Traceability    
PM Beef Group 
(U.S) 
40 - Sell Calves 
- Partner w/Feedlot 
- Retain ownership 
- Feed Protocol 
- Health Protocol 
- Certified          
  Feedlots 
- USDA Verified 
- Animal  
  Passports 
- Electronic 
identification 
$40-$60 
per head 
- Ind. Carcass     
   Data 
Heartland 
Premium Beef 
(U.S) 
Not 
specified 
- Retain ownership - Feed Protocol 
- Health Protocol 
 
- Electronic 
identification 
↓ Discount in 
beef market  
 
Cow Camp Beef 
Alliance (U.S) 
50 - Retain ownership 
- Partner w/Feedlot 
- No Specific                   
  Protocols  
- Electronic 
identification 
Grid 
Premiums 
- Ind. Carcass    
   Data (USPB) 
- Group 
Carcass Data 
(IBP) 
GeneNet (U.S) 40 - Sell Calves 
- Partner w/Feedlot 
- Retain ownership 
- No Specific                   
  Protocols 
Optional:  
- Tags 
- Electronic 
identification 
$20 -$40 per 
head 
- Ind. Or 
Group Carcass 
Data 
- Cost of Data    
  Varies 
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Table 6.3 – Continued 
 
Alliance Program Requirements Average 
Premiums 
Other Benefits 
 # of Head Ownership Protocols Certification   
Nebraska Corn 
Fed Beef 
(NCFB) (U.S) 
40  - Sell Calves 
- Partner w/Feedlot 
- Retain ownership 
- Produced in  
   Nebraska  
- Feed Protocol 
- Health Protocol 
- Beef Quality 
Assurance 
Certification  
- Affidavits &  
  Internal Audits 
- Required to  
   keep 
records 
Slotting 
Premiums: 
$1-$3/cwt + 
Grid 
Premiums 
- Group 
Carcass Data 
Laura’s Lean 
Beef (LLB) 
(U.S) 
No 
Minimum 
- Sell Calves 
- Retain ownership 
- Exotic Breeds 
- Feed Protocol 
- Health Protocol 
- Affidavits &  
   Internal Audits 
- USDA Cert. 
- Program  
  specific tags 
Cow/Calf    
Bonus 
Fdlt Bonus 
Grid 
Premiums  
- Ind. Carcass  
   Data 
Ward Feed 
Yard/ILS (U.S) 
Not 
specified  
- Sell Calves 
- Retain ownership 
- No Specific  
   Protocols 
 $5-$20 
per head 
- Ind. Or Group  
   Carcass Data  
Beef Marketing 
Group (U.S) 
N/A N/A - No Specific   
  Protocols 
 IBP Price 
Premiums  
- Ind. Or Group  
   Carcass Data 
Decatur Beef 
Alliance (U.S) 
60  
(same sex) 
- Sell Calves 
- Retain ownership 
- No Specific  
   Protocols 
- Scanning Tech.  
    
- Electronic 
identification 
$30-$50 
per head  
- Ind. Carcass  
   Data 
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Table 6.3 – Continued 
 
Alliance Program Requirements Average 
Premiums 
Other Benefits 
 # of Head Ownership Protocols Certification   
U.S. Premium 
Beef (U.S) 
100  - Retain ownership 
- Lease shares  
- No Specific  
   Protocols 
- Qualified 
Custom Feedlots 
- Electronic 
identification 
- Tags 
$16-$46 
per head 
- Ind. Carcass  
   Data 
- Dividends   
   (% of profits) 
-↑ in share 
value 
Highland 
Premium Alberta 
Beef Alliance 
(Cdn) 
35 - Sell Calves 
- Partner w/Feedlot 
- Retain ownership 
- Feed Protocol 
- Health Protocol 
- Certification 
- Tags  15% above 
live weight 
market price 
- Ind. Carcass  
   Data 
Tee Creek 
Premium Meats 
(Cdn) 
Not 
specified  
- Retain ownership - Feed Protocol 
- Health Protocol 
- Internal Cert.   
- Working 
w/CFIA to obtain 
cert. 
- Tags  
- Individual   
  monitoring 
No Prem.  
currently 
paid  
↑ in value of 
company 
Ranchers 
Renaissance 
(U.S) 
Classes: 
A- 150 
B- 2,000 
- Retain ownership  - Feed Protocol 
- Health Protocol 
- HACCP system 
- Internal 
Certification 
- Electronic 
identification 
$27-$52 per 
head 
- Ind. Carcass  
  Data 
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Referring to Table 6.2, cow-calf producer-driven alliances appear to be more 
formal and have often been structured as cooperatives where ownership is shared 
between the individuals involved in the program.  An example of such a program is 
U.S. Premium Beef.  When feedlots or packers have developed alliances they are 
typically privately driven ventures that are more informal in their coordination of the 
supply chain.  An example of a packer driven program is PM Beef Group and an 
example of a feedlot driven program is Decatur Beef Alliance.  Other alliances have 
been initiated by external entities and have taken two different forms.  Firstly, 
companies have emerged that facilitate coordination, as a service to different 
industry segments, without the company actually owning any facilities, livestock, or 
end-products.  GeneNet is an example of such a company that provides a service to 
producers, feedlots, and the packer with which it is aligned.  Other external 
companies have emerged that also work to facilitate the coordination of different 
industry segments.  These companies are different in that they purchase finished 
products and manage the marketing of these products to retailers and other end 
users.  Examples of such companies include Laura’s Lean Beef (LLB) and Nebraska 
Corn Fed Beef (NCFB).               
  The attributes being branded by the alliances focus mainly on the 
production of high quality beef products that are tender, flavourful, and of a 
consistent quality.  Laura’s Lean Beef (LLB), Highland Premium Alberta Beef 
(HPAB), and Tee Creek Premium Meats (TCPM) produce natural beef products that 
are hormone and antibiotic free.  The production of lean meat is also emphasized by 
LLB, while HPAB brands its product as being produced in Alberta.  NCFB 
differentiates its product as being produced in Nebraska and corn-fed.  Heartland 
Premium Beef (HPB) produces Holstein cattle derived from the calves from dairy 
farms and focuses strictly on this breed.  Also unique is the Beef Marketing Group 
(BMG), which was developed by a group of feedlots in order to guarantee the 
processor, IBP, with a supply of product into a specific plant.  While members of the 
group are focused on high quality production, the arrangement is not directly driven 
by the production of particular attributes.  Instead, benefits are derived from 
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guaranteeing the supply of a large volume of cattle to a nearby processor and 
therefore an assured market drives this alliance.          
All of the individuals interviewed indicated that the involvement of a packer 
was critical to the success of their alliance.  Accordingly, they were aligned or 
driven by a specific packer.  In a couple of cases, alliances marketed beef through 
two or more different processors.  An example is the Cow Camp Beef Alliance, 
which markets beef through National Beef and IBP.  Alliances with retailers depend 
directly on their objectives and structure.  Critical to alliances with a retailer is who 
owns the brand name label(s) that beef production is directed towards.   
Seven out of the thirteen programs presented in Table 6.2 are not linked to a 
particular branded beef program and, instead, direct their production into multiple 
commodity and brand programs that are owned by a processor.  Processors typically 
market their brands through major retailers and distributors throughout North 
America.  Four of the alliances own a brand name label and are aligned with specific 
retailers.  Two programs focus on supplying products to specific retailer private 
labels.  The ownership structure for a brand name label can affect the relationship 
between supply chain participants within an alliance and also how they are linked to 
end-users.  This will be discussed in Section 6.4.1.1. 
 
6.3.2 Coordination of Production  
6.3.2.1.  Pricing Method 
In the production of high quality consistent products, many of the alliances 
actively seek to operate outside of the traditional commodity market that uses a live-
weight pricing system based on average lot quality.  Many individuals in both the 
cow-calf sector and feedlot level appear frustrated that they are not rewarded for the 
production of high quality cattle.  Consequently, they support the use of a grid-based 
pricing system.  The majority of alliances used a grid-based pricing system, with the 
exception of two of the natural programs (Highland Premium Alberta Beef Alliance 
and Tee Creek Premium Meats) in Canada which are currently quite small in terms 
of the volumes produced.          
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The structure of the grid-based pricing systems varies, with some being more 
detailed than others in terms of the number and types of measurements used to 
determine overall carcass quality.  Also, some grid-based pricing systems are 
exclusive and only available to cattle marketed through a specific alliance to a 
certain packer.  Other grid-based pricing systems are developed by the processor and 
available to both individuals within an alliance and other alliances and individuals 
that are marketing cattle to that processor.   
All of the individuals interviewed stated that their grid-based pricing systems 
changed on an ongoing basis, with adjustments being made to respond to consumer 
demands to encourage the production of particular types of animals.  As more 
quality-based grids have emerged in the market, processors have had to remain 
competitive and increase the premiums paid to producers in order to procure 
adequate volumes of cattle with particular attributes.  Processors have an incentive 
to ensure that their grid-based pricing systems are competitive, as individuals have 
increasing opportunities to switch to other grid-based pricing programs.  Those that 
do not remain competitive will not be able to procure adequate volumes of high 
quality cattle for their own branded programs and will incur increased search costs 
to procure these cattle through the cash market.    
6.3.2.2.  Program Requirements 
A cow-calf operator or feedlot is typically required to have at least 40 head 
to enter into a program.  This is because an individual’s cattle must typically be 
segregated throughout production, or a portion of the production process.  A certain 
number of head is therefore required in order to maintain an efficient lot size.  New 
identification technologies have facilitated the tracking of cattle in mixed ownership 
lots, but have not yet been adopted on a widespread scale.  When shipping cattle by 
truck, a load is approximately forty head.  As a result, the requirement also ensures 
transportation costs are minimized and economies of scale are captured.  Some of 
the alliances require larger volumes of cattle to ensure adequate volumes of 
production flow into their branded beef programs.  Table 6.3 shows that U.S. 
Premium Beef requires an annual minimum of 100 head of cattle and Ranchers 
Renaissance has a minimum requirement of 150 head.      
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The alliances varied significantly in terms of the production protocols they 
required participants to follow.  From Table 6.3 the natural-based programs, such as 
Laura’s Lean Beef and Highland Premium Alberta Beef, all have specific feed and 
health protocols that producers and feedlots are required to follow.  The quality-
based programs vary in terms of the protocols that they have implemented.  
Alliances like Ranchers Renaissance require participants to follow quite detailed 
production and processing protocols that have been implemented to ensure 
consistent and high quality production.   Others alliances, like Decatur Beef 
Alliance, rely on the use of economic signals to direct production and have very few, 
if any, production requirements.  Programs also had different requirements due to 
the attributes being produced and required cattle to be of a certain origin, of a certain 
breed, and other specifications.  For example, Heartland Premium Beef Alliance 
marketed Holstein cattle and cattle marketed through Nebraska Corn Fed Beef must 
be fed within Nebraska. 
6.3.2.3. Traceability and Certification Systems 
 The implementation of traceability and certification systems also varies 
among alliances.  Electronic identification systems have been adopted by several of 
the alliances to facilitate the tracking of individual animals throughout production 
and processing.  These systems are often tied directly to the provision of carcass 
quality data that can be applied to specific animals instead of on an overall lot basis.  
The natural programs examined did have third party certification by either the 
Canadian Food Inspection Agency or the U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA).  
While several of the quality-based programs have internal certification programs and 
require participants to sign affidavits, PM Beef is unique in that its system is USDA 
Process Verified, which is a third party certification system developed by the USDA 
to ensure compliance with specified production and processing protocols.           
It is apparent that the mechanisms used to coordinate production and 
guarantee specific attributes can vary significantly, in terms of the pricing methods 
used, program requirements, and traceability systems implemented.  This is partially 
a result of the attributes being provided by different alliances, but also a result of the 
level of consistency that programs are providing for particular attributes.  An 
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overview of the alliances interviewed shows that there is a significant variance in the 
structures used to produce consistently high quality, tender beef.   Some programs 
are focused on achieving very high levels of consistency and have implemented 
more detailed pricing structures, program requirements, and traceability systems to 
achieve this.  Others are focused on moving away from the inconsistencies that exist 
in the spot market and increasing quality, but are more relaxed in terms of their 
coordination and requirements and are more accepting of some variation between 
animals.   
 
6.3.3 Benefits Received 
 Based on the interviews with individuals involved in alliances, the perceived 
benefits of improved coordination are numerous.  Most significant is the improved 
flow of information along the supply chain.  With increased coordination, more 
accurate information on consumers’ demands is passed back from retailers and other 
end users to processors, feedlots, and cow-calf operators.  Grid-based pricing 
systems convey more accurate economic signals regarding the quality of the 
product.  Of particular importance is the ability of alliances to provide cow-calf 
operators access to demand information and grid-based pricing systems.  The use of 
contracts and grid-based pricing systems to improve alignment between processors 
and feedlots has been quite common and facilitated the transfer of information to 
this sector, but information flow further upstream have thus far been limited.  
Alliances provide cow-calf operators with access to grid-based pricing systems and 
information on the quality of their production, which was previously not available. 
Access to premiums provides cow-calf operators with increased incentives to 
improve their production and the information made available to them can assist in 
their production decisions.      
 Based on the interviews, alliances also provided substantial benefits for 
seedstock producers.  Alliances often try and align with certain seedstock producers 
who have been proven to produce animals that perform well in their program.  This 
creates a dependable market for seedstock producers and is likely to result in 
increased demand for their seedstock if their progeny perform well and provides 
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their customers (cow-calf operators) with increased returns.  Seedstock producers 
have also purchased back cattle from their customers and marketed these cattle 
through the alliance.   The purpose of this is to obtain quality information on the 
progeny of their seedstock.  This allows them to see what adjustments they should 
make to their breeding program and aids in selling seedstock, as they can outline to 
cow-calf operators what types of calves their seedstock will produce in terms of 
finished quality.      
 Processors benefit from having a more constant and stable flow of product 
that can be processed and marketed through their various commodity and branded 
beef programs.  When they do not own the brand and either custom process cattle or 
have an alternative arrangement with an alliance, they still benefit from the constant 
flow through the plant.  Alliances also facilitate the transfer of information to 
processors, retailers, and other end-users regarding the source and processes used in 
order to ensure the guarantees provided under a brand.   
 For retailers, the provision of a specific product through an alliance allows 
them to differentiate themselves from their competitors.  Retailers that can provide 
their customers with differentiated high quality beef may be able to establish 
increased consumer loyalty to the store.  Some retailers have limited the premium at 
which they sell their brand name product.  An example is the one of the retail brands 
Rancher’s Renaissance produces for.  In this case the retailer has focused on using 
their brand name product to increase consumer loyalty.  They have traded-off the 
lower returns they receive on their meat case for higher levels of consumer loyalty 
and an overall increase in grocery sales. 
 
6.4 Transaction Characteristics 
6.4.1 Specialized Investments 
In Chapter 5, cow-calf operators indicated that the investments that they 
were required to make in order to participate in an alliance was the most important 
transaction characteristic affecting their willingness to participate in a particular 
alliance.  Therefore, it is important to consider more closely the nature of specialized 
investments in the alliances interviewed and how this potential barrier to 
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participation is managed.  From Table 6.3 it is apparent that the alliances 
interviewed varied widely in terms of what they required at the cow-calf level, with 
the most common requirement being that cattle follow a specific feed and health 
protocol.    
Record and certification systems were also required by some alliances.  
Again, these varied with respect to the complexity of these systems and the amount 
of time or capital required by cow-calf operators.  The more standardized and 
simplified the record keeping system was, the more willing cow-calf operators are to 
participate in an alliance given the reduced time required to manage records.  Logan 
McClelland, Executive Director of NCFB, stated that the previously cumbersome 
record keeping process required by their system limited producer participation to 
some extent.  As a result, the organization has worked to create a standardized 
system that reduces the amount of time required to input information while 
improving the overall quality of the information that is obtained throughout the 
supply chain.     
No significant farm improvement expenditures were required by any of the 
alliances interviewed.  The most common element of farm improvement across the 
different alliances was the adoption of HACCP based programs that certify 
participating cow-calf operators, feedlots, and in some cases processors and 
retailers9.  These types of programs appear to be best suited to ensuring 
standardization of production procedures, while requiring minimal investments by 
the majority of cow-calf operators.  Other more detailed certification and audit 
programs were also apparent.  For example, PM Beef has implemented a USDA 
process verified system that requires each individual animal to have a “passport”, 
which includes detailed information on the animal and the production and 
processing procedures carried out.  In addition, USDA audits the production and 
processing segments on an ongoing basis.          
                                                 
9 Hazard Analysis and Critical Control Point (HACCP) systems focus on identifying and preventing 
hazards within a production system.  The objective of a HACCP based system is to analyze a 
production system for potential hazards and identify critical control points. Upon identification of 
critical control points, measures are established to reduce hazards.  Ongoing monitoring and record 
keeping systems are then implemented.   
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Overall, the investments in human and physical capital cow-calf operators 
were required to make to participate in any of the alliances were quite small.  
Confirming the results of the conjoint analysis, alliances have limited the amount of 
investment required in order to encourage participation.  Recognizing that while 
individuals are willing to make small investments in either physical or human 
capital, large investments offset the benefits derived from participation and are 
likely to limit entry.  Investments mainly focused on the implementation of feed and 
health protocols and record/certification systems, both of which had positive part-
worth values in the completed conjoint analysis of cow-calf operators.        
As cow-calf operators were required to make minimal investments in 
specialized assets in most of the alliances, the risk of opportunistic behaviour is 
expected to be low.  This coincides with the observation that in most of the alliances 
coordination between cow-calf operators and the alliances was low. Cow-calf 
operators were willing to participate in the alliances without the use of contracts to 
ensure a buyer’s commitment and to reduce their exposure to opportunistic 
behaviour.     
The investments required by feedlots are in most cases similar to those 
required in the cow-calf sector.  In some situations, the feedlots and processors 
initiating alliances incur costs associated with implementing computer vision 
scanning (CVS) technologies and tracking technologies.  The investments 
associating with implementing these technologies can initially be quite high, but risk 
of opportunistic behaviour by other supply chain participants is expected to be low.  
CVS and electronic identification/ tracking technologies are highly transferable and 
can be easily adapted for different purposes.  Although supporting database systems 
are often developed to specifically meet a particular program’s needs, the risk of 
opportunistic behaviour is still expected to be low.  Typically, information systems 
can be easily adjusted and, as a result, are transferable.  Consequently, the 
transaction costs incurred to reduce the risk of opportunistic behaviour with 
investments in CVS, traceability systems, and information systems are expected to 
be low and will not affect the degree of coordination to any great extent.        
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Overall, the risk of opportunistic behaviour as a result of investment in 
specific assets is minimal and has not had a great impact on the degree of supply 
chain coordination.  This may be, in part, due to the limited amount of investment 
alliances have required supply chain participants to make in order to encourage 
participation.  It may also be due to the reciprocal nature of the relationship between 
buyers and sellers in the supply chain.  Buyers need to be able to ensure adequate 
supplies of a differentiated product, which is not readily available in the spot market.  
If they act opportunistically sellers will not be willing to transact with buyers in 
subsequent years, thus increasing buyers costs associated with searching out and 
procuring new supplies.  Similarly, if sellers act opportunistically, buyers will 
choose not to deal with them in the future and they will lose a market in which to 
sell their differentiated product.  If both parties do not act opportunistically, an 
ongoing relationship can be established where market access is provided and a 
consistent flow of supply is realized. 
 
6.4.1.1. Brand Ownership 
The following section explores the issue of asset specific investments with 
respect to brand ownership.  It is expected that the degree of coordination between 
different supply chain segments is dependent on who owns a brand name label and 
how the product is supplied into a label.  Developing and owning a brand name label 
results in both capital investments and transaction costs. Both physical and human 
capital investments are made in developing a brand and marketing it to consumers.  
If an alliance owns a brand they must pay listing fees to have their products stocked 
in retail stores.  Listing fees can be quite expensive and may limit the feasibility of 
marketing a brand name product through a retailer.  In order to avoid some of the 
high capital costs that are incurred with owning a brand name label, several of the 
alliances interviewed indicated that they chose instead to be the exclusive suppliers 
into retailer-owned branded beef programs.  This reduces the amount of capital that 
is required, as the retailer incurs the costs of developing and marketing the brand.      
For many alliances that are initiated by participants in the production sectors, 
avoiding brand ownership may be a more efficient alternative for three main 
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reasons.  Firstly, processors and retailers have more marketing expertise than those 
involved in cow-calf production and feedlots.  Secondly, give the size of the 
majority of processors and retailers they have greater access to large amounts of 
capital and can more easily absorb the capital costs involved with owning a brand 
name label.  In the interview with PM Beef Group, another reason for retailer 
ownership of a brand was that consumers are already familiar with the retailer’s 
reputation and brand name.  Lower costs are incurred in educating consumers about 
the quality of the product, as a retailer already has an established reputation and has 
an incentive to maintain a positive self image, thus lowering information costs for 
consumers.          
One of the biggest challenges identified by many of the alliances that either 
owned a brand name label or were the exclusive suppliers into a private label is 
maintaining a constant flow of product to meet year round demands.  If adequate 
volumes are not maintained on a consistent basis, consumer loyalty is undermined 
and retailers and other end users are not willing to work with an alliance.  At the 
same time, large volumes are often required in order to meet retailer and end user 
demands.  It can become extremely costly to organize supply chain participants and 
ensure adequate volumes of a differentiated product are available on an ongoing 
basis.   
The costs of organizing the supply of a differentiated product through an 
alliance arise because additional product cannot be easily procured through the spot 
market.  In a sense, a brand name is a specialized asset and the supply chain 
participant that owns a brand name label, or is the exclusive supplier to a brand 
name, faces the risk that both suppliers and buyers that they have aligned with will 
act opportunistically.  This is because of the high sunk investments involved in 
developing and maintaining a brand name label.  In the case of suppliers, cow-calf 
operators and feedlots could commit to providing a specific volume of product for 
the brand name program, but upon the sale they may demand a higher price for this 
product than was previously agreed.  Due to downstream supply commitments and 
the inability to procure the differentiated product through the current spot market 
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system, the program would be forced to pay a higher price and the overall 
profitability of the program would decrease.       
In order to reduce the risk of opportunistic behaviour by suppliers, increased 
transaction costs will be incurred to determine the reputation of suppliers, and 
establish and enforce the commitments made by cow-calf operators and/or feedlots.  
Search costs may be incurred in order to procure adequate supplies for the program.  
The transaction costs associated with guaranteeing adequate supplies for a brand 
name program can be high, whether or not the label is owned internally or an 
alliance is the exclusive supplier to a brand name program.  In order to minimize 
these costs, participants in a branded program may focus on several different 
measures to increase coordination and commitment.     
Whether they owned a brand name label or were an exclusive supplier into a 
label, the majority of alliances required an increased level of commitment from 
participants when they were compared to alliances that were not linked directly to a 
specific brand name label.  Commitment was ensured through the use of annual 
contracts and in some cases participants were required to commit capital to the 
program in the form of membership fees or the purchase of shares.  The extent to 
which contracts and membership fees are used to ensure commitment varies between 
the alliances.  Several used contracts that required cow-calf producers and feedlots 
to commit a certain volume of supply within a particular production period.  These 
types of agreements reduce the overall information costs, but can increase ongoing 
negotiation and enforcement costs as individual contracts must be negotiated and 
enforcement costs may arise if supply commitments are breached.  The ongoing 
negotiation costs may be minimal if contracts with cow-calf operators and feedlots 
are standardized and price is determined using a pre-specified grid-based pricing 
system.   
The commitment of capital by alliance participants to reduce the risk of 
opportunistic behaviour also varied considerably.  Some alliances required new 
members to pay entrance fees or to purchase shares that give them the right and 
obligation to deliver a certain number of animals each year.  For example, as shown 
in Table 6.2, U.S. Premium Beef requires participants to pay a membership fee, as 
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well as purchase or lease shares.  Similarly, Ranchers Renaissance requires a 
membership fee, with the fee tied to the number of cattle committed to the program.  
Further coordination and the commitment of capital to the program reduces the 
ongoing negotiation and enforcement costs incurred with the use of annual contracts, 
as the provision of capital by participants creates hostage assets.  If participants do 
not fulfill their obligations to supply a particular volume of animals into the 
program, they can be removed and their shares or membership fees will not be 
reimbursed.   
The creation of more formal alliances that require participants to purchase 
shares and/or pay membership fees appear to be used mainly in situations where the 
volume of supply being committed by individual participants is large and 
membership is closed.  In these situations, no further supply can be procured and it 
is essential to ensure the supply commitments made by existing members are 
fulfilled.  Both U.S. Premium Beef and Ranchers Renaissance require participants 
invest in the cooperative in order to ensure their commitment of a certain number of 
animals into the program on an annual basis.  Since these cooperatives are closed 
and no outside supplies of animals can be used, it is essential to ensure the 
commitment of members and eliminate any incentive for them to act 
opportunistically.  The commitment of hostage assets achieves this purpose.  The 
use of contracts is more successful when supply can be procured on an annual basis 
both from existing alliance members and new members.  In these cases, a lower 
level of commitment is required from individual participants and supply can be 
procured from a greater number of sources.   
It appears to make little difference, in terms of brand ownership, whether an 
informal structure that relies on contracts or a more formal structure using hostage 
assets is used to ensure commitment.  At the same time, ensuring commitment of 
supply chain participants to maintain a constant flow of product is necessary.  For 
the Nebraska Corn Fed Beef program, which owns its brand name label, supply 
commitment has been a very large issue.  When cash prices outside the alliance rose 
substantially in the U.S. due to the discovery of BSE in Canada in May 2003, much 
of the supply that had been committed to the program was withdrawn and sold in the 
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cash market.  The program had not required cow-calf operators or feedlots to sign 
contracts prior to this time.  As a result, the program was unable to meet the supply 
commitments they had made with end users and consequently lost customers.  
Nebraska Corn Fed Beef is now working on implementing a contract system 
to ensure an adequate level of commitment by program participants.  While NCFB 
requires the payment of annual fees to cover administration costs, it has not required 
participants to pay membership fees in order to ensure commitment.  The choice to 
move to a structure that requires participant to invest capital is expected to be 
dependent on a combination of factors that are in addition to who owns a brand 
name label.  These factors will be discussed in sections 6.5 and 6.6 and include 
issues surrounding information asymmetry and the number of buyers and sellers.           
Alliances have used one additional measure to ensure commitment of supply 
into the program and minimize the associated transaction costs.  A number of the 
alliances interviewed required that cow-calf operators retain ownership of their 
calves through to processing, or at least share ownership with feedlots.  In a sense, 
cow-calf operators are providing the alliance with an increased capital commitment, 
as they incur the additional feeding costs at the feedlot level and also the opportunity 
costs of having their capital tied up for a longer period of time.  Retained ownership 
does not create a hostage asset, as finished cattle can still be sold into other markets.  
However, upon entry into an alliance that requires retained ownership, a cow-calf 
operator forgoes the opportunity to use their capital elsewhere.  In order to recover 
their capital and make a return on it, they have an incentive to stay with the alliance, 
as opposed to exiting and having to incur search costs to locate another market for 
their cattle.  Cow-calf operators are also accepting the risk that they may receive 
lower returns than if they sold their calves, which in itself signals a certain degree of 
commitment.       
Retained ownership increases cow-calf operators’ exposure to opportunistic 
behaviour.  They have incurred a higher level of investment in producing a 
differentiated product and if they are unable to sell it through the previously agreed 
upon pricing method they could receive a discounted price in the spot market. 
However, the risk of buyers involved in a branded beef program acting 
 177
opportunistically is unlikely as they need to ensure adequate supplies and sellers will 
choose not to deal with them if they have a reputation of acting opportunistically.  
As a result, the expected transaction costs arising because of opportunistic behaviour 
when ownership of cattle is retained by cow-calf operators are expected to be 
minimal and are unlikely to have an impact on the method of coordination chosen.  
The value associated with retained ownership, in terms of reduced transactions, will 
be discussed in greater detail in section 6.6.1.           
Opportunistic behaviour by retailers and other end-users, when they are 
aligned with an alliance that owns their own brand or is the exclusive supplier into a 
private label, is also expected to be minimal.  There is a risk that retailers and other 
end-users could refuse to take delivery of the pre-agreed volume of product and 
instead demand a lower price.  However, it is unlikely that this will occur, as in 
order to satisfy their consumers they need a constant supply of the product that 
satisfies the guarantees they are providing to consumers and it is unlikely they would 
be able to easily obtain such product through the spot market system without 
incurring large information and search costs.  Supporting the reciprocal nature of 
this relationship is the fact that in the alliances interviewed, minimal transaction 
costs are incurred to ensure end-user commitment, with most of the alliances relying 
on trust and verbal contracts. 
 
6.4.2 Alignment with Packer-owned Programs 
In order to reduce the coordination and transaction costs associated with 
managing supply and ensuring an adequate flow of products on a consistent basis, 
some participants in the supply chain have taken an alternative approach.  Cow-calf 
operators and feedlots have aligned themselves with specific packers, focusing on 
the production of high-quality tender beef that fits into multiple existing commodity 
and branded beef programs that are owned by the processor.   
Typically under such an arrangement alliances are not required to ensure the 
supply of a particular volume of animals into the plant on an ongoing basis.  Instead, 
the processor and alliance establish an approximate average annual volume that the 
alliance will market through the processor.  Volume requirements are fairly flexible 
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given that the percentage of product that the processor procures from the alliance 
may only be a small portion of its total processing needs.  Many of these alliances 
indicated that the processor was willing to accept as much production as the alliance 
could produce. From Table 6.2, examples of alliances that are aligned with a specific 
processor and its beef programs include GeneNet, Decatur Beef Alliance, and the 
Beef Marketing Group.     
Normally under such an arrangement, program requirements are minimal, 
thus asset specific investments are minimal. These alliances are more focused on 
using grid-based pricing systems to convey information back along the supply chain 
and to increase the value received when high quality cattle are produced.  Based on 
carcass quality, and other requirements such as breed, cattle can be allocated into 
several different programs run by the processor.  The benefit is that it may be 
possible to allocate animals that do not fit one program into an alternative branded 
program.  Often alliances that are focused on marketing product through their own 
brand name or through an exclusive arrangement into a private label program face 
substantial discounts for cattle that do not meet the program requirements or when 
they have excess supply.   
The transaction costs incurred when marketing to packer-owned beef 
programs are reduced.  Lower information and negotiation costs are incurred by 
supply chain participants due to the lower level of asset specificity and reduced risk 
of opportunistic behaviour.  As the processor benefits from the increased flow of 
high quality product into its plant, it has less incentive to act opportunistically 
towards sellers.  The reciprocal nature of the relationship and mutual benefits 
received by both parties is important to the sustainability of this relationship. 
There is also less concern over ensuring adequate volumes of supply on an 
ongoing basis, consequently negotiation costs incurred to ensure supply 
commitments are reduced.  Typically, those alliances that direct production into 
multiple programs owned by a specific packer require little more than a verbal 
commitment or a feeding agreement when the cattle are put on feed.  Program fees 
usually range between $3 and $7 per head.  These fees are not typically used to 
ensure commitment instead they cover the costs of tagging cattle and measuring 
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quality.  No long-term commitment is required by either party, and typically cattle 
can be entered into the program at anytime prior to the time that they are processed. 
 
6.4.3 Price Uncertainty Associated with Quality Variability  
Grid-based pricing systems are a more efficient method to transfer detailed 
information on consumer demands back within the beef industry when attributes 
such as tenderness are being produced.  There is a reallocation of risk, as instead of 
the processor accepting the risk of quality variability, cow-calf operators and 
finishing feedlots are accepting the risk.  Cow-calf operators and feedlots have the 
greatest impact on the quality of cattle being produced and the incentive to produce 
high quality products is greater when payment is based on carcass quality.   
Price grids varied between the alliances analyzed.  More detailed grids 
allowed information costs to be reduced.  Cow-calf operators are provided with clear 
economic signals regarding the quality demanded by the target market.  The 
incentive to improve production in order to access the premiums available is 
increased due to the grid’s larger premiums and discounts.  From Table 6.2, 
alliances with more detailed grids include GeneNet and PM Beef Group.  When a 
more detailed grid is used, monitoring costs are lower than through a program that 
focuses on implementing more detailed production requirements and protocols.  
Monitoring costs do not have to be incurred to ensure compliance with program 
requirements, with the system focusing on the use of transparent economic signals to 
achieve the desired product quality.       
While information costs associated with the transfer of information to 
upstream supply chain participants is reduced with grid-based pricing systems, it is 
important to note that cow-calf operators and feedlots incur information costs when 
they are initially planning to participate in this system.  Costs are incurred in 
searching out information on grid-based pricing systems so that individuals can 
evaluate their expected performance on different pricing systems and to determine 
which alliance and grid-based pricing system best suits their production system.  
Most of the alliances interviewed used grid-based pricing systems, with the use of 
this type of pricing system increasing in the industry.  Therefore, it is likely that the 
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initial information costs incurred to reduce price uncertainty are low and are offset 
by the reduction in information costs that occurs when a grid-based pricing system is 
used. 
6.4.3.1. Producer Acceptance of Grid-based Pricing Systems 
On the whole, most of the individuals interviewed indicated that although the 
use of grid-based pricing systems is increasing, a portion of cow-calf producers are 
hesitant to price their cattle this way.  This may in part be due to the fact that while 
cow-calf operators can search out information on price and reduce price uncertainty, 
it is difficult for them to completely eliminate uncertainty as to the price they will 
receive.  Many cow-calf operators are risk averse individuals who prefer a live-
weight pricing system where the price they receive is more predictable and they are 
not exposed to the risk that they will receive price discounts upon cattle being 
processed.  The question arises as to how to encourage producer participation so that 
consumer demands can be met on a more consistent basis. The alliances interviewed 
focused on two methods to encourage participation.     
Firstly, alliances have focused on helping individuals manage their exposure 
to risk.  The base price that many alliances use, from which carcass quality 
premiums and discounts are added or subtracted, is established using an average 
weekly spot market price at the time of processing. Given the lag in time between 
when production decisions are made and returns are determined, it is difficult for 
producers to project what type of base price and net returns they can expect.  For PM 
Beef, the base price is determined by the futures market price for the expected 
month of delivery.  Producers have the option of locking in their price anytime up 
until cattle are processed.  This provides them with a greater ability to determine and 
control their expected net return.  Other alliances use similar techniques, assisting 
individuals in hedging their production on the futures market in order to lock in a 
base price or allowing producers to establish a forward contract with a specified base 
price.     
Nebraska Corn Fed Beef continues to allow individuals to sell their cattle on 
a live weight basis, while providing them with quality information that outlines how 
their cattle would have performed on the grid-based pricing system.  This has been 
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very successful in encouraging participation and providing producers with an insight 
into how their cattle perform prior to taking on the risk of pricing cattle through a 
grid.  Currently, over 75 percent of producers are pricing their cattle through the 
organization’s quality grid, while the remainder either forward contract their cattle 
or sell them on a live weight basis.   
In addition to assisting cow-calf operators in managing risk, alliances have 
focused on educating them about the other benefits of a grid-based pricing system.  
The majority of the alliances interviewed placed less emphasis on the ability of grids 
to provide premiums and more focus on the value of the information provided 
through grids.  Prior to the creation of these pricing systems, access to information 
on the quality of production was limited.  Those individuals that participate in 
alliances with grid-based pricing systems now have access to information on the 
quality of their production and, as a result, can make changes to improve quality and 
be more competitive.   
One view was that, with the increasing use of grid-based pricing systems, a 
two-tiered market is slowly developing, with higher prices being received for cattle 
purchased on a grid-based pricing system (Weibert, 2004).  In the cash market 
buyers are taking on the risk that quality will be low and they are passing that risk 
onto feedlots and cow-calf operators through lower prices.  Processors and other 
buyers are paying for the information on product quality made available through the 
grid, to which they do not have access when using live weight pricing mechanisms.   
Given the potential emergence of a two-tiered market for cattle, the value of 
the information that can be obtained through a grid-based pricing system is expected 
to increase.  In order to remain competitive and gain access to premium prices, 
individuals need information on the quality of their production and will place a 
greater value on this information if, in its absence, they are subject to large discounts 
in the spot market.  In many of the alliances interviewed, individuals whose cattle 
did not perform well left after the first year and used the information obtained on the 
quality of their production to make the changes to their production processes.  They 
then returned to the alliance a few years later in order to gain access to premiums 
through the grid.  Educating participants on the changing industry structure and the 
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value of quality information assists in encouraging participation.  Joining an alliance 
aids in ensuring long-term competitiveness by increasing cow-calf operators and 
feedlots access to information and their ability to access markets with higher prices. 
6.4.3.2. Grid-based Pricing and Alliances 
The question arises as to why alliances are necessary if a grid-based system 
can be used between processors and production sectors to improve information flow 
and increase the quality of cattle.  From the interviews, three main reasons became 
apparent.  Firstly, alliances work to coordinate the cow-calf sector with the rest of 
the industry.  Alliances align cow-calf operators with feedlots and processors 
through standardized methods.  Instead of negotiating multiple separate transactions 
with individuals, an alliance aligns cow-calf producers with specific feedlots and 
from there coordinates transactions with a processor.  Negotiations between the 
different supply chain participants are limited and the associated costs are reduced, 
with the alliance negotiating on behalf of multiple individuals for a large volume of 
cattle.  Upon processing, the alliance administers the transfer of information back 
along the supply chain.  Without the standardized coordination of transactions along 
the supply chain, it is costly to link the large number of cow-calf operators, with 
small numbers of cattle, to the rest of the supply chain and improve coordination.          
 Monitoring costs are also reduced under an alliance structure.  Grid-based 
pricing systems may result in monitoring costs for producers in ensuring that 
processors do not falsify carcass grades to pay lower prices.  Under an alliance, 
these monitoring costs are reduced because a processor has an incentive to maintain 
a positive relationship with the alliance given the benefits it receives from having a 
more consistent flow of high quality product into its processing plants.  Also, the 
alliance transacts with a processor on a more frequent basis than would individuals.  
Consequently, there is a greater reliance on trust to ensure proper carcass grading, 
and monitoring costs are minimal. 
 
6.4.4 Information Asymmetry 
The alliances branded experience, credence, and search attributes.  Program 
requirements and certification methods have been implemented to ensure that the 
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production of different credence attributes can be guaranteed to downstream 
customers.  Three of the alliances focused on the production of natural beef with no 
hormones or antibiotics.  In addition to providing natural beef, Highland Premium 
Beef Alliance also brands a portion of their product with the guarantee that the beef 
was raised in Alberta.  Nebraska Corn Fed Beef guarantees that product is corn fed 
and raised in Nebraska.  PM Beef provides consumers with a guarantee that the 
source and process for all of its beef can be verified.  With the exception of 
Nebraska Corn Fed Beef, all of the alliances guaranteeing credence attributes rely on 
affidavits and third-party certification to ensure compliance and reduce the problems 
associated with information asymmetry.  Typically the third party certification 
systems require alliances to submit regular records.  Random audits are performed 
throughout the supply chain on an ongoing basis.       
Nebraska Corn Fed Beef verifies the production of its credence attributes 
through an internal certification and audit process.  Participants in the alliance are 
required to following the Beef Quality Assurance program, which works to reduce 
quality and consistency problems through the implementation of specific feed, 
health, and management protocols. Participants are also required to keep detailed 
and accurate production records and are subject to random internal audits on an 
ongoing basis.   
The systems used to guarantee the production of experience and search 
attributes, namely tenderness and leanness, vary significantly.  Some alliances have 
implemented detailed production and management protocols to reduce overall 
variability and increase the production of tenderness and/or leanness attributes.  The 
more detailed protocols become, the more costly it is for individuals to comply with 
them.  As a result, the incentives to cheat increases because attributes are not easily 
detected prior to consumption and information asymmetries exist.  In order to reduce 
information asymmetries and ensure compliance, alliances with detailed program 
requirements have often implemented internal certification and audit systems.    
In some cases, the move from a more informal alliance to a formal new 
generation cooperative structure has also facilitated compliance with more detailed 
program requirements.  For example, Ranchers Renaissance and other new 
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generation cooperatives increase the incentive to comply with program 
requirements, as participants have committed capital to the cooperative that is non-
refundable.  Consequently, the monitoring costs incurred to ensure compliance with 
more detailed program requirements are lower when a more formal alliance structure 
is chosen.  New generation cooperatives provide for greater control and the closer 
alignment of incentives. 
 
6.4.5 Number of Buyers and Sellers 
Tighter program specifications reduce the number of buyers and sellers due 
to the transaction specific quality of the product and, as a result, closer coordination 
is necessary to ensure adequate supplies.  For example, Laura’s Lean Beef requires 
that cattle are of an exotic breed and have been raised with no hormones or 
antibiotics.  Requiring cattle to be both of an exotic breed and natural places 
significant limits on the number of cattle that are eligible to be marketed through the 
program and it is very difficult to procure adequate volumes through the regular 
market system.   
From the buyer’s perspective, significant search costs are incurred to procure 
adequate volumes of lean and natural cattle.  To ensure adequate volumes of these 
cattle, negotiation costs are also incurred, with contracts being used to ensure the 
commitment of sellers. Sellers are also concerned with ensuring market access due 
to the specialized nature of the product they are selling and the limited number of 
buyers that are willing to pay a premium for that product.  Consequently, they will 
incur search and information costs in order to find buyers and determine their 
reputations.  The increased transaction costs are expected to result in closer vertical 
coordination.     
If both the numbers of buyers and sellers for a specialized product are small, 
a mutually beneficial relationship exists and the risk of opportunistic behaviour by 
either party is low.  For example, Highland Premium Alberta Beef has limited access 
to alternative suppliers that can fulfill their needs, and sellers also have limited 
access to alternate markets to sell their natural cattle.  This creates a mutually 
dependent relationship and a low risk that either party will break commitments.  A 
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similar situation exists for other alliances that operate in niche markets with a small 
number of buyers and sellers.  In these situations, it appears that transaction costs are 
minimized and, while increased coordination may be required to ensure the 
production of particular attributes, a small number of buyers and sellers does not 
necessitate increased coordination.    
The situation changes as an increasing number of sellers are available when a 
differentiated product is being produced.  With many of the programs that are 
producing tenderness, such as GeneNet and PM Beef Group, there are a larger 
number of cow-calf operators and feedlots available.  At the same time there are few 
buyers in the market due to industry concentration in the processing and retailer 
sectors.  Alliances such as PM Beef Group, which are focused on providing a high 
level of consistency and, as a result, have detailed program requirements that 
increase their costs, will be subject to a greater risk of opportunistic behaviour by 
buyers.  Based on the alliance structures present in the industry, it appears that 
although there is an increased risk of opportunistic behaviour in this situation it does 
not affect the type of alliance structure chosen.  This may be a result of the fact that 
often a program’s guarantees are dependent on the more detailed production 
specifications.  For example, PM Beef Group guarantees its beef is produced under 
its Ranch to Retail verified production system.  As a result, there is no incentive for 
them to act opportunistically given that it would be difficult for them to procure 
high-quality, tender process verified cattle from alternative sources, and thus a 
mutually dependent relationship exists. 
 
6.4.6 Transaction Frequency 
 Discussion in the previous chapters indicated that a significant challenge in 
coordinating the beef industry was the differences in the frequency of transactions 
between supply chain participants.  While transactions between other sectors of the 
beef industry occur on a more frequent basis, cow-calf operators typically market 
cattle in one or two transactions per year.  The focus of most of the alliances is to 
improve coordination between cow-calf operators and the rest of the supply chain by 
acting as a facilitator.  As alliances transact with all segments in the supply chain on 
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a more frequent basis it aids in creating trust-based relationships and improving the 
flow of information to cow-calf operators. Using alliances to overcome the 
challenges associated with less frequent transactions reduces transaction costs 
resulting from asset specificity and transaction uncertainty and, as a result, increases 
the incentives of cow-calf operators to participate in alliances and produce 
differentiated beef products.  Whether or not an informal or formal alliance is 
chosen to overcome the challenges associated with less frequent transactions does 
not seem to matter.  The choice between alliance structures appears to be more 
dependent on the premium structure, degree of asset specificity, brand ownership 
structure, and amount of transaction uncertainty associated with producing different 
beef products.   
 
6.5 Critical Success Factors and Challenges for Alliances 
6.5.1 Creating Value Along the Supply Chain  
The previous section provided insights from the alliances interviewed on the 
importance of the different transaction characteristics outlined in the predictive 
model.  The following section examines additional factors that have an impact on 
improved supply chain coordination.    
   One of the most significant challenges that many of the individuals 
interviewed identified was creating value along the entire supply chain.  In order to 
encourage participation in the alliance, the benefits of participation have to be 
greater than the associated costs.  The production of differentiated attributes can 
increase transaction costs and production costs.  Changes to existing production and 
processing practices may also create inefficiencies that do not exist in the 
commodity oriented system.  These inefficiencies are often associated with the 
restricted use of different technologies, such as hormones and antibiotics, and lower 
volumes that flow through the supply chain when differentiated products are 
produced.   
 With many niche market products that have high production and processing 
costs, the price charged to consumers is significantly higher than the price of 
commodity oriented beef products. Only a small segment of consumers are willing 
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to accept the large price differential.  Consequently, the market size for many 
products is limited and the potential to create value and ensure that increased 
transaction and operation costs are covered within each segment of the supply chain 
is limited.      
In a sense, the market is in disequilibrium.  Some alliances that are currently 
operating are unable to ensure that the benefits received by all supply chain 
segments are greater than the costs incurred by these segments.  In the long run, it is 
likely that these alliances will move in one of three directions.  Firstly, they may 
choose to restructure to ensure value is distributed along the supply chain based on 
the increased costs incurred by each sector.  Secondly, when overall costs are greater 
than benefits, alliances may restructure their existing focus and program 
requirements to better meet consumer demands.  Finally, if they are unable to 
restructure it is likely these alliances will disband in the long run, with participants 
exiting the alliance.   
One alliance had examined branding beef based on an enhanced food safety 
program implemented throughout the production process (Borck, 2004).  However, 
while there is a demand for enhanced food safety, consumers’ willingness to pay a 
premium appeared to be limited.  As a result, it is unlikely that the alliance would be 
able to recoup the increased production and transaction costs.  Similarly, the 
emergence of process and source verification systems is likely to increase in the 
future in order to guarantee other attributes.  However, it is unclear whether these 
attributes alone would command a price premium.  This may be because consumers 
are coming to expect verification of all beef products consumed, as part of ensuring 
the quality guarantees provided and food safety.            
While the market may be in disequilibrium, short-term market fluctuations 
may arise where costs for some participants may exceed the increase in value 
received through an alliance.  Getting participants to accept that in the short term 
there may be periods where the price received through the alliance is lower than in 
the cash market has been a priority for many of the alliances.  Over the long run, it is 
important that the benefits exceed the costs.  It is necessary that participants in an 
alliance understand whether the market is in short run disequilibrium or a structural 
 188
failure exists and the alliance is not viable in the long run.  Newer alliances faced 
greater uncertainty as how to manage market fluctuations and to understand whether 
costs exceeded benefits over the short and long run.  It appears that those alliances 
where the costs exceed the benefits in the long run will exit from the industry, while 
those that face short-term fluctuations will be able to overcome the situation and 
operate in the long run.          
If in the short run disequilibrium exists, it is necessary that participants in an 
alliance understand and have a long-term focus and commitment to the program.  As 
exit in the short term is not beneficial to participants, it will result in the failure of 
the alliance.  At the same time, the alliance must be flexible and facilitate 
communication to ensure that all participants are represented and to adapt the 
alliance if a long-run structural problem becomes apparent. 
 
6.5.2 Marketing the Entire Carcass 
Alliances also face a challenge in selling the whole carcass at a premium in 
order to offset the increased costs associated with producing differentiated beef 
products.  In general, only a portion of the carcass can be sold at a premium.  Some 
cuts are not as popular with customers and, as a result, their willingness to pay a 
premium for these cuts is lower.  Therefore, in order to recoup increased costs, 
larger premiums must be charged on a small portion of the carcass, while lower or 
no premiums are available for the rest of the carcass.     
Being able to market an adequate portion of the carcass at a premium to 
offset increased costs has been identified by many alliances as a challenge.  It is 
especially important for those alliances that market product into their own brand 
name label or an exclusive private label.  Typically they have higher average costs 
than alliances that market products into multiple processor-owned brand programs.  
It is expected that their transaction costs will also be higher given the greater need to 
ensure commitment of supply chain participants in order to guarantee a consistent 
flow of product.  Alliances that market product into multiple processor-owned brand 
programs typically incur a lower level of transaction costs associated with ensuring 
participants’ commitment, as it is not as necessary to maintain a consistent and 
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constant supply of product.  Alliances that market product into multiple brand 
programs also have an advantage because they are typically able to market product 
into multiple brands and sell a larger portion of the carcass at a premium.   
In order to offset the costs, several alternative approaches have been used to 
improve the marketability of the carcass.  Firstly, alliances such as GeneNet, Cow 
Camp Beef Alliance, and the Beef Marketing Group have chosen to market product 
into multiple brand name labels rather than developing their own brand or an 
exclusive supply relationship with a private label.  This lowers their average 
production and transaction costs.  It also increases the available markets in which to 
sell different portions of the carcass at a premium and reduces the discounts that are 
often incurred by programs that have access to few alternative markets.   
Alternatively, NCFB has chosen to establish their own brand name label, but 
purchases back from the processor only those cuts of meat that can be sold at a 
premium.  The processor sells the cuts back to the alliance with a processing margin 
added back into the price.  The remainder of the carcasses or portions of the carcass 
are sold through the processor’s branded and commodity based programs using a 
grid pricing system.  While this method does not aid in increasing the portion of the 
carcass that can be sold at a premium through the brand name label, it does enable 
the alliance to have access to an alternative market to sell other product.  This may 
reduce the discounts these types of alliances typically face in selling the remainder 
of the carcass and assists in increasing value along the supply chain.      
Other programs have worked to increase the percentage of the carcass that is 
sold at a premium through the brand name label.  Research and development has 
been done to produce alternative value-added products from those cuts of meat that 
are otherwise difficult to sell at a premium.  For example, Laura’s Lean Beef has 
expanded into the production of pre-cooked products, frozen patties, and other 
convenience oriented products. Ranchers Renaissance has taken a different approach 
and brands the whole beef case in the retail stores to which it sells.  They are able to 
obtain a large premium for their tender-verified products, while also obtaining a 
smaller premium for those products that are not tender-verified but guaranteed to be 
consistent and process verified.   
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Many alliances have focused on selling to multiple end-users to increase the 
percentage of the carcass sold at a premium.  The demand for specific beef cuts for 
many end-users in the service sector is limited to only the most popular cuts.  
Therefore, focusing solely on this market reduces the percentage of the carcass that 
can be sold at a premium.  Consequently, alliances have focused on selling into 
multiple retail and end-user markets and increase the percentage of the carcass that 
can be sold at a premium. 
 
6.5.3 Objectives of Cow-calf Operators 
 Chapter 5 investigated the effect of different transaction characteristics on 
the willingness of cow-calf operators to participate in alliances and produce 
differentiated cattle.  The chapter did not assess the effect of the characteristics of a 
producer’s operation on their decision to participate in an alliance.  Cow-calf 
producer’s operations are often diversified, with beef production being only a 
portion of their total farm enterprise.  In many situations they are involved in beef 
production as a method to utilize existing grass and forage resources that are 
unsuited to crop production, with beef production not being the primary source of 
income for the overall farm operation.   
 It is expected that producers are rational profit maximizers, who seek to 
maximize the net returns of their farm enterprise.  As a result, it would appear that 
even when beef production is not their primary source of income they would want to 
increase quality and participate in an alliance in order to gain access to differentiated 
markets that have higher returns.  At the same time, because producers are often 
managing multiple operations, and have limited access to both human and capital 
resources, the additional gain from participating in an alliance needs to outweigh the 
costs, including the opportunity costs of diverting human and capital resources from 
other farm enterprises.  The reallocation of human and capital resources into beef 
production may actually result in a decrease in net returns and, as a result, less focus 
may be placed on improving quality and making the changes required to produce 
differentiated beef products through an alliance.  It is expected that as the portion of 
the operation that is allocated to beef production decreases it is less likely that 
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human and capital resources will be reallocated to improve quality and differentiate 
the beef cattle produced.  Whereas, those operations that are more specialized in 
beef production will have a greater incentive to allocate the increased human and 
capital resources that are often required when participating in an alliance and 
maximize overall net returns.           
   If many cow-calf operators are involved in beef production as a method to 
utilize existing forage resources, average herd size is expected to remain small due 
to the limited additional resources that can be reallocated from other aspects of their 
farm operation into beef production.  Alliances have struggled to encourage 
participation by these types of producers, who are not as focused on improving 
quality and becoming more competitive in the beef industry.  The question arises as 
to how to encourage participation in alliances when cow-calf operators’ objectives 
do not always match those held by the rest of the industry.  Educating individuals 
about the benefits that can be derived from participation in an alliance, aside from 
the premiums received, is one approach to encouraging greater participation in 
alliances.   
 For many producers, their expertise does not lie in the marketing of beef 
cattle.  Alliances can reduce an individual’s marketing costs, as the alliance does the 
marketing.  This allows cow-calf operators to concentrate on the production of beef 
cattle and their other farm operations, while maximizing the returns they receive.  
They spend less time and incur lower costs in searching out markets and negotiating 
transactions, with the alliance performing and specializing in these functions.  Other 
benefits derived from participation in an alliance were previously discussed in 
Section 6.3.3 and could also be outlined to potential alliance participants in order to 
encourage increased participation.  In addition, in Section 6.4.3.1 the creation of a 
two-tiered market was discussed.  As this system emerges, the value of the benefits 
received is expected to increase, which may encourage further participation from 
mixed farm operations producing beef cattle. 
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6.5.4 Managing Product Flow 
 The management of product flow throughout the supply chain has been 
identified as a significant challenge for several reasons.  Firstly, in order to ensure 
supply on an ongoing basis, many alliances that own their own brand name label or 
have an exclusive relationship with a retailer-owned label, have tried to encourage 
producers to adjust their calving periods.  For example, NCFB and several other 
alliances encourage fall calving rather than the more common practice of calving 
cows in the spring.  This provides a more consistent flow of finished cattle on a year 
round basis, but its acceptance at the cow-calf operator level has been limited due to 
increased costs in terms of the human and capital resources required.  On mixed 
farm operations, producers may prefer to complete calving prior to seeding and/or 
harvesting crops.  Additional labour would be needed if calving occurred at the same 
time as either seeding or harvesting and result in increased costs to the producer.  
Calving later in the year also requires the maintenance of calves into the winter, 
which can result in higher costs and lost revenues due to lower rates of gain in areas 
where winters are harsh.  
Encouraging producers to adopt alternative calving patterns requires 
offsetting the increased costs incurred.  Nebraska Corn Fed Beef pays premiums for 
cattle that will be finished in periods of the year where product supplies are typically 
lower.  Producers entering into the program are required to commit cattle at specific 
time periods, with higher premiums for those periods where supply is low.  
Although this has encouraged some cow-calf operators to alter their calving period, 
success with mixed farm operations is lower.  In situations where acceptance has 
been low, programs have chosen alternate measures to manage supply.         
Some programs, such as Ranchers Renaissance and U.S. Premium Beef, 
have worked to pull supplies from different regions, where due to climatic 
differences average calving and finishing times vary and result in a more consistent 
flow of supply through the alliance.  Supply flow is also managed through grazing 
programs and other feeding regimes that adjust the finishing times of cattle to better 
suit demand.  Alliances that supply into multiple packer-owned programs, and do 
not own their own label or exclusively supply into a retailer-owned label, are not 
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required to maintain as consistent a flow of animals into the processor and thus are 
less focused on encouraging producers to make changes to their existing production 
schedule.  Examples of such programs include Cow Camp Beef Alliance, GeneNet, 
and Decatur Beef Alliance.  Producers are more likely to participate in these types of 
alliances if they operate mixed farms and do not wish to change their production 
schedule.             
The second challenge related to managing product flow is with respect to the 
relationship between processors and alliances.  Processors have looked to alliances 
as a method of securing adequate flows of both specialized inputs and commodity 
inputs.  Alliances lower the information and search costs associated with procuring 
cattle and ensuring adequate supplies are available to fulfill the requirements of 
different branded programs.  In turn, processors are able to make supply 
commitments to downstream end users when adequate supplies of inputs are 
available.  In some circumstances, alliances have been used as a method to ensure a 
more consistent and adequate flow of cattle into the plant without a direct focus on 
increasing supplies into their branded programs.  Given the increasing size of 
processing plants and substantial decrease in profitability that occurs if they do not 
operate at capacity, ensuring a portion of cattle supplies through the use of alliances 
is beneficial.   
The Beef Marketing Group (BMG) is an example of an alliance that was 
formed specifically to provide an IBP plant in eastern Kansas with an ongoing base 
supply of cattle, with the plant having previously struggled to obtain the volumes it 
required on a consistent basis.  In exchange for the supply of cattle, IBP has 
developed a preferential pricing agreement with the alliance.  A legal challenge to 
this relationship from feed yards and the U.S. government in the late 1990s alleged 
that the Beef Marketing Group received unfair preferential treatment.  The lawsuit 
was defeated, but the opposition of some beef industry participants to such an 
arrangement is important to mention, as such actions could impact the formation of 
alliances and degree of supply chain coordination in the beef industry in the future.      
Whether an alliance is ensuring supplies or working to coordinate the 
production of a differentiated beef product, opposition to such arrangements has 
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surfaced.  This opposition arises mainly because of concerns that alliances result in 
reduced competition and a movement away from the spot market.  Essentially, there 
is opposition to the emergence of a two-tiered market where cattle that are sold in 
the spot market may be discounted.  This opposition has resulted in a push for 
regulatory intervention and lawsuits against organizations involved in closer vertical 
alliances, with arrangements including exclusive pricing agreements, supply 
contracts, or custom feeding of cattle by a processor.      
At the Alberta Cattle Feeders Association’s 2004 annual meeting a motion 
was passed that would limit the number of cattle that packers could own to 10% of 
their monthly kills.  This comes just after a recent U.S. case involving Tyson Foods 
in which a jury recommended $1.28 billion be awarded to cattle producers to 
compensate for Tyson Foods allegedly manipulating cattle prices by controlling 
approximately 1/3 of the cattle that they processed.  The decision against Tyson 
Foods was subsequently overturned, but it is important to discuss as both situations 
focus on limiting processor control.  The importance of the issue is that while 
packers may not always directly own cattle, many of the arrangements used to 
improve coordination and produce differentiated products to meet consumer 
demands may be limited in the future due to regulatory intervention.  Warren 
Weibert, of the Decatur Beef Alliance, has struggled to establish an exclusive 
pricing agreement with Excel.  This could increase the value received by alliance 
participants and overall alliance participation, but Excel appears to be hesitant to 
enter into an arrangement as a result of the increased opposition and the associated 
lawsuits.     
Whether improved coordination occurs to increase the production of 
differentiated beef products and/or maintain an adequate flow of product throughout 
the supply chain it appears that the industry is moving in this direction.  With the 
emergence of a two-tiered market system, where cattle are sold either through the 
spot market or by methods of closer coordination, it is expected that individuals in 
the spot market will be penalized for the reasons discussed in Section 6.4.3.1.  At the 
same time, regulatory intervention to prevent such a situation will disrupt the market 
and may limit the ability of industry participants to improve coordination and 
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respond to consumer demands.  The opposition to increased coordination also brings 
into question how new generation cooperatives will be managed.  U.S. Premium 
Beef is a producer-owned cooperative that is the majority owner of the fourth largest 
processor National Beef. While opposition to such cooperatives has not currently 
occurred to any great extent, they are in a sense a vertically integrated company that 
limits market access and results in preferential treatment.  If regulatory intervention 
limits packer-ownership and control of supplies, presumably these operations will 
also be affected. 
 
6.5.5 Concentration in the Processing and Retailer Sectors 
The processing and retailing sectors in Canada are even more concentrated 
than those in the U.S. and the degree of concentration is expected to increase in the 
future.  This may affect the development of alliances in two ways.  First, it has been 
found in the U.S. that after a processor or retailer has aligned itself with a few 
programs, they typically do not want to align with themselves with any additional 
alliances.  This reluctance results from increased management costs, including the 
opportunity cost of human and capital resources required to organize additional 
programs, administer several different grid-based pricing systems, and segregating 
processing runs.  In addition, retailers are reluctant to run more than one or two 
branded programs in their stores.  Retailers are more likely to develop a single brand 
name label and have a limited number of supply chain relationships to procure 
product for that label.   
The high degree of concentration in the processing and retailing sector, 
combined with their limited willingness to adopt multiple branded programs, will 
affect how alliances develop in the future.  Alliances will likely be required to 
supply substantial volumes of cattle in order to fulfill the requirements of branded 
programs.  This was not a problem for many of the existing alliances interviewed, as 
when they were initiated very few similar programs were in existence and 
processors and/or retailers were willing to work with them even if they only 
marketed small volumes of cattle initially.  These alliances were able to grow slowly 
to their current size.  However, as more alliances have emerged, and concentration 
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in the processing and retailing sectors continues to increase, it is less likely that they 
will be willing to work with alliances that supply small volumes of cattle at the 
outset.  At the same time, supplying large volumes of cattle is less feasible for new 
alliances.   An inability of new alliances to start small and expand slowly may be a 
limiting factor in the number of new alliances that emerge within the Canadian 
industry in the future.   
 Within the U.S. industry, participants have also had the alternative of 
creating alliances with mid-size processors and retailers.  Mid-size processors and 
retailers benefit, as they are able to create a differentiated value-added market where 
they do not have to compete with their larger competitors based on price.  Alliances 
benefit, as typically they do not have to supply the substantial volumes of cattle that 
are required by larger processors and retailers.  This allows them to grow and 
develop more slowly.  PM Beef Group and NCFB are two alliances in the U.S. that 
have created relationships with mid-size processors and/or retailers.  They have been 
very successful, as they have been able to establish themselves on a smaller scale 
and ensure an adequate supply flow prior to increasing the volumes they supply into 
processor-owned or private label programs. In addition, those alliances with their 
own brand name typically are smaller.  Large processors are not willing to work 
with them due to the decrease in their operational efficiency associated with 
segregating small volumes of production.  Similarly, large retailers are less willing 
to market small volumes of product.   
 In Canada, very few mid-size processors or retailers exist.  The industry is 
oligopolistic, with a few large firms dominating both sectors.  This could limit the 
types of alliances that emerge.  New alliances may choose not to have their own 
brand name given the substantial costs associated with developing and marketing a 
label.  In addition, maintaining the substantial volume of cattle that would be 
required under such a structure results in high transaction costs.  In order to 
minimize marketing and transaction costs, alliances in the Canadian beef industry 
are more likely to focus on marketing into existing processor-owned or private label 
branded programs.  Less exclusive relationships where multiple alliances supply into 
packer-owned programs or private label retailer pro
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pricing arrangement and more general program requirements, may also occur.  This 
would reduce overall complexity and, as a result, possibly increase the acceptance of 
additional alliances that supply lower volumes of cattle. 
 
6.6 Additional Opportunities to Improve Coordination 
 Aside from increased supply chain coordination through the use of contracts 
and alliances, additional opportunities exist to improve coordination and reduce the 
transaction costs incurred by supply chain participants when producing 
differentiated beef products.  The following section will briefly outline these 
opportunities and how they facilitate improved coordination in the beef industry. 
 
6.6.1 Retained Ownership of Cattle by Cow-calf Operators 
 Most of the alliances interviewed either required or strongly encouraged 
cow-calf operators to retain ownership of cattle throughout production until they 
were processed.  Retained ownership can affect the degree of coordination required 
when providing differentiated beef products.  When producers retain ownership of 
cattle, transactions at the cow-calf operator/feedlot interface change and the feedlot 
becomes a “hotel” where cattle are fed on a custom basis.  Cow-calf operators 
transact directly with processor.  While an alliance typically facilitates the 
interaction between cow-calf operators and the processor, the direct interaction 
between these two parties may increase the incentive for cow-calf operators to 
produce high-quality cattle with specific attributes.  The returns to cow-calf 
operators become directly dependent on the finished quality of cattle.     
 The better alignment of incentives should result in lower transaction costs 
associated with determining the reputation of sellers and monitoring production in 
order to ensure compliance with program requirements.  At the same, transaction 
costs are also reduced as information, in the form of data and economic price 
signals, is transferred directly from the processor to the producer.  This creates a 
more transparent flow of information to guide cow-calf operator’s production 
decisions.  It is unclear whether negotiation costs are reduced.  While pricing 
arrangements are only negotiated between producers and processors when 
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ownership is retained, a flat rate custom feeding fee must be negotiated between 
cow-calf operators and feedlots.  It is expected that the negotiation costs associated 
with a custom feeding fee are minimal, as a result of it being standardized.    
 Retained ownership may also increase the value received by cow-calf 
operators.  Instead of receiving premiums by selling their calves through an alliance 
to a feedlot, they are able to capture all of the premiums that are paid upon cattle 
being processed.  Whether or not the increase in premiums received will offset the 
opportunity costs associated with retaining ownership will vary depending on each 
cow-calf operator’s situation.  It is likely that producers who operate mixed farms 
will be less willing to retain ownership, as they would have to use capital resources 
allocated for other farm enterprises to pay feeding charges.  They may also depend 
on the revenue derived from the sale of their calves to finance other enterprises and 
they would not have access to this capital until the sale of finished cattle.    
In order to encourage smaller cow-calf operators to retain ownership, other 
alternatives have been provided, such as feedlots partnering and sharing ownership 
of an operator’s cattle through to processing.  GeneNet, PM Beef Group, Cow Camp 
Beef Alliance, and several other alliances allow cow-calf operators to partner with 
feedlots and share ownership.  This reduces the capital that producers are required to 
commit, while still maintaining the more direct link between a producer’s returns 
and the finished quality.  For example, NCFB, Laura’s Lean Beef, and Highland 
Premium Alberta Beef allow calves to be purchased by feedlots.  Alliances that 
allowed cow-calf operators to partner with feedlots or sell their calves to feedlots, 
said that initially providing cow-calf operators with these options often encourages 
them to retain ownership over the long run.  When cow-calf operators receive 
information on the quality of cattle produced and the premiums paid at the feedlot 
level they are often encouraged to increase their involvement in order to capture the 
potential premiums available from retained ownership. 
 
6.6.2 Certification Institutions 
For many of the credence attributes being produced, a third party that verifies 
production and processing methods and provides certification is often necessary.  
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Highland Premium Alberta Beef and Tee Creek Beef are both Canadian-based 
alliances that produce natural beef.  When interviewed, both of these alliances 
indicated that obtaining third-party certification for their product has been a 
significant challenge, as currently there is no standardized institution to provide such 
certification in Canada.  Both of the alliances approached the Canadian Food 
Inspection Agency and have developed a system, but this took a substantial amount 
of time and effort to develop.  As the Canadian beef industry continues to develop 
and produce increased numbers of differentiated products, it needs to recognize the 
importance and facilitate the provision of third party certification institutions.  These 
institutions reduce the monitoring costs that would otherwise be incurred through 
internal auditing.  Third party certification institutions are expected to provide a 
more standardized and simplified certification process that reduces the amount of 
effort and coordination required to monitor supply chain participants. 
 
6.6.3 Electronic Identification and Computer Vision Scanning Systems 
 Electronic identification has the potential to improve traceability and verify 
the source of individual animals in the beef industry.  The computer vision scanning 
systems (CVS) and data management systems used with electronic identification 
also potentially facilitate the transfer of substantial amounts of information 
regarding the quality of individual animals.  Information can be gathered on the 
production and processing methods used, live animal quality, and carcass quality.  In 
addition, electronic identification enables cattle to be mixed with other cattle in 
feedlots and at processing plants, as electronic identification tags can link an 
individual animal with a specific owner.  This may enable cow-calf operators with a 
small number of cattle to retain ownership.  Previously, as cattle had to be 
maintained in separate lots through the feeding process it was more difficult for 
small cow-calf operators to retain ownership because many feedlots preferred larger 
lots of animals for operational efficiency.     
The Decatur Beef Alliance uses electronic identification to sort and 
commingle cattle at the feedlot level.  The alliance uses the Micro Beef Technology 
ACCU-TRACTM Electronic Cattle Management System, which measures and 
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manages individual animals using CVS, in order to optimize finishing quality.  
Every animal in the alliance is measured with the ultrasound technology, which 
evaluates carcass quality characteristics of the live animal.   Key to the success of 
the system is the use of electronic identification that can link a specific animal back 
to its owner.  When the cattle are sorted based on carcass quality characteristics they 
are commingled into mixed ownership lots.  Cattle can then be sold when they reach 
the point at which they will maximize returns.  Previously, cattle from each owner 
had to remain in separate lots, as it was too difficult to manage the record keeping 
associated with mixed ownership lots.  Cattle were managed based on the average 
finishing time of cattle within the lot rather than on an individual animal basis.  In 
the Decatur alliance, a producer’s cattle can be sold over several different periods, 
while the associated record management costs are reduced through the use of 
electronic identification tags.    
Electronic identification tags can also be used in conjunction with other 
systems that produce credence attributes where it is necessary to implement a 
traceability system to ensure compliance with program requirements.  Information 
on individual animals and the production and management processes that have been 
used is entered into a database, with information being tied to an animal’s electronic 
identification tag.  The multiple uses of electronic identification tags can potentially 
be beneficial in improving coordination and transferring information throughout the 
supply chain.  The adoption of this technology is currently limited.  This may be 
because cow-calf operators must incur the costs of purchasing the tags and, unless 
they retain ownership of calves, they do not necessarily receive any benefits or 
information due to the low level of coordination that currently exists between cow-
calf operators and the rest of the supply chain.  Consequently, the adoption of 
electronic identification tags by cow-calf operators has been minimal.  The use of 
electronic identification technology has also been limited as a result of the fact that 
currently very few feedlots and processors have implemented the scanning 
technologies and associated databases, which are required in order to read and use 
electronic identification tags.  This equipment can be costly and, as a result, industry 
segments have been slow to implement it.  
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The mandatory tagging program in Canada has indicated that in the near 
future it will adopt the use of electronic identification tags (Tollens, 2004).  The 
adoption of electronic identification tags by the mandatory tagging program is 
expected to reduce the costs of tags for cow-calf operators and the adoption of 
scanning technologies throughout the supply chain would occur in order to verify 
source along the supply chain.  While the goal of the Canadian Cattle Identification 
Agency (CCIA) is to verify source, their system has the potential to be tied into 
database systems that gather production and quality information for supply chain 
participants.  This will be discussed further in the next section. 
 
6.6.4 Information Management Systems 
 Information management systems that are used in conjunction with 
individual animal identification have the potential to improve the transfer of 
information on quality and on the production of other attributes along the supply 
chain.  As a result, some industry players are increasingly focused on developing 
more efficient and comprehensive systems to gather and interpret information, and 
increase the availability of this information throughout the supply chain.   
Within Canada’s beef industry, the creation of new information management 
systems has occurred.  Examples include those produced by ComputerAid 
Professional Services and Viewtrak Technologies. Both of these companies work 
with supply chain participants and alliances to develop customized information 
management platforms to gather and analyze both production and financial data.  
The establishment of these types of information management systems has utilized 
developments in technology that have allowed for long term retention of information 
in extensive databases.  Being able to retain large volumes of data is of a significant 
value and facilitates more informed management decisions related to production and 
processing methods.  Supply chain participants can use this data to create an 
increased understanding as to the changes that have occurred, with it enabling 
management decisions to be made based on more comprehensive data analysis.            
The mandatory CCIA tagging program in Canada could potentially facilitate 
the transfer of information along the supply chain and reduce the transaction costs 
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associated with transferring information.  The transfer of information between the 
cow-calf sector and the rest of the supply chain is especially poor.  This is because 
information management systems are very costly and most cow-calf operators 
cannot justify such an investment given the size of their operation and the value they 
would obtain from incurring such an investment.  In order to increase coordination 
and improve the flow of information between cow-calf operators and other supply 
chain participants, the CCIA could be used as a conduit to facilitate information 
transfer.   Instead of having multiple private corporations developing separate data 
management systems it may be more efficient develop a national system from which 
data could be drawn from by different supply chain participants.  A single system 
may reduce the overlapping development costs that would be incurred by private 
corporations that are working to achieve similar objectives.   
In addition, when multiple information collection systems exist, supply chain 
participants incur transfer costs if they choose to move from one system to another.  
Consequently there are barriers to entry and exit.  If cow-calf operators or other 
supply participants are required to enter into one system and pay to input 
information into that system, they are limited to transacting with those buyers within 
that particular supply chain.  As a result, there is an increased risk of opportunistic 
behaviour and transaction costs will be increased in order to mitigate this risk.  
Whereas with a single system, participants have access to a large number of buyers, 
with no transfer costs being incurred to access these buyers.  In this type of system, 
the risk of opportunistic behaviour and associated transaction costs may be reduced.   
Understanding the benefits and costs associated with developing private data 
systems or a nationally-based data system is an area that could be further researched 
in order to determine the benefits and costs involved under either scenario.  It is 
especially important to note while significant benefits appear to exist under the 
creation of a single system, significant challenges are also involved as a result of 
confidentiality and data ownership issues.  Research in this area would facilitate a 
greater understanding of the options the industry has in increasing information flow 
along the supply chain to improve coordination.     
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6.7 Summary and Conclusions 
The objective of this chapter was to provide in-depth case study analyses on 
the structure of several alliances within the U.S. and Canadian beef industries.  This 
analysis focused on discussing the types of supply chain coordination programs 
emerging within the beef industry and the challenges, limitations, and opportunities 
associated with these different programs.  Key to the discussion in the chapter was 
examining the opportunities and constraints associated with industry and operation 
characteristics that are unique to the beef industry and have a significant impact on 
the development of beef supply chain coordination programs.         
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7 Summary and Conclusions 
7.1 Introduction 
 The purpose of Chapter 7 is to summarize the key findings of the research.  
The chapter will also discuss the implications of this research for the beef industry, 
limitations of the research, and topics for further study.   
 In recent years, the beef industry has been forced to examine improving 
coordination along the supply chain in response to declining consumer demand for 
beef.  Consumers are demanding more convenient, consistent, high quality, 
differentiated products.  In order to expand their markets, participants in the beef 
industry have begun to examine seriously the production of differentiated and 
branded beef products.  This transformation has been slow to occur due, in part, to 
the substantial reorganization of the beef supply chain that is required to transform 
existing commodity production systems into more coordinated, vertically aligned 
supply chains. 
 There has been limited research on supply chain coordination within the beef 
industry and on how the relationship between different supply chain participants 
evolves with differentiated beef products.  This research is critical for identifying 
what makes a successful supply chain alliance and understanding both the 
opportunities and constraints to improving coordination along the beef supply chain.  
An understanding of how different product attributes affect transaction costs and 
result in the formation of particular supply chain structures is a first step towards 
determining what makes a successful supply chain alliance.   
 The purpose of this study was to examine the sustainability and effectiveness 
of different alliances and their ability to coordinate various branded beef programs.  
In order to increase the production of differentiated beef products, improved 
coordination will be needed.  At the same time, improving coordination will only be 
successful if the value received by the industry more than offsets the increase in 
production and transaction costs.  These costs are dependent on both the types of 
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attributes being produced and the level of consistency that is guaranteed.  The 
optimal supply chain structure that minimizes transaction costs is influenced by the 
transaction characteristics that emerge when producing a specific beef product and 
the associated transaction costs.  Additional opportunities and constraints to 
improving coordination in the beef industry were also identified through the study.        
 
7.2 Summary of Research Findings 
7.2.1 Cow-calf Operator Survey 
Effective research is integral to the design and successful development of 
branded beef programs and improved supply chain coordination.  The conjoint 
experiment and additional survey questions presented in Chapter 5 provides insights 
into why the participation of cow-calf operators in value chain alliances has been 
minimal.  Closer vertical coordination, through the use of value chain alliances, can 
result in substantial benefits, but there are also costs involved with the production of 
differentiated beef products.  The results in Chapter 5 indicate that transaction 
characteristics and the associated transaction costs limit the willingness of cow-calf 
operators to participate in branded beef programs.   
The creation of successful programs is therefore dependent on a program’s 
characteristics being such that the benefits to cow-calf operators are greater than the 
increase in transaction costs.  The emphasis on premiums in the conjoint analysis 
and the questions regarding program fees show that, while cow-calf operators are 
willing to make trade-offs and accept increased costs, they are only willing to do this 
when benefits are greater than costs.  This is readily apparent because respondents 
indicated a willingness to make the required investments and increase their exposure 
to opportunistic behaviour.  Beyond a certain point, when large expenditures or one-
time fees are required, the information and negotiation costs incurred to reduce the 
risk of opportunistic behaviour exceed the benefits received and limit participation.        
It appears that cow-calf operators are most concerned with the balance 
between premiums received and the costs associated with the investments required 
to produce different beef attributes.  Lower importance is placed on the number of 
buyers and the pricing method used.  This implies that price uncertainty is less of a 
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concern and, as a result, lower transaction costs are incurred to ensure the 
reputations of buyers, searching out information on grid-based systems, and 
negotiating agreements to secure price and market access.     
Aside from premiums, other benefits were not considered in the experiment.  
Additional benefits that often arise as a result of increased coordination are the 
assurance of access into a premium market and the ability to receive information on 
the quality of cattle after they have been processed.  Cow-calf operators were asked 
to explicitly rate the importance of these benefits and they were rated as high.  
However, this does not tell us how cow-calf operators make trade-offs between these 
benefits and other characteristics (i.e. expected premiums, investments, pricing 
method, and number of buyers).  Further research examining the trade-offs made 
between these benefits and other program characteristics would be beneficial.  It is 
expected that cow-calf operators would be willing to accept certain transaction 
characteristics with low or negative part-worth values in exchange for quality 
information and market access.             
 The relationship between pricing method and the receipt of quality 
information is worth emphasizing.  Cow-calf operators indicated a preference for a 
combination live weight and carcass quality pricing system, where a base price is 
determined and premiums and discounts are then applied based on carcass quality.  
Even though using this method means that some of the risk associated with 
variability in cattle quality is transferred to them, it may be that they are willing to 
accept the increased risk of price discounts.  As in exchange they typically receive 
quality information.  If this is the case, it is an indication that cow-calf operators 
place a high value on the receipt of quality information and are willing to make 
trade-offs to receive it.  At the same time the lower relative preference for a pricing 
system based solely on carcass quality, as opposed to a live weight pricing system, 
demonstrates that cow-calf operators are limited in their willingness to make trade-
offs.  Namely, the value of carcass quality information is offset by the greater 
transfer of risk that occurs under a pricing system that is based solely on carcass 
quality.  Cow-calf operators, on average, do not appear to be willing to make this 
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trade-off and would prefer a live weight system where no carcass quality 
information is received.     
The conjoint analysis in Chapter 5 also identified differences in the relative 
importance of transaction characteristics based on specific socio-economic factors 
including herd size, participation in an alliance, sources of farm income, and age.  
Differences between operations and production characteristics were shown to 
influence the relative importance of the transaction characteristics.  Understanding 
the differences between cow-calf operations needs to be considered when branded 
beef and value chain alliance programs are developed.   
 
7.2.2 Alliance Interviews 
 To evaluate the importance of different transaction characteristics from the 
perspective of alliances, interviews were conducted with key managers and directors 
of different alliances throughout Canada and the United States.  Several conclusions 
can be made.  First, asset specific investments have typically been limited to 
compliance with specific feed and health protocols and the implementation of 
record/certification systems.  As a result, the risk of opportunistic behaviour appears 
to be minimal and the transaction costs to reduce opportunistic behaviour associated 
with asset specificity are small.  Consequently, the degree of coordination is not 
affected to, any great extent, by the level of investments required.  
 Instead, the degree of coordination appears to be a result of how an alliance 
is aligned with a particular brand name label.  Those alliances that own a brand 
name label or have an exclusive relationship with a retailer-owned brand name label 
face an increased risk that sellers will act opportunistically given the fixed nature of 
their supply and the ongoing need to fulfill downstream obligations.  In order to 
minimize the transaction costs incurred to reduce the risk of opportunistic behaviour, 
alliances often chose a formal structure, which uses contracts and/or membership 
fees, to ensure a greater level of commitment from participants and reduce their 
incentive to act opportunistically.  Whereas, when an alliance is aligned with a 
specific processor and sells into multiple programs owned by a processor, there is 
greater flexibility in terms of the quantity of cattle that alliances are required to 
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provide on an ongoing basis.  Since processors are able to procure supply through 
other marketing arrangements, the volumes provided by an alliance can vary and, as 
a result, there is a lower risk of opportunistic behaviour by suppliers.  Consequently, 
transaction costs will be lower and the degree of coordination necessary to minimize 
costs is also lower, with more informal alliance structures emerging.               
 Alliances have readily adopted the use of grid-based pricing systems in order 
to reduce the degree to which incomplete information is available on quality and to 
realign incentives.  Participants receive more transparent signals regarding the 
quality of products.  These systems reduce information costs from searching out 
quality information and, as a result, reduce the degree of coordination required.  It is 
also feasible for grid-based pricing systems to reduce monitoring costs.  Alliances 
have implemented grid-based pricing systems with more detailed specifications that 
result in higher premiums and discounts being paid based on carcass quality.  When 
detailed program requirements are implemented in an alliance to ensure a more 
consistent level of quality, participants must be monitored in order to ensure that 
they comply as there is an incentive to cheat.  Less monitoring is required when 
price is directly tied to the quality of production through a more detailed grid.  
Participants have a clear incentive to ensure a more consistent level of quality, to 
avoid being discounted under a more accurate grid.           
 The numbers of buyers and sellers did not seem to have a substantial impact 
on the degree of coordination chosen by alliances.  This mirrors the results from the 
cow-calf operator survey, where the relative importance of the number of buyers 
was low compared to other transaction characteristics.  In large part, this appears to 
be a result of the reciprocal nature of the relationship between buyers and sellers 
along the supply chain.  Sellers with specialized products need to be guaranteed 
access into the markets that sell these products.  Buyers also need a constant supply 
of specialized products, which cannot be easily procured through the spot market, in 
order fulfill their downstream obligations.  Consequently, the risk of opportunistic 
behaviour by either buyers or sellers is expected to be minimal and does not have a 
large impact on the degree of coordination.   
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The relatively low concern over the number of buyers, even when the number 
of buyers is limited, is apparent in that most of the alliances did not have formal 
contracts or arrangements to secure the commitment buyers.  Alliances rely on the 
fact that buyers receive benefits from obtaining an ongoing and consistent supply of 
product and have an incentive to maintain positive relationships with their suppliers.
  
7.3 Implications for the Industry 
Improved coordination between supply chain participants facilitates the 
development of differentiated products that are more consistent and of a higher 
quality.  Several critical success factors and challenges to the successful 
development of branded beef alliances are apparent from this research.   
 
7.3.1 Critical Success Factors 
 The production of specific beef attributes can result in an increase in both 
production costs and transaction costs throughout the supply chain.  While 
consumers are often willing to pay premiums for differentiated branded beef 
products, there is a limit to the level of premiums they are willing to accept.  As a 
result, the premiums available throughout the supply chain do not always offset the 
increase in production and transaction costs.  This problem may be a result of short 
term market fluctuations.  In this situation, the long term commitment of supply 
chain participants is necessary in order to ensure the ongoing success of an alliance.  
It is also important to note that aside from weighing costs against the premiums 
received, the value of other benefits needs to be considered.  Access to markets and 
the ability to obtain increased information are significant benefits of alliances and 
need to be considered when determining the net gain received from participating in a 
program.                 
 In certain situations, it may be difficult to overcome periods where 
production and transaction costs exceed the benefits received by different supply 
chain participants.  The results from the cow-calf operator survey clearly show that 
when programs are developed to improve coordination and produce different beef 
attributes, the importance of different transaction characteristics needs to be kept in 
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mind.  While cow-calf operators can have a significant impact on the production of 
different attributes, coordination between this sector and the rest of the supply chain 
has been limited.   To improve coordination between cow-calf operators and other 
supply chain participants, programs need to work with all supply chain participants 
and consider the trade-offs they make between different transaction characteristics 
and the benefits received. 
 Improved information flows are also important to the success of coordination 
initiatives and the production of differentiated branded beef products.  Cooperation 
and flexibility within a program is necessary to facilitate the transfer of information 
both upstream and downstream along the supply chain.  The industry needs to 
continue to work on transferring information along the entire supply chain, 
especially to feedlots and cow-calf operators.  Up to this point, the transfer of quality 
information and accurate price signals to cow-calf operators has been limited.  Key 
to the increased transfer of such information is the development of different methods 
that enhance information flow, while minimizing the associated transaction costs.  
These methods include the continued advancement of grid-based pricing systems to 
provide more transparent price signals to cow-calf operators and feedlots.  Further, 
integrated information management systems are important.  This technology has the 
potential to reduce information costs while substantially improving the flow of 
detailed information throughout the supply chain.   
 Critical to improving information flows, while minimizing the association 
transaction costs, is how alliances are linked to processors and retailers.  All of the 
alliances examined were linked to specific processors and in some cases they were 
linked directly to the retail sector.  While the success of alliances did not seem 
dependent on direct alignment with the retail sector, alignment with a processor(s) 
was considered to be essential to the success of an alliance.  Processors appear to be 
the main interface between end-users and the production sectors and key to the 
transfer of information between end-users and the rest of the supply chain.  They 
facilitate the production of their own branded and commodity beef products and also 
custom process for brand name labels owned by retailers.       
 211
With some products the cooperation of processors is crucial to ensure the 
traceability of animals and products is maintained and that other guarantees provided 
under a brand name are fulfilled.  Alignment with a specific processor that is willing 
to fulfill traceability requirements and any other program requirements is usually 
necessary.  Otherwise, the monitoring costs that would have to be incurred by other 
supply chain participants to ensure traceability and/or other program requirements 
would likely be prohibitive.    
 
7.3.2 Critical Challenges 
 Although alignment with a processor is usually necessary to the success of 
an alliance, the high concentration of the processing and retailer sectors limits the 
number of alliances that can be expected to develop and be sustainable.  This is 
partly a result of the large volumes of cattle required to fulfill the requirements of 
processor or retailer-owned brand name labels.  Coordination to ensure adequate 
supplies becomes quite costly, with high negotiation and search costs being incurred.  
This is because of the low concentration in the cow-calf sector that requires 
transactions with a large number of cow-calf operators to ensure adequate volumes 
to fulfill program requirements.   
 Coordination with processor and retailer-owned brand name labels is also 
expected to be limited in the future.  Once processors and retailers have developed a 
few brand name labels and aligned themselves with a couple of alliances they may 
not need to form additional alliances or develop additional brand name products.  
This reduces the transaction costs associated with organizing multiple production 
runs when production has to be segregated, multiple grid-based pricing systems have 
to be managed, and multiple sets of negotiations must occur.     
The structure of alliances will be further impacted by how they are aligned 
with a brand name label.  When an alliance owns a brand name label or is the 
exclusive supplier into a retailer-owned brand name label, marketing and transaction 
costs are expected to be higher throughout the supply chain.  This is a result of the 
increased costs incurred to ensure adequate supplies and the commitment of alliance 
participants.  Due to the higher costs incurred when an alliance owns a brand name 
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label or is the exclusive supplier into a retailer-owned label, it appears that some 
alliances have opted to operate under a different structure.   
In particular, there has been an increased emergence of more informal 
alliances that align themselves with a specific processor and market product through 
multiple processor-owned branded and commodity beef programs.  This type of 
relationship also overcomes the limited willingness of processors to work with 
several different alliance-based programs.  When alliances are aligned with a 
specific processor, multiple alliances can be established that supply product into 
processor-owned programs using similar agreements, pricing arrangements, and 
program requirements.  This limits the number of brand name labels and the 
production and transaction costs involved with having many different exclusive 
arrangements.  At the same time, it allows for a greater number of alliances to be 
aligned with a processor.  This may enable alliances to supply smaller volumes, 
reducing the transaction costs associated with ensuring adequate supplies.             
The structure of cow-calf operations also presents a challenge to the 
development of alliances and improved coordination within the industry.  Producers 
often run mixed farming operations and, as a result, the opportunity costs of 
reallocating human and capital resources from other enterprises into cow-calf 
production may be high.  This may limit the willingness of cow-calf operators to 
participate in alliances.  The participation of cow-calf operators is necessary in the 
production of many different attributes and, as a result, the opportunity costs 
incurred by cow-calf operators could be an important limitation to program 
development.   
 
7.3.3 Opportunities 
 Even though challenges exist to improving coordination in the beef industry, 
several opportunities exist to lower transaction costs and facilitate improved 
coordination.  For example, cow-calf producers have been encouraged to retain 
ownership of their calves throughout production.  This may allow increased 
transparency and reduces information and negotiation costs.  Alliances have 
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provided financing incentives for retained ownership and often facilitate feedlots 
sharing ownership of calves to reduce the capital commitment required.           
 Industry infrastructure also aids in lowering transaction costs.  Certification 
institutions implement standardized procedures in order to reduce the monitoring 
costs of producing credence attributes.  Quality assurance programs are similar in 
that they implement standardized procedures to increase the quality and consistency 
of products, with the key attribute being tenderness.  The creation of certification 
institutions for credence attributes and quality assurance programs facilitates 
coordination, while minimizing the associated transaction costs.  To date, the 
presence of such institutions in Canada has been minimal.       
 The mandatory individual animal identification program in Canada is another 
institution that was implemented to trace cattle, but is being looked at carefully as a 
method to tie individual animal identification with information systems that could 
transfer detailed production and quality information throughout the supply chain.  
The further development and use of other technologies, such as comprehensive 
information management systems, electronic identification, and computer vision 
scanning (CVS), could also facilitate the reduction of information and monitoring 
costs while improving coordination within the beef industry.            
 
7.4 Limitations of the Research 
 There are several limitations related to the conjoint-based survey.  First, the 
surveys provided to cow-calf operators were completed independently without the 
assistance of an interviewer.  As a result of this, it is difficult to say if respondents 
completely understood and followed the directions given for completing the survey.  
In order to reduce the complexity of the survey, a rating scale rather than a ranking 
scale was chosen to evaluate the different profiles in the conjoint experiment.  Hair 
et al. (1992) suggests that ranking is the preferred evaluation method for fewer than 
20 profiles, as it provides greater versatility in estimating both additive and 
interactive functions (Hair et al., 1992).  Therefore, using an approach where 
respondents ranked profiles rather than rated them would improve the accuracy of 
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the results obtained, although it would have complicated the cognitive task required 
of respondents.                
 Another possible shortfall of the conjoint-based survey is that not all 
transaction characteristics and characteristic levels that may affect a respondent’s 
decision to participate in a program could be included.  This was necessary in order 
to limit the complexity of the survey.  To create more comprehensive program 
scenarios for respondents to consider, further conjoint-based surveys could include 
additional variables.           
 It could also be argued that the characteristic “number of buyers” was not 
well represented in the conjoint analysis, with the different levels possibly being 
subject to considerable interpretation by the respondent.  The terms “single buyer”, 
“small number of buyers”, and “large number of buyers” were used.  These are 
relative terms, which may represent very different levels of buyers to different 
respondents.  At the same time, the levels chosen were distinct and, as a result, it is 
expected that the respondents were able to effectively trade-off between this 
characteristic and others in a meaningful way.  Although it is understood that the 
terms used are not precise, for the purposes of this analysis they were able to provide 
insights into the relative importance of the number of buyers and the transaction 
uncertainty associated with different structures in the buyers market.   
 Another criticism of the cow-calf operator survey is that the sample size was 
small and limited to one site.  It is possible that the preferences for particular 
program characteristics and trade-offs identified through the study are regional and 
oriented to this particular group.  As a result, care needs to be taken in generalizing 
the preferences of the cow-calf operators surveyed as being representative of the 
preferences of cow-calf operators in other regions of Canada.  The information 
obtained can be used, however, to provide some valuable insights into the relative 
importance of different transaction characteristics to cow-calf operators.   
Given the limited sample size and the preference for a fractional factorial 
design, which limits the overall complexity, interaction effects between the 
attributes were assumed to be minimal and, as such, not considered.  It could be 
argued that a relationship exists between number of buyers and asset specific 
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investments.  In spite of this, the explanatory power of the effect is expected to be 
insignificant, with respondents not considering the relationship between the two 
characteristics when they completed the conjoint portion of the survey.      
The research is also limited due to the nature of the interviews conducted 
with key directors of alliances.  First, it proved difficult to obtain interviews with 
industry members in Canada, as the occurrence of BSE and subsequent negative 
impacts on the beef industry appear to have shifted the industry towards a more 
short term focus that emphasizes the maintenance and recovery of the industry.  
Consequently, when industry members were approached they were not as willing to 
contribute to this research project.  Even prior to BSE, the Canadian industry has not 
been exposed to alliances and increased coordination to the extent the U.S. industry 
has been and this may also explain some of the hesitation to participate in the 
research project.  If industry members have less experience in the area of alliances, 
they may be less willing to discuss their perspectives in an interview setting.  
Nevertheless, a broad range of different types of alliances were interviewed in order 
to provide an extensive perspective on the alliances that exist and the importance of 
different transaction characteristics to supply chain participants.   
The shortfall of an interview-based approach is that the information obtained 
is qualitative.  A conjoint survey was not feasible in examining the importance of 
different transaction characteristics to various supply chain participants, other than 
cow-calf operators.  Conjoint analysis provides quantitative data that can be used to 
evaluate the trade-offs between different transaction characteristics and also the 
relative importance of different transaction characteristics.  Data such as this would 
provide greater insights into why particular structures are used to coordinate the 
production of particular attributes in the beef industry.  Even though a conjoint-
based survey was not feasible, the information obtained was considered to be 
important in identifying commonalities and differences between alliances.    
 
7.5 Areas for Further Study 
 The results from this research can be used as the basis for further study in 
several different areas.  First, further conjoint analysis could be conducted in order 
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to evaluate the importance of additional transaction characteristics to cow-calf 
operators and the trade-offs they are willing to make.  Additional factors include 
other benefits, aside from premiums (i.e. market access, carcass quality/production 
information, reduced market fluctuations).  Participant commitment requirements 
(i.e. membership fees, purchase of shares, annual/long term contracts) would also be 
of interest in understanding the trade-offs cow-calf operators make between the 
benefits received and program requirements.  Additional levels of asset specific 
investments could also be included.  As well, the preference between different grid-
based pricing systems could be examined in more detail in order to better understand 
the trade-offs producers make between the greater levels of quality information and 
increased price uncertainty.   
 The research could also be broadened to encompass a broader range of 
alliances and cow-calf operators in Canada.  This would provide a more 
comprehensive understanding of the Canadian beef industry and the opportunities 
and constraints associated with improving coordination.  Greater focus on the beef 
industry in Alberta, Saskatchewan, and Ontario would be of particular interest given 
that these three provinces are the largest beef producing regions in Canada.   
 It would also be beneficial to focus further research on the retailer/processor 
interface in order to better understand the relationship between retailers and the rest 
of the supply chain.  In particular, it would be of interest to examine how retailers 
affect transaction characteristics and the ability of the industry to improve 
coordination.  The retailing sector has changed substantially in the last decade and 
continues to evolve.  It has a significant impact on how beef products are presented 
to consumers and the types of supply chain relationships that are expected to 
emerge.   
 Industry infrastructure that included grid-based pricing systems, information 
systems, ID technologies, and certification/quality assurance institutions was 
mentioned.  Most significant is the ability of such infrastructure to lower transaction 
costs and facilitate increased information flow along the supply chain, while not 
necessarily requiring a greater degree of coordination to do so.  It would be of 
interest to do further research into the degree to which these different technologies 
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and institutions reduce transaction costs, while facilitating improved coordination.  
Results could also be used to understand how to best structure new institutions and 
adopt new technologies in order to minimize transaction costs throughout the supply 
chain.                 
 
7.6 Conclusion 
 The beef industry plays a significant role in Canadian agriculture.  However, 
increasing value in the industry is partially dependent on the production of 
differentiated beef products that better respond to consumer demands and increase 
the value received by industry participants.  The industry must improve coordination 
to increase the transfer of information regarding consumers’ demands and product 
quality along the supply chain.  In improving coordination, the importance of 
different transaction characteristics to supply chain participants is critical.  It is also 
important to understand the trade-offs supply chain participants are willing to make 
between the benefits received from improved coordination and transaction costs 
arising when producing different beef attributes.  The trade-offs will have a 
substantial impact on the optimal method of coordination for branded beef products.  
This research has taken a first step towards understanding the importance of 
different transaction characteristics and how they impact supply chain coordination 
in the beef industry.  The research also identifies several critical success factors and 
challenges to improved coordination in the future.   
 218
REFERENCES 
 
Agriculture and Agri-Food Canada.  Beef Demand in Canada.  Red Meat  
Information Website.  http://www.agr.gc.ca/redmeat/ 
 
Agri-Food Trade Service Fact Sheets.  Trade Statistics. Agriculture and Agri- 
Food Canada. www.ats-sea.agr.ca  July 2003. 
 
Alberta Agriculture, Food and Rural Development.  A Review of the Competitive  
Position of Alberta’s Primary Beef Production Sector.  November, 2001.   
 
Allan, John.  Retail’s View.  Beef. February 15, 2002.  http://www.beef-mag.com 
 
Anderson, J.L. and S.U. Bettencourt.  A Conjoint Approach to Model Product  
Preferences: The New England Market for Fresh and Frozen Salmon.  
Marine Resource Economics.  1993.  Vol. 8.  pp. 31-49.   
 
Anton, T.E. Not All Beef Marketing Are the Same: A Review of Alliance Types.   
EDIS.  Cooperative Extension Service. Institute of Food and Agricultural  
Sciences, University of Florida.  November 2002.  FE362. 
 
Barkema, Alan D.  The Changing Structure of the U.S. Food System.  Canadian  
Journal of Agricultural Economics. December 1994.  Vol. 42 pp. 541-547. 
 
Barkema, Alan D. and Mark Drabenstott.  A Crossroads for the Cattle Industry.   
Economic Review.  Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas City.  
November/December 1990. Vol. 75(6). pp. 47-66.    
 
Barkema, Alan D., Mark Drabenstott, and Nancy Novack.  The New U.S. Meat  
Industry. Economic Review.  Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas City.  Second  
Quarter 2001.  pp. 33-56 
 
Bastian, Chris.  The New Beef Industry: What Will it Mean to Feeder Cattle  
Producers? University of Wyoming. December 2001.   
 
Beef Trade Website.  Beef Grades.  Beef Information Centre.  September 2003.  
www.beefinfo.org 
 
Beshear, Michelle and Russell Lamb.  From the Plains to the Plate: Can the Beef  
Industry Regain Market Share?  Economic Review.  Federal Reserve Bank 
of Kansas City.  1998.  Vol. 83(4).  pp. 49-66.   
 
Bliss, Timm J. and Clement E. Ward.  Assessing Group Marketing Alternatives for  
Livestock.  Oklahoma Cooperative Extension Service: OSU Extension Facts.   
Oklahoma State University.  1992.  F-525.  
 219
Boehlje, Michael D., S.L. Hofing, and R.C. Schroeder.  Value Chains in  
Agricultural Industries.  Ag Education and Consulting, LLC.  Department of  
Agricultural Economics, Purdue University.  August 1999.   
Staff Paper 99-10.   
      
Boland, Michael and Jeffrey P. Katz.  A New Value-Added Strategy for the US Beef  
Industry: the Case of US Premium Beef Ltd.  Supply Chain Management: An  
International Journal.  2000.  Vol. 5(2).  pp. 99-109.    
 
Brester, Gary W.  Meeting Consumer Demands with Genetics and Market  
Coordination: The Case of the Leachman Cattle Company.  Review of  
Agricultural Economics.  Spring/Summer 2002.  Vol. 24(1).  pp. 251-265. 
 
Brester, Gary W., James Mintert, and Ted C. Schroeder.  Positioning the Beef  
Industry for the Future.  Department of Agricultural Economics, Kansas  
State University. May 1995.  MF – 2123.   
 
Brewin, Derek and Alvin Ulrich.  Consistency and Quality: Some Lessons from  
Saskatchewan’s Beef Supply Chain.  Saskatchewan Agriculture  
Development Fund, University of Saskatchewan.  January, 1999.   
 
Butler, John.  President and CEO of Ranchers Renaissance.  Personal  
Communication.  March 17, 2003.   
 
Canfax Research Services.  Alberta Packing Plant Procurement Summary.  Canadian  
Cattlemen’s Association.  Calgary, Canada.  2003.  www.cattle.ca/canfax/ 
 
Canfax Research Services.  Canfax Annual Report.  Canadian Cattlemen’s  
Association.  Calgary, Canada.  2002. www.cattle.ca/canfax/ 
 
Canfax Research Services.  Canfax Statistical Briefer.  Canadian Cattlemen’s  
Association.  Calgary, Canada.  2001.  www.cattle.ca/canfax/ 
 
Caswell, Julie H. and Eliza M. Mojduszka.  Using Informational Labeling to  
Influence the Market for Quality in Food Products.  American Journal of  
Agricultural Economics.  December 1996.  Vol. 78.  pp. 1248-1253.   
 
Certified Angus Beef Website. August 2003.  www.certifiedangusbeef.com  
 
Coase, Ronald H.  The Nature of the Firm.  Economica.  1937.  N.S. Vol. 4(16).   
pp. 386-405.   
 
Decatur Beef Alliance Fact Sheet.  2003.  Decatur County Feed Yard.   
Oberlin, Kansas.   
 
 
 220
Den Ouden, M., Aalt A. Dijkhuizen, Ruud B.M. Huirne, and Peter J.P. Zuurbier.   
Vertical Cooperation in Agricultural Production-Marketing Chains, with  
Special Reference to Product Differentiation in Pork.  Agribusiness.  1996.   
Vol. 12(3).  pp. 277-290. 
  
Frank, Stuart D. and Dennis R. Henderson.  Transaction Costs as Determinants of  
Vertical Coordination in the U.S. Food Industries.  American Journal of  
Agricultural Economics.  November 1992.  Vol. 74(4).  pp. 941-950.    
 
Fuez, Dillon M. and Wendy J. Umberger.  Consumers Willingness to Pay for  
Flavour in Beef Steaks: An Experimental Economics Approach.  Cornhusker  
Economics.  Institute of Agriculture and Natural Resources, Department of  
Agricultural Economics, University of Nebraska.  March 21, 2001.   
 
Green, Paul E. and Vithala R. Rao.  Conjoint Measurement for Quantifying  
Judgmental Data.  Journal of Marketing Research.  1971.  Vol. 8.   
pp. 355-363.      
 
Green, Paul E. and V. Srinivasan.  Conjoint Analysis in Consumer Research: Issues  
and Outlook.  The Journal of Consumer Research: An Interdisciplinary  
Quarterly.  1978.  Vol. 5(2).  pp. 103-123.   
  
Green, Paul E. and Yoram Wind.  Multiattribute Decisions in Marketing: A  
Measurement Approach.  1973.  The Dryden Press, Hinsdale.   
 
Hair, J.E., R.E. Anderson, R. L. Tatham, and W.C. Black.  Chapter 9: Conjoint  
Analysis.  Multivariate Data Analysis with Readings.  1992.  3rd Edition.   
Macmillan Publishing Company, New York.   
 
Halbrendt, Catherine, J. Richard Bacon, and John Pesek.  Weighted Least Squares  
Analysis for Conjoint Studies: The Case of Hybrid Striped Bass.   
Agribusiness.  1992.  Vol. 8(2).  pp. 187-198.   
 
Hammack, Stephen P.  Cattle Types and Breeds Characteristics and Uses.  Texas  
Adapted Genetic Strategies.  Texas Agricultural Extension Service.  1998.   
L-5206.   
 
Hayenga, Marvin, Dermot Hayes, John Lawrence, Wayne Purcell, Ted Schroeder,  
Tomislav Vukina, and Clement Ward.  Meat Packer Vertical Integration and  
Contract Linkages in the Beef and Pork Industries: An Economic  
Perspective.  American Meat Institute.  May 2000.       
 
Hayenga, Marvin, Ted Schroeder, and John Lawrence.  Churning Out the Links:  
Vertical Integration in the Beef and Pork Industries.  Choices: The Magazine  
of Food, Farm and Resource Issues.  Winter 2002.  pp. 19-23.   
 
 221
Hayes, Dermot J., Sergio H. Lence, and Andrea Stoppa.  Farmer-Owned Brands?   
Center for Agricultural and Rural Development, Iowa State University.   
2003.   
 
Hill, R. Carter, William E. Griffiths, and George G. Judge.  Undergraduate  
Econometrics.  Second Edition.  2001.  New York: John Wiley & Sons, Inc. 
   
Hobbs, Jill E. A Transaction Cost Analysis of Quality Traceability and Animal  
Welfare Issues in UK Beef Retailing.  British Food Journal.  1996.   
Vol. 98(6).  pp. 16-26.   
  
Hobbs, Jill E.  A Transaction Cost Approach to Supply Chain Management.  Supply  
Chain Management.  1996a.  Vol. 1(2).  pp. 15-27.  
 
Hobbs, Jill E., William A. Kerr, and Kurt K. Klein.  Coordination and  
Competitiveness of Supply Chains: Implications for the Western Canadian  
Livestock Industries.  Canadian Journal of Agricultural Economics.  1996.  
Vol. 44.  pp. 403-408. 
 
Hobbs, Jill E.  Innovation and Future Direction of Supply Chain Management in the  
Canadian Agri-Food Industry.  Canadian Journal of Agricultural Economics.  
1998.  Vol. 46.  pp. 525-537.   
 
Hobbs, Jill E.  Transaction Costs and Slaughter Cattle Procurement: Processors’  
Selection of Supply Channels.  Agribusiness.  1996b.  Vol. 12(6).   
pp. 509-523.   
  
Hudson, William T. and Wayne D. Purcell.  Risk Sharing and Compensation Guides  
for Managers and Members of Vertical Beef Alliances.  Review of  
Agricultural Economics.  2003. Vol. 25(1).  pp. 44-65. 
  
International Beef Industry Congress.  International Beef Industry Congress  
Proceedings.  Calgary, Canada. July 11, 2003  
 
International Livestock Congress.  2000 Beef Section: Global Beef Best Demand  
Initiatives.  2002 International Livestock Congress Proceedings.  Houston,  
Texas.  February 2000.   
 
International Livestock Congress.  2002 Beef Section: Surviving and Thriving in the  
Next Decade. 2002 International Livestock Congress Proceedings. Houston,  
Texas.  February 2002. 
 
Ishmeal, Wes.  Why Future Beef Went Under.  Beef.  Nov. 1, 2002.  
http://www.beef-mag.com 
 
 
 222
Kinsey, Jean and Ben Senauer.  Consumer Trends and Changing Food Retailing  
Formats.  American Journal of Agricultural Economics.   December 1996.  
Vol. 78(5).  pp. 1187-1192.  
 
Kovanda, Joseph and Ted C. Schroeder.  Beef Alliances: Motivations, Extent, and  
Future Prospects.  Forthcoming chapter in: Economics of Red Meat and  
Dairy Industries. TheVeterinary Clinics of North America – Food Animal  
Practice.  July 2003.   
 
Kroes, Eric P. and Robert J. Sheldon.  Stated Preference Methods.  Journal of  
Transport Economics and Policy.  January 1988.  Vol. XXII (1).  pp. 11-25.   
 
Kubas, Len and Adrienne Simmons.  Looking Ahead.  Canadian Retailer.  Retail  
Council of Canada.  November/December 2000.   
http://www.retailcouncil.org/media/cdnretailer/ 
 
Lamp, Greg.  50% Branded by 2005.  Beef.  May 1, 1998.   
http://www.beef-mag.com 
 
Lawrence, John D., Ted C. Schroeder, and Marvin L. Hayenga.  Evolving Producer- 
Packer-Customer Linkages in the Beef and Pork Industries.  Review of  
Agricultural Economics.  2001.  Vol. 23(2).  pp. 370-385. 
  
Louviere, Jordan J.  Conjoint Analysis Modelling of Stated Preferences.  Journal of  
Transport Economics and Policy.  January 1988.  Vol. XXII(1).  pp. 93-119.   
 
Lusk, Jayson.  Branded Beef Is It “What’s for Dinner?”  Choices: The Magazine of  
Food, Farm and Resource Issues.  Spring 2001.  Vol. 16(2).  pp. 27  
 
Lusk, Jayson, John Fox, Ted Schroeder, James Mintert, and Mohammad  
Koohmaraie.  Will Consumers Pay for Guaranteed Tender Steak?  Research  
Bulletin.  Research Institute on Livestock Pricing. Agricultural and Applied 
Economics, Virginia Tech.  February 1999.   
 
Marsh, Thomas L., J. Mintert, and Ted C. Schroeder.  Beef Demand Determinants:  
A Research Summary.  Beef Marketing.  Department of Agricultural 
Economics, Kansas State University.  March 2000. MF-2457.   
 
Martinez, Steve W., Kevin E. Smith, and Kelly D. Zering.  Analysis of Changing  
Methods of Vertical Coordination in the Pork Industry.  Journal of  
Agricultural and Applied Economics.  December 1998.  Vol. 30(2).   
pp. 301-311. 
 
McCullough, James and Roger Best.  Conjoint Measurement: Temporal Stability  
and Structural Reliability.  Journal of Marketing Research.  February 1979.   
Vol. XVI.  pp. 26-31. 
 223
 
Meeting the Market: Growth through Strategic Alliances.  Agriculture and Food  
Council Conference Proceedings.  Red Deer, Canada.  November 2002.      
 
Ness, Mitchell R. and Hubert Gerhardy.  Consumer Preferences for Quality and  
Freshness Attributes of Eggs.  British Food Journal.  1994.  Vol. 96(3).  
pp. 26-36. 
 
Oxley, Joanne E.  Appropriability Hazards and Governance in Strategic Alliances:  
A Transaction Cost Approach.  Journal of Law, Economics, and  
Organization.  1997.  Vol. 13(2).  pp. 387-409.    
 
Patterson, Paul M., Timothy J. Burkink, Rozlyn S. Lipsey, Jason Lipsey, Richard W.  
Roth, and Mary Kay Martin.  Targeting Tourists with State Branding  
Programs.  Agribusiness.  2003.  Vol. 19(4).  pp. 525-538.     
 
Pearcy, Ben.  Ranchers Renaissance.  Harvard Business School Publishing.  Boston,  
Massachusetts. April 2000.  Report 9-900-008.   
 
Peterson, H. Christopher and Jon C. Phillips.  Segmentation and Differentiation of  
Agri-Food Niche Markets: Examples from the Literature.  Department of  
Agricultural Economics, Michigan State University.  March 2001.   
Staff Paper 2001-05. 
 
Peterson, H. Christopher and Allen Wysocki.  Strategic Choice Along The Vertical  
Coordination Continuum.  Department of Agricultural Economics, Michigan  
State University.  July 1998.  Staff Paper 98-16.   
 
Prentice, Barry E. and Dave Benel.  Determinants of Empty Returns by U.S.  
Refrigerated Trucks: Conjoint Analysis Approach.  Canadian Journal of  
Agricultural Economics.  March 1992.  Vol. 40(1).  pp. 109-127.   
 
Purcell, Wayne D.  Consumers’ Buying Behavior for Beef: Implications of Price and  
Product Attributes.  Research Bulletin.  Research Institute on Livestock 
Pricing.  Agricultural and Applied Economics, Virginia Tech.  April 1993.     
 
Purcell, Wayne D.  Demand for Meats: Past, Present, and a Look Ahead.  Research  
Institute on Livestock Pricing.  Agricultural and Applied Economics,  
Virginia Tech.  October 2002. 
 
Purcell, Wayne D.  Measures of Changes in Demand for Beef, Pork, and Chicken,  
1975-2000. Research Institute on Livestock Pricing. Agricultural and  
1975-2001. Applied Economics, Virginia Tech.  2000.   
 
Ranchers Renaissance Website.  August 2003.  www.ranchersrenaissance.com 
 
 224
Sanderson, Patricia Kim.  Consumer Preferences: The Bison Meat Industry.   
Department of Agricultural Economics Master of Science Thesis.  Canada:  
University of Saskatchewan.  Fall 2001.   
 
Schroeder, Ted., John Lawrence, Clement E. Ward, and Dillon M. Fuez.  Fed Cattle  
Marketing Trends and Concerns: Cattle Feeder Survey Results.  Agricultural  
Experiment Station and Cooperative Extension Service, Kansas State  
University.  June 2002.  MF-2561.   
 
Shelanski, Howard A. and Peter G. Klein.  Empirical Research in Transaction Cost  
Economics: A Review and Assessment.  The Journal of Law, Economics, and  
Organization.  1995.  Vol.  11(2).  pp. 335-361. 
  
Smith, Rod.  Beef Cattle Producers Urged to Align to Deliver Guarantees  
Consumers Want.  Feedstuffs.  December 18, 2000.  Vol. 72(52).  pp. 8.   
 
Sporleder, Thomas L. Assessing Vertical Strategic Alliances by Agribusiness.   
Canadian Journal of Agricultural Economics.  1994.  Vol. 42.  pp. 533-540.  
 
SPSS Inc. 1997.  SPSS Conjoint 8.0., Chicago.    
 
Statistics Canada Website.  April 2004.  www.statcan.ca   
 
Steenkamp, Jan-Benedict E.M.  Conjoint Measurement in Ham Quality Evaluation.   
Journal of Agricultural Economics.  1987.  Vol. 38.  pp. 473-480 
 
Stevens, Thomas H., Sarah White, David B. Kittredge, and Donald Dennis.  Factors  
Affecting NIPF Landowner Participation in Management Programs: a  
Massachusetts case study.  Journal of Forest Economics.  2002.  Vol. 8(3).   
pp.169-184. 
 
Sy, Hamath A., Merle D. Faminow, Gary V. Johnson, and Gary Crow.  Estimating  
the Values of Cattle Characteristics Using an Ordered Probit Model.   
American Journal of Agricultural Economics.  May 1997.  Vol. 97(2).   
pp. 463-476.   
 
Tollens, Yvonne.  ComputerAid Professional Services Ltd.  Interview by Andrea  
Brocklebank.  February 10, 2004. 
 
Unterschultz, James.  New Instruments for Coordination and Risk Sharing Within  
the Canadian Beef Industry.  Department of Rural Economy, University of  
Alberta.  Edmonton, Canada.  May 2000.  Project Report 00-04.     
 
Ward, Clement E.  Beef Industry Alliances and Vertical Arrangements.  Oklahoma  
Cooperative Extension Service: OSU Extension Facts.  Oklahoma State  
University.  2001.  WF-563.  
 225
 
Ward, Clement E.  Vertical Integration Comparison: Beef, Pork, and Poultry.   
Oklahoma Cooperative Extension Service: OSU Extension Facts.  Oklahoma  
State University.  2001.  WF-552 
 
Weibert, Warren.  Decatur Beef Alliance.  Interview by Andrea Brocklebank.   
February 10, 2004.  
    
Williamson, Oliver E.  The Vertical Integration of Production: Market Failure  
Considerations.  American Economic Review.  1971.  Vol. 61(2).   
pp. 112-123. 
 
Williamson, Oliver E. Chapter Seven. Transaction Cost Economics: The  
Governance of Contractual Relations.  Economic Organization: Firms,  
Markets, and Policy Control.  Wheatsheaf Books, Brighton, Sussex.  1986a.  
pp. 101-130 
  
Williamson, Oliver E.  Chapter Nine. What is Transaction Cost Economics?   
Economic Organization: Firms, Markets, and Policy Control.  Wheatsheaf  
Books, Brighton Sussex.  1986b. pp. 174-191. 
 
 226
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
APPENDICES 
 227
APPENDIX A - COW-CALF OPERATOR COVER LETTER & SURVEY 
 
 
Code # __________ 
 
Re: Branded Beef Programs and Value Chain Alliances  
 
Dear Potential Participant:  
 
We are conducting a research project on branded beef programs and value chain 
alliances in the Canadian beef industry. The purpose of this study is to examine the 
opportunities and constraints for the industry in developing these types of programs. 
Examples of beef products that are currently being produced through branded 
programs include: tender beef, natural beef (no hormones or antibiotics), and organic 
beef, and others. We are interested finding out what producers think about branded 
beef programs and would value your participation in a short survey.   
 
You will not be asked to identify yourself in the survey. We will ask you questions 
about different production systems for producing branded beef. The survey will ask 
how likely you would be to participate in different types of value chain alliance or 
branded beef programs if you had to make changes to your current production and 
marketing practices.   
 
The survey is composed of three parts.  First, you will be given a series of 
production and market characteristics and asked to score them based on your 
willingness to produce calves for a branded beef program with different features.  
Second, you will be asked several questions that will assist us in determining how 
different program features affect producers’ decisions whether or not to join the 
program.  Finally, there are some broad socio-economic questions that will enable us 
to segment producers into different groups.      
 
The research is being conducted through the Department of Agricultural Economics 
at the University of Saskatchewan under the supervision of Dr. Jill E. Hobbs. The 
results of the study may be submitted to journals, used in presentations to the 
academic community and industry and used in M.Sc. thesis research.  You will not 
be asked to identify yourself on the survey, therefore guaranteeing confidentiality.  
You must be 18 years of age or older to participate in the study.   
   
There are no foreseeable risks to being involved in this project.  The results will be 
used in aggregate rather than at the individual level.  Please do not provide your 
name, address, or telephone number on the survey.   The results of the survey will be 
held in the office of Dr. Hobbs at the University of Saskatchewan for at least five 
years after the study is complete.   
 228
 
You are free to withdraw from participating in the survey at any time.  If for any 
reason you wish to withdraw your responses from the survey, please contact one of 
the researchers within seven (7) days and cite the code number located at the top of 
this cover letter.  If you provide notice within this period your completed survey will 
be removed from the study and destroyed.   
 
Submission of the completed survey will indicate your consent to participate.  This 
also implies that the researchers may use the data gathered as described above.   
 
This research project was reviewed and approved by the University of Saskatchewan 
Advisory Committee on Ethics in Behavioural Research on November 28 2003.   
 
After you have completed the survey if you have any questions or concerns about 
the study or your rights as a participant, you are encouraged to contact one of the 
following:  
 
Dr. Jill E. Hobbs, Associate Professor  (306) 966-2445 
Andrea Brocklebank, M.Sc. Student  (306) 966-4047 
Office of Research Services, University of Saskatchewan  (306) 966-8576 
   
If you would like to be notified of the results or wish to receive a copy of them, 
please contact Dr. Jill Hobbs.   
 
Sincerely,  
 
 
 
Dr. Jill E. Hobbs 
Associate Professor 
Department of Agricultural Economics 
University of Saskatchewan 
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University of Saskatchewan 
Department of Agricultural Economics 
 
CONFIDENTIAL      CODE # __________ 
 
Location  ________________ 
Date   ________________ 
Time  ________________ 
 
The following questions are about branded beef programs.  You do not need to have 
participated in a program to complete the survey.  We are interested in your opinions 
about different types of programs.  You will not be identified in the survey.   
 
Section A 
 
Please circle an answer for each of the following questions, from 1-5, where #1 is 
not important and #5 is very important to you as a producer.  (Circle the number) 
 
1. How important is it to you to secure a buyer for your calves a considerable time 
before you plan to sell them?  
 
Not important ………………………………………………Very important 
 1  2  3  4  5   
 
2. How important is it to you that you receive a premium price for your calves?  
 
Not important ………………………………………………Very important 
 1  2  3  4  5   
 
3. How important is it to you that you are able to lock in a price for your calves 
early on? 
 
Not important ………………………………………………Very important 
 1  2  3  4  5   
 
4. How important is it to you that you are able to obtain detailed data about the 
carcass quality of the calves that you produce? 
 
Not important ………………………………………………Very important 
 1  2  3  4  5   
 
Please circle an answer for each of the following questions, from 1-5, where #1 is 
not very good and #5 is very good.  (Circle the number) 
 
5. How good do you think a branded beef alliance would be in improving market 
access and securing a buyer for your calves? 
 
Not very good …………………………………………………….Very good 
 1  2  3  4  5   
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6. How good do you think a branded beef alliance would be in securing you a 
premium price for your calves?  
 
Not very good …………………………………………………….Very good 
 1  2  3  4  5   
  
7. Do you think branded beef alliances would be a good method for you to obtain 
information regarding the carcass quality of your calves? 
 
Not very good …………………………………………………….Very good 
 1  2  3  4  5   
 
8. Do you think branded beef alliances are a good method for you to lock in certain 
price for your calves? 
 
Not very good …………………………………………………….Very good 
 1  2  3  4  5   
 
 
Section B 
 
We are now going to show you some descriptions, or “profiles of different branded 
beef programs.  Each description combines different features of a branded program.  
Remember that it is not necessary for you to have been involved in a program to 
answer these questions.   
 
Please Continue to the Next Page 
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Program Features 
 
The following exercise will describe 4 features of branded beef programs.  Please 
read through them carefully.  If you have any questions, just ask.  Once you have 
read through these features you can proceed to the exercise on the next page.   
 
1. Investment: An Investment that you would need to make in order to join a 
branded beef program.   
a. No additional investments are required  
b. Adoption of a specific Feed and Health Protocol  
(Requires that you purchase specific inputs and invest time in the maintenance of 
records in order to prove compliance with a program’s standards) 
c. Capital Expenditures for Farm Improvement:  
(Requires that you invest capital into your current operation, for example, in order 
to improve the corral system currently used, pen size, the water drainage system , 
or other capital improvements)  
d. Record/Certification System 
(Requires that you invest time and increase your knowledge/management skills in 
order to implement a new record keeping system that allows for third party 
verification and the certification of your production) 
 
2. Pricing Method: How price will be determined when your calves are sold to 
backgrounding/finishing feedlots. 
a. Carcass Quality 
(Price for calves is determined based on the quality of the carcass upon processing) 
b. Live Weight 
(Price for your calves is determined at the time you sell them based on their live 
weight) 
c. Live Weight & Carcass Quality 
(An initial payment for your calves is determined at the time you sell them, with a 
final payment being made after processing when the quality of the carcass can be 
determined)  
 
3. Number of Buyers:  The number of buyers that you will have access to 
when selling your calves.   
a. Single Buyer 
(Only one buyer is available for you to sell your calves to) 
b. Small Number of Buyers 
(A limited number of buyers are available for you to sell your calves to) 
c. Large Number of Buyers  
(A large number of buyers are available for you to sell your calves to) 
 
4. Expected Premium: The premium that you expect to receive (above current 
market price) for producing calves with specific attributes.   
a. No Premium 
b. 0-5% 
c. 5-10% 
d. 10-15% 
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We will now show you descriptions of branded beef programs that combine 
different aspects of these features.  Below is an example.  As is shown in the 
example, we will be asking you to score each profile on a scale of 1-12 representing 
how likely you would be to produce calves for a branded program with these 
features.   
 
Example:  
 
The left hand side lists features of the branded program and the right hand side 
describes these features.   
 
Investment Farm Improvement Expenditures 
Pricing Method Live Weight & Carcass Quality 
Number of Buyers  Large Number of Buyers 
Expected Premium 0-5% 
 
Please rate the scenario based on how willing you would be to produce calves for a 
program with these features. 
 
Unlikely to produce……………………………………………..Likely to produce 
 
1 2 3 4 5 6  7 8 9 10 11 12 
 
 
 
 
 
Please score each of the following profiles based on your willingness to produce calves in 
branded beef programs with these features, where 1 = highly unlikely to produce for this 
type of program and 12 = highly likely to produce.  You can refer back to page 3 for 
details of each feature. 
 
PLEASE TRY TO USE THE FULL RANGE OF THE SCALE WHEN SCORING 
THESE PROFILES.     
 
Profile 1 
 
Investment:            Record/Certification System 
Pricing Method:       Live Quality 
Number of Buyers:  Large Number of Buyers 
Expected Premium: 5-10% 
 
Unlikely to produce              Likely to produce 
 
1    2    3    4   5    6    7    8    9    10     11     12    
 
Profile 2 
 
Investment:               Feed & Health Protocol 
Pricing Method:       Carcass Quality 
Number of Buyers:  Small Number of Buyers 
Expected Premium: 5-10% 
 
Unlikely to produce              Likely to produce 
 
1    2    3    4   5    6    7    8    9    10     11     12    
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Profile 3 
 
Investment:            Record/Certification System 
Pricing Method:       Carcass Quality 
Number of Buyers:  Single Buyer 
Expected Premium: 0-5% 
 
Unlikely to produce              Likely to produce 
 
1    2    3    4   5    6    7    8    9    10     11     12    
 
Profile 4 
 
Investment:            Record Certification System 
Pricing Method:       Carcass Quality 
Number of Buyers:  Single Buyer 
Expected Premium: 10-15% 
 
Unlikely to produce              Likely to produce 
 
1    2    3    4   5    6    7    8    9    10     11     12    
 
Profile 5 
 
Investment:               No Additional Investment 
Pricing Method:       Live Weight  
Number of Buyers:  Small Number of Buyers 
Expected Premium: 10-15% 
 
Unlikely to produce              Likely to produce 
 
1    2    3    4   5    6    7    8    9    10     11     12    
 
Profile 6 
 
Investment:    Farm Improvement Expenditures 
Pricing Method:       Live Weight 
Number of Buyers:  Single Buyer 
Expected Premium: No Premium 
 
Unlikely to produce              Likely to produce 
 
1    2    3    4   5    6    7    8    9    10     11     12    
 
Profile 7 
 
Investment:    Farm Improvement Expenditures 
Pricing Method:       Carcass Quality 
Number of Buyers:  Large Number of Buyers 
Expected Premium: 10-15% 
 
 
Unlikely to produce              Likely to produce 
 
1    2    3    4   5    6    7    8    9    10     11     12    
 
Profile 8 
 
Investment:           Record/Certification System 
Pricing Method:   Live Weight & Carcass  
                               Quality 
Number of Buyers:  Small Number of Buyers 
Expected Premium: No Premium 
 
Unlikely to produce              Likely to produce 
 
1    2    3    4   5    6    7    8    9    10     11     12    
 
Profile 9 
 
Investment:    Farm Improvement Expenditures 
Pricing Method:    Live Weight & Carcass                    
                                Quality 
Number of Buyers:  Single Buyer 
Expected Premium: 5-10% 
 
Unlikely to produce              Likely to produce 
 
1    2    3    4   5    6    7    8    9    10     11     12    
 
Profile 10 
 
Investment:               No Additional Investment 
Pricing Method:       Carcass Quality 
Number of Buyers:  Single Buyer 
Expected Premium: 5-10% 
 
 
Unlikely to produce              Likely to produce 
 
1    2    3    4   5    6    7    8    9    10     11     12    
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Profile 11 
 
Investment:               Feed & Health Protocol 
Pricing Method:       Carcass Quality 
Number of Buyers:  Large Number of Buyers 
Expected Premium: No Premium 
 
Unlikely to produce              Likely to produce 
 
1    2    3    4   5    6    7    8    9    10     11     12    
 
Profile 12 
 
Investment:    Farm Improvement Expenditures 
Pricing Method:       Carcass Quality 
Number of Buyers:  Small Number of Buyers 
Expected Premium: 0-5% 
 
Unlikely to produce              Likely to produce 
 
1    2    3    4   5    6    7    8    9    10     11     12    
 
Profile 13 
 
Investment:               No Additional Investment  
Pricing Method:       Live Weight & Carcass  
                                   Quality 
Number of Buyers:  Large Number of Buyers 
Expected Premium: 0-5% 
 
Unlikely to produce              Likely to produce 
 
1    2    3    4   5    6    7    8    9    10     11     12    
 
Profile 14 
 
Investment:              No Additional Investment 
Pricing Method:       Carcass Quality 
Number of Buyers:  Single Buyer 
Expected Premium: No Premium 
 
 
Unlikely to produce              Likely to produce 
 
1    2    3    4   5    6    7    8    9    10     11     12    
 
Profile 15 
 
Investment:               Feed & Health Protocol 
Pricing Method:       Live Weight & Carcass  
                                   Quality  
Number of Buyers:  Single Buyer 
Expected Premium: 10-15% 
 
Unlikely to produce              Likely to produce 
 
1    2    3    4   5    6    7    8    9    10     11     12    
 
Profile 16 
 
Investment:               Feed & Health Protocol 
Pricing Method:       Live Weight 
Number of Buyers:  Single Buyer 
Expected Premium: 0-5% 
 
 
Unlikely to produce              Likely to produce 
 
1    2    3    4   5    6    7    8    9    10     11     12    
 
Profile 17 
 
Investment:               Feed & Health Protocol 
Pricing Method:       Carcass Quality  
Number of Buyers:  Single Buyer 
Expected Premium: No Premium 
 
Unlikely to produce              Likely to produce 
 
1    2    3    4   5    6    7    8    9    10     11     12    
 
Profile 18 
 
Investment:            Record/Certification System 
Pricing Method:       Carcass Quality 
Number of Buyers:  Large Number of Buyers 
Expected Premium: 10-15% 
 
Unlikely to produce              Likely to produce 
 
1    2    3    4   5    6    7    8    9    10     11     12    
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Section C 
The following section of the survey will ask you some questions regarding your 
individual operation.  Please circle the appropriate answer for each question.   
 
9. What percentage of your farm income is derived from cow-calf production?   
a. None 
b. 0-25% 
c. 25-50% 
d. 50-75% 
e. 100% 
 
10. Please circle any other sources of income that are applicable to your 
operation. 
a. Background Cattle Feeding 
b. Finishing Feedlot 
c. Grain Farming 
d. Other Livestock 
e. Other (Please Specify) ______________________________ 
 
11. Are you or have you ever been involved in any sort of branded beef program 
or alliance with other producers or beef industry segments (i.e. feedlots, 
packers, and/or retailers)? 
a. Yes 
b. No 
 
If you answered yes to question #11 please proceed to questions #12 - 
#14.  If you answered no to question #11 please skip to question #15.   
 
12. What type of an alliance are you or were you involved in? (You can choose 
more than one) 
a. Marketing Contract (where price, date, and delivery location are 
specified)  
b. Production Contract (where inputs/production processes, price, and 
buyer rights to inspect are specified)  
c. Brand Licensing Program (e.g. Certified Angus Beef) 
d. Marketing Alliance (e.g. Laura’s Lean Beef) 
e. Producer Cooperative (e.g. Ranchers Renaissance) 
f. Other (Please Specify) ____________________ 
 
13. What proportion of your production (beef) is marketed through the alliance? 
a. 0-25% 
b. 26-50% 
c. 51-75% 
d. 76-99% 
e. 100% 
 
 236
14. What is the name of the alliance you are involved in? (Optional) 
__________________________________________ 
 
 
 
All respondents: please continue and answer all of the questions below.      
 
15. What was your gross farm/corporate revenue last year? 
a. Under $10,000 
b. $10,000 to $24,999 
c. $25,000 to $49,999 
d. $50,000 to $99,999 
e. $100,000 to $249,999 
f. $250,000 to $499,999 
g. $500,000 + 
 
16. How large is your cow-calf operation? (# of cows) 
a. 0-50 head 
b. 50-100 head 
c. 100-150 head 
d. 150-200 head 
e. 200-300 head 
f. 300+ 
 
17. How do you typically sell your calves?  
a. Cash Market (i.e. local auction market) 
b. Order Buyer 
c. Forward Contract 
d. Other (Please Specify) __________________________  
 
18. Please indicate your age.  
a. 18 – 25 
b. 25 – 35 
c. 35 – 45 
d. 45 – 60 
e. 60 + 
 
19. Please indicate the highest level of education obtained (Circle one): 
a. Less than grade 9 
b. Grade 9 to 12 
c. High school graduate 
d. Technical School 
e. College Diploma 
f. Bachelor’s Degree 
g. Master’s Degree 
h. Doctorate Degree 
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20. Please rate each of the following different branded beef products based on 
whether you think consumer demand for each product is High, Medium, or 
Low.  Circle the appropriate answer (High, Medium, or Low)  
 
a. Animal Welfare Friendly  High   Medium Low  
b. Tender     High   Medium Low 
c. Organic & GM Free   High   Medium Low 
d. Natural (no hormones or antibiotics) High   Medium Low 
e. Environmentally Friendly  High   Medium Low 
f. Lean      High   Medium Low 
g. Breed (i.e. Angus, Hereford, etc.)  High   Medium Low 
h. Product Origin (i.e. Alberta Beef)  High   Medium Low 
i. Grass Fed     High   Medium Low 
j. Convenience    High   Medium Low 
 
21. Many branded beef programs require that producers and other participants 
pay membership fees.  These fees are often used to ensure that participants 
are committed to the program and to cover ongoing administration costs.  
Typically these fees come in two different forms. 
1. Lump-sum payments that must be paid to become a member of the 
program.  
AND/OR 
2. A Yearly fee per head of cattle marketed through the program  
 
a. Suppose you joined a branded beef program that required you to pay a one-
time lump sum payment of $15,000 to enter the program and then a $5 yearly 
fee per head for each of the calves that you market through the program.  
What would be the minimum premium (above current market price) that you 
would be willing to accept and still enter the branded beef program:  
a. 0-5% 
b. 5-10% 
c. 10-15% 
d. 15-20% 
 
b. Suppose you joined a branded beef program that required you to pay a one-
time lump sum payment of $2,500 to enter the program and then a $5 yearly 
fee per head for each of the calves that you market through the program.  
What would be the minimum premium (above current market price) that you 
would be willing to accept and still enter the branded beef program:  
a. 0-5% 
b. 5-10% 
c. 10-15% 
d. 15-20% 
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c. Suppose you joined a branded beef program that required you to pay a $5 
yearly fee per head for each of the calves that you market through the 
program.  What would be the minimum premium (above current market 
price) that you would be willing to accept and still enter the branded beef 
program:  
a. 0-5% 
b. 5-10% 
c. 10-15% 
d. 15-20% 
 
22. What are the key factors that have limited your involvement in value chain 
alliances and branded beef programs? 
    
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Do you have any further comments about branded beef programs that you would 
like to share with us?  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Thank you for your participation! 
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APPENDIX B – ALLIANCE SURVEY 
 
 
Re: Supply Chain Coordination in the Beef Industry:  
Assessing the Opportunities and Constraints 
 
Dear Potential Participant:  
 
We are undertaking a research project assessing the role of value chain alliances and 
branded beef programs in the Canadian beef industry.  The objective is to provide 
the industry with a better understanding of the opportunities and challenges 
associated with different branded beef value chain alliances.  The research is funded 
by Canadian Cattlemen’s Association Beef Industry Development Fund and is being 
conducted through the Department of Agricultural Economics at the University of 
Saskatchewan under the supervision of Dr. Jill E. Hobbs. 
 
We would like to interview a representative from your organization.  The interview 
will be used to gather information on how different marketing alliance structures 
have been used to overcome the limitations encountered by producers and other 
supply chain participants (i.e. feedlots, packers, and retailers) in building successful 
value chain alliances.  The interview will build on information we have gathered 
from a survey of producer attitudes towards value chain alliances.  So we are 
interested in finding out how existing value chain alliances have overcome any 
challenges identified in the producer survey.  It will consist of questions about how 
the marketing alliance is organized (i.e. Ownership structures, size who is involved 
and general pricing structure).  We are also interested in finding out whether 
producers are required to follow specific protocols, how quality is monitored, etc. 
 
The information gathered will be used in a case-study comparison of how different 
types of marketing alliances manage the limitations often encountered when 
producing branded beef products.  Given the nature of the study, it may be necessary 
to identify the marketing alliance when presenting the results of the study.  The 
interviews would not require that individuals reveal any personal information, 
private company information, or financial records.  The results of the study may be 
submitted to journals, used in presentations to the academic community and industry 
and used in M.Sc. thesis research. 
 
There are no foreseeable risks to being involved in this project. You must be 18 
years of age or older to participate in the study.  Interviewees can choose not to 
answer specific questions and are also free to withdraw from participating in the 
interview at any time.  If for any reason you wish to withdraw your responses from 
the interview, please contact one of the researchers within seven (7) days of the 
interview.  If you provide notice within this period information obtained during your 
interview will be removed from the study and destroyed.  The results of the survey 
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will be held in the office of Dr. Hobbs at the University of Saskatchewan for at least 
five years after the study is complete.   
 
This research project was reviewed and approved by the University of Saskatchewan 
Advisory Committee on Ethics in Behavioural Research.   
 
If, after you have completed the interview you have any questions or concerns about 
the study or your rights as a participant, you are encouraged to contact one of the 
following:  
 
Dr. Jill E. Hobbs, Associate Professor  (306) 966-2445 
Andrea Brocklebank, M.Sc. Student  (306) 966-4047 
Office of Research Services, University of Saskatchewan  (306) 966-4053 
   
If you would like to be notified of the results of this study please contact Dr. Jill 
Hobbs.   
 
Sincerely,  
 
 
 
Dr. Jill E. Hobbs 
Associate Professor 
Department of Agricultural Economics 
University of Saskatchewan 
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Company _________ 
 
Consent Form 
 
You are invited to participate in a study entitled Supply Chain Coordination in the 
Beef Industry: Assessing the Opportunities and Constraints.  The following is a 
Consent Form that we are required to provide to potential study participants under 
the University of Saskatchewan ethical research guidelines.  Please read this form 
carefully, and feel free to ask any questions that you might have.   
 
Researchers: 
 
 Andrea Brocklebank 
 Masters of Science Student 
 Department of Agricultural Economics, University of Saskatchewan 
 51 Campus Drive 
 Saskatoon, Saskatchewan 
 S7N 5A8 
 Phone: (306) 966-4047 
 Email: amb499@mail.usask.ca 
  
 Dr. Jill Hobbs 
 Associate Professor 
 Department of Agricultural Economics, University of Saskatchewan 
 Phone: (306) 966-2445 
 Email: jill.hobbs@usask.ca 
 
Purpose and Procedure: 
 
The purpose of this study is to examine the opportunities and constraints 
faced by the Canadian beef industry in developing branded beef programs 
and improving supply chain coordination within the industry.  
 
The study will provide the beef industry with a better understanding of the 
opportunities and challenges associated with different types of branded beef 
value chain alliances.  This includes comparing different types of marketing 
alliances in order to better understand how these arrangements encourage 
participation by producers and enable the development of successful value 
chain alliances for producing branded beef.   
 
This research project is being funded by the beef industry though the 
Canadian Cattlemen’s Association.  The project is composed of two stages.  
We have already surveyed cow-calf producers to understand their 
experiences with and perspectives on participating in branded beef programs 
and marketing alliances. In the second stage we are looking to interview 
representatives from different marketing alliances that currently exist in the 
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industry in both the U.S. and Canada in order to build a picture of how 
different marketing alliance structures have been used to overcome any 
perceived barriers to participation by producers and others in the supply 
chain. 
 
We anticipate that the interview will last approximately one hour.  The 
interview will be conducted in person by Andrea Brocklebank, M.Sc. 
candidate.   
 
Potential Risks: 
 
 There are no known risks to the participant by participating in this study.   
 
Potential Benefits: 
 
The participant may benefit from the interview process because it may help 
him or her think more critically about the structure of their marketing 
alliance/branded beef program and other programs currently operating within 
the industry.  The beef industry should benefit from the results of this 
research by helping industry participants to better understand the 
opportunities and constraints associated with operating different types of 
marketing alliances.    
 
Storage of Data: 
 
The information collected in the personal interviews will be recorded on 
interview forms.  Andrea Brocklebank and Dr. Jill Hobbs will keep these 
forms, as well as an electronic version of the data that they contain.  The 
interview forms will be retained in the campus office of Dr. Jill Hobbs for a 
period of at least five years after the completion of the study.  In addition, the 
responses will be stored electronically by Dr. Jill Hobbs (this is required by 
University of Saskatchewan regulations).     
 
Confidentiality: 
 
Andrea Brocklebank will use the findings of the research to write her thesis 
in order to complete the requirements of a M.Sc. in Agricultural Economics.  
The results will also be used to prepare a report for the Beef Industry 
Development Fund a division of the Canadian Cattlemen’s Association.  
Both documents will be publicly available upon their completion.  The 
findings may take the form of conference presentations or condensed 
research reports and papers that will be publicly available.  Interview 
participants can also receive condensed versions of the research findings if 
they choose.   
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Given the nature of the interviews, information identifying the name of the 
branded beef program/marketing alliance will be recorded as part of the 
interview.  We will not be asking for any financially sensitive information as 
part of the interview process.  Instead we are interested in gaining a better 
understanding of your experience with a branded beef program or value 
chain alliance, how your organization overcame any barriers in establishing 
the program and what your views are for the future of these types of 
programs to assist in growing the beef industry.   
 
Right to Withdraw: 
  
You may withdraw from the study for any reason, at any time, without 
penalty of any sort.  If you withdraw from the study at any time, any data or 
information that you have contributed will be destroyed. 
 
Questions:  
 
If you have any questions concerning the study, please feel free to ask at any 
point; you are also free to contact the researchers at the phone numbers or 
email addresses provided above if you have questions at a later time.  This 
study has been approved on ethical grounds by the University of 
Saskatchewan Behavioural Sciences Research Ethics Board.  Any questions 
regarding your rights as a participant may be addressed to that committee 
through the Office of Research Services (306) 966-2084.  Out of town 
participants may call collect.  You can find out about the results of the study 
by requesting a copy of the results, or by contacting the researchers at any 
time.  We welcome your involvement in the research process.     
 
Consent to Participate: 
 
I have read and understood the description provided above; I have been 
provided with an opportunity to ask questions and my questions have been 
answered satisfactorily.  I consent to participate in the study described 
above, understanding that I may withdraw this consent at any time.  A copy 
of this consent form has been given to me for my records.  
 
 
___________________________________   __________________ 
Signature of Participant      Date 
 
 
___________________________________ 
Signature of Researcher 
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Request for a Copy of the Results of the Study? 
 
Would you like to be sent a copy of a condensed final report with the 
findings and analysis of this research?     
 
Please indicate your wishes by ticking yes or no: 
 
Yes ________  No ________ 
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Data/Transcript Release 
 
I, ________________________________, have reviewed the complete transcript of 
my personal interview in this study, and have been provided with the opportunity to 
add, alter, and delete information from the transcript as appropriate.  I acknowledge 
that the transcript accurately reflects what I said in my personal interview with 
___________________________.  I hereby authorize the release of this transcript to 
_______________________ to be used in the manner described in the consent form.  
I have received a copy of this Data/Transcript Release Form for my own records.   
 
 
______________________________________  __________________ 
Signature of Participant      Date  
 
 
______________________________________  __________________ 
Signature of Researcher      Date 
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University of Saskatchewan 
Department of Agricultural Economics 
 
CONFIDENTIAL        
 
Company  ________________ 
Contact ________________ 
Location ________________ 
Date   ________________ 
Time     ________________ 
 
 
The following interview questions are about marketing alliances and branded beef 
programs.  They focus on the ownership structure of different marketing alliances, 
organizational characteristics, program requirements, program pricing methods, and 
market access issues.     
   
1. Organizational Characteristics 
 
a. What is the name of the branded beef program(s)/marketing 
alliance(s) your company is currently involved in? What products are 
currently being produced?  
 
____________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________________ 
b. What is the focus of the program? What are the attributes being 
provided (branded) under the program? (E.g. organic, breed, etc.) 
 
____________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________________ 
c. How long has the program been in existence? How long has your 
company been involved in the program?  
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____________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________________ 
d. Who initially established the program? Were there any significant 
challenges to be overcome? How were they overcome?  
 
____________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________________ 
e. What is the size of the existing program in terms of the number of 
cattle processed through the program each year? In terms of sales? 
 
____________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________________ 
f. How important is the branded beef program to your company? (In 
terms of % of company sales or some other measure)  Is all the beef 
from the animals that qualify for the program marketed through the 
program, or do some cuts still get marketed through traditional (non-
branded) channels?  Has the sale of lower quality cattle/cuts been an 
issue? How has this been handled? 
 
____________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________________ 
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g. What type of growth do you project over the next several years for 
your program? Do you foresee any significant changes in the focus of 
the program?  
 
____________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________________ 
2. Structure/Ownership of the company/program 
 
a. How is the program structured? For example is it run through a 
cooperative, a marketing alliance, contracts, or some other method? 
 
____________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________________ 
b. What supply chain members are involved in the program and how are 
they linked together (e.g. cow-calf producers, feedlots, packers, 
distributors, retailers)? Which are the links that are crucial to 
providing the branded attributes you are marketing? 
 
____________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________________
___________________________________________________________________ 
c. In aligning with other members of the supply chain what is your 
major priority? (E.g. to ensure ongoing supplies, access to specific 
qualities of animals, easier monitoring of quality….etc?) 
 
____________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________________
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____________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________________ 
d. Who are your major customers (supermarkets, restaurants, specialty 
stores)? How were these connections developed?  Have there been 
any challenges in dealing with certain types of end-users as opposed 
to other types of end-users? 
 
____________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________________ 
e. What are some of the main issues that have to be dealt with in 
developing downstream markets for branded beef programs? How 
have the requirements of your downstream customers affected how 
you interact with upstream suppliers, e.g. in terms of sharing risks, 
program requirements, etc.?   
 
____________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________________ 
3. What is required of producers in order to participate in your program? 
 
a. In terms of investments, changes in practices, by producers 
i. Feed/Health Protocol 
ii. Record/Certification System 
iii. Capital Expenditures 
iv. Other program specific investments 
 
____________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________________ 
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b. In terms of commitment 
i. What level of commitment do you require from 
producers/feedlots that participate in your program? (Length 
of time, Number of cattle) 
ii. How do you ensure a certain level of commitment? 
1. Equity Investment 
2. Contractual Obligations 
 
____________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________________ 
c. Have you been involved in any previous programs that failed to get 
enough participation by producers or other supply chain members? 
What were the main reasons this occurred? 
 
____________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________________
___________________________________________________________________ 
d. In the current program, have any of the existing or previous program 
requirements limited producer participation? If so what has been done 
to overcome these limitations?  
 
____________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________________ 
4. Payment/Reward System 
a. How are producers and feedlots paid through the program? 
i. Grid Pricing System 
ii. Live Weight Pricing 
iii. Other 
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b. What are the key components of the pricing system if a grid pricing 
system is used? (Check current use of institutions both for grading 
and for other attributes)  
 
____________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________________ 
c. Previous analysis of branded beef programs has indicated that 
producers were not as willing to participate in programs that used 
carcass quality grid-based pricing systems? (Transfer of risk) Have 
you found this to be a problem under your program?  How has your 
grid been designed to ensure that there is still incentive for producers 
to enter into the program? 
 
____________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________________ 
d. Based on previous years, what kind of premium can producers expect 
when participating in your program?  
 
____________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________________ 
e. Are there other program incentives that seem to encourage producer 
participation in the program – market access, quality information, 
etc?   
 
____________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________________
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____________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________________ 
5. Market Access 
a. As program requirements become increasingly detailed and specific 
in nature the market available for producers to sell their product (at a 
premium) tends to decrease and they are increasingly dependent on 
only a few buyers or a single buyer.  This sometimes discourages 
producers from participating in a program.  What have you done to 
assure producers that they will have ongoing market access under the 
program and encourage their commitment to the program? 
 
____________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________________ 
6.    Future Directions 
a. Are there any current limitations/barriers that the program is facing, 
which have limited its growth?  What has been done to overcome 
these limitations? 
 
____________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________________ 
b. In addition to premium prices are there other less obvious benefits 
that can be obtained from increased coordination and involvement in 
a branded beef program? For whom? 
____________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________________ 
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7. Industry concerns  
a. With the occurrence of BSE what changes do expect with respect to 
marketing alliances both in general and more specifically the program 
you are involved in? 
____________________________________________________________________ 
 
____________________________________________________________________ 
 
____________________________________________________________________ 
 
____________________________________________________________________ 
 
b. What would be the value of a standardized tagging/tracking system 
such as the CCIA to your program and alliances in general?   
 
____________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________________
___________________________________________________________________ 
 
 
 
 
 
